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ABSTRACT  
 
Two-sided online platforms are typically plagued by hidden information (adverse 
selection) and hidden actions (moral hazard), limiting market efficiency. Under the 
context of the increasingly popular online labor contracting platforms, this dissertation 
investigates whether and how IT-enabled monitoring systems can mitigate moral hazard 
and reshape the labor demand and supply by providing detailed information about 
workers’ effort. In the first chapter, I propose and demonstrate that monitoring records 
can substitute for reputation signals such that they attract more qualified inexperienced 
workers to enter the marketplace. Specifically, only the effort-related reputation 
information is substituted by monitoring but the capability-related reputation information. 
In line with this, monitoring can lower the entry barrier for inexperienced workers on 
platforms. In the second chapter, I investigate if there is home bias for local workers 
when employers make the hiring decisions. I further show the existence of home bias 
from employers and it is primarily driven by statistical inference instead of personal 
“taste”. In the last chapter, I examine if females tend to have a stronger avoidance of 
monitoring than males. With the combination of the observational data and experimental 
data, I find that there is a gender difference in avoidance of monitoring and the 
introduction of the monitoring system increases the gender wage gap due to genders 
differences in such willingness-to-pay for the avoidance of monitoring. These three 
studies jointly contribute to the literature on the online platforms, gig economy and 
agency theory by elucidating the critical role of IT-enabled monitoring. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The “Gig” economy is thriving today with short-term jobs increasingly replacing 
traditional long-term jobs. Despite the great success of Gig economy in recent years, it is 
characterized by information asymmetries, including ex ante hidden information of 
workers and ex post hidden actions by workers, which undermine the efficiency of hiring 
outcomes. To mitigate information asymmetry, online monitoring, an IT-enabled 
technology, has gained popularity among online platforms. Specifically, with online 
monitoring, employers can observe workers’ ex post actions through screenshots and 
webcams. While several studies have examined the impact of monitoring systems on 
workers’ performance in offline contexts, few studies have considered the role of 
monitoring, particularly its potential interactions with other proxies of signals (e.g., 
reputation, nationality, and gender), which have important implications for competition 
and market efficiency in online employment. In my dissertation, I attempt to address the 
following three research questions: 
1) Does monitoring substitute for reputation signals? If so, what type of reputation 
information is substituted by monitoring? Does monitoring lower the entry barrier for 
inexperienced workers? 
2) What are the underlying mechanisms for home bias in online employment? Does 
home bias decrease with the introduction of monitoring? 
3) Do females have a higher willingness-to-pay for the avoidance of monitoring than 
males do? Does monitoring increase the gender wage gap due to the gender difference in 
avoidance of monitoring? 
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I study these problems in three essays. Each of these essays deals with one of the 
major problems of the market: entry barrier, home bias and gender wage gap, with each 
piece contributing a different perspective to understand the impact of IT artifacts on the 
future of work.  
My first essay investigates whether the introduction of an IT-enabled monitoring 
system mitigates moral hazard in online platforms by providing direct information on 
workers’ effort. Our identification hinges on a quasi-natural experiment at Freelancer 
when the platform introduced an IT-enabled monitoring system for time-based projects 
but not for fixed-price projects. I find that IT-enabled monitoring systems can alleviate 
moral hazard, reduce the effect of effort-related reputation, and intensify supply-side 
competition.  
My second essay studies the nature of home bias in online employment, wherein 
employers prefer workers hailing from the same home countries. Using a unique large-
scale dataset from a major online labor market containing employers’ consideration sets 
of workers and their ultimate selection of workers, I first empirically demonstrate that 
employers do exhibit home bias in their hiring decisions. Then, I use a quasi-natural 
experiment to examine the extent of statistical and taste-based home bias, respectively.  
My third essay explores whether there exists a gender wage gap in the gig economy 
and examines to what extent the gap could be accounted for by gender differences in job 
application strategies. I find that females only earn around 81.4% of the hourly wage of 
their male counterparts. I further show that the gender wage gap can be largely explained 
by gender differences in job application strategies, including bid timing, job selection, 
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and avoidance of monitoring. Overall, this study suggests the important role of job 
application strategies in the persistent gender wage gap. 
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CHAPTER 1 
IT-ENABLED MONITORING AND LABOR CONTRACTING IN ONLINE 
PLATFORMS:  EVIDENCE FROM A QUASI-NATURAL EXPERIMENT 
 
Situated in the context of the increasingly popular online platforms for labor 
contracting (herein referred to as “online labor markets”) where market efficiency is 
limited by information asymmetry, this paper investigates whether IT-enabled monitoring 
systems can mitigate moral hazard by providing detailed information about workers’ 
efforts. Our identification hinges on a quasi-natural experiment at Freelancer, following 
the introduction of a monitoring system for time-based projects but not for fixed-price 
projects in February 2014. Based on a unique dataset comprising 5,383 fixed-price 
projects and 3,099 time-based projects matched on observable characteristics, we employ 
a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to identify the effect of the monitoring system 
on outcomes on both the demand side (i.e., employers’ worker choices) and the supply 
side (i.e., workers’ entry decisions). To that end, we decompose workers’ reputations into 
two parts: effort-related and capability-related reputations. We observe that the 
introduction of the monitoring system decreases employer preference for bidders with 
high effort-related reputations for time-based projects, thus lowering the entry barrier for 
workers who have not yet established reputations. However, there is no significant 
change in employer preference for bidders with high capability-related reputations. 
Further, the introduction of the monitoring system increases the number of bids on time-
based projects by 24.7% (primarily from bidders with no prior experience on the 
platform). Our results demonstrate a partial substitution relationship between reputation 
  5 
systems and monitoring systems, and further suggest that IT-enabled monitoring systems 
have a significant effect on alleviating moral hazard, reducing agency costs, and 
intensifying supply-side platform competition. 
 
Keywords: online labor market, moral hazard, monitoring systems, reputation systems, 
entry barrier 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Platform-based businesses are thriving in today’s economy (Anderson et al. 2013; 
Parker et al. 2016; Eisenmann et al. 2006, 2011; Van Alstyne et al. 2016). Numerous new 
business models have been developed based on the platform paradigm, ranging from 
platforms that enable transactions of physical products (e.g., eBay, Taobao, Amazon), to 
ride sharing (e.g., Uber, Lyft) and short-term lodging (e.g, AirBnB, CouchSurfing). 
Online labor markets—two-sided platforms that connect employers with freelance 
workers—are at the forefront of this phenomenon. Over the past decade, online labor 
markets have experienced tremendous growth. As a prominent example, as of August 
2018, about 29 million registered users have either posted (employers) or bid on 
(workers) millions of projects at Freelancer,1 one of the major online labor markets.   
Despite tremendous growth, online labor markets are plagued by two forms of 
information asymmetry—hidden information and hidden action—which can lead to 
significant agency problems. Hidden information refers to workers possessing ex ante 
private information about their capabilities and skills (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005; 
Horton 2017), which makes it difficult for employers to evaluate workers (Eisenhardt 
1989). In such scenarios, employers tend to make contract decisions based on their 
beliefs about the distribution of capabilities and skills, which so-called adverse selection 
problems (Akerlo 1978; Hart and Holmstrom 1987; Greenwald 1986). In contrast, hidden 
action relates to ex post information asymmetry regarding workers’ actual actions, such 
as the amount of time and effort spent on projects. Due to ex post information 
                                                 
1 https://www.freelancer.com/community/articles/20-million-users-things-that-made-this-milestone-
remarkable-for-freelancer-com 
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asymmetry, moral hazard occurs, when workers opportunistically misrepresent their 
effort levels to maximize their own utility, to the detriment of employers after the 
initiation of the contract (Pauly 1974; Holmstrom 1979,1982; Eisenhardt 1989).  
To mitigate information asymmetry and both types of agency problems, a strategy 
commonly employed by employers is contract design. In general, two contract forms are 
available in online labor markets: time-based contracts and fixed-price contracts. For 
time-based contracts, compensation is based on the hourly wage set in the contract and 
the number of hours the worker has spent on the contracted project (Mani et al. 2012). 
While time-based contracts provide stronger incentives for high-quality project outcomes 
and a higher flexibility in renegotiation (Dey et al. 2010; Mani et al. 2012), they are more 
susceptible to moral hazard because workers’ compensation is not directly linked to the 
project outcome (Dey et al. 2010; Mani et al. 2012). Specifically, when there is a low 
probability that shirking will be noticed (monitoring efficiency), workers tend to 
overreport their work hours (also known as hours-padding). In fixed-price contracts, 
workers’ compensation is dependent on the outcome of a project, such that the worker 
receives payment only when the project has been completed (Mani et al. 2012). 
Therefore, fixed-price contracts provide enough incentive for workers to complete 
projects, suggesting a lower moral hazard risk in terms of cost-padding. However, fixed-
price contracts can involve corner-cutting behavior, higher ex ante costs of contract 
design (Susarla et al. 2009), and higher ex post costs of maladaptation and renegotiation 
(Benaroch et al. 2016). The trade-off between two types of contracts is also referred as 
the “make-or-buy” decision in the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) literature (e.g., 
Coase 1937; Williamson 1981; Walker and Weber 1984; Bajari and Tadelis 2001). The 
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decision of contract forms is mostly dependent on employers’ sensitivity to quality, task 
complexity, and uncertainty (Dey et al. 2010; Bajari and Tadelis 2001). Taken together, 
both time-based contracts and fixed-price contracts are limited in their efficacy for fully 
resolving information asymmetry in online labor markets. 
To further help to alleviate agency problems, major online platforms have developed 
reputation systems and online monitoring systems, both of which are IT systems designed 
to reduce information asymmetry. First, reputation systems mitigate information 
asymmetry problems using positive externality derived from information sharing among 
users (e.g., Dellarocas 2006; Moreno and Terwiesch 2014). Specifically, reputation 
systems allow employers to share their experiences about workers, which help other 
employers screen for capable and diligent workers who are willing to expend 
commensurate effort for projects, thus mitigating both adverse selection and moral 
hazard. For one thing, reputation information regarding workers’ capabilities (here 
referred as “capability-related reputation”) lowers the likelihood that workers would 
misrepresent their capabilities to win contracts, which helps to alleviate adverse-selection 
problems. For another, reputation information reflecting workers’ effort in previous 
projects (here referred as “effort-related reputation”) serves as a sanctioning device that 
deters worker shirking behavior even if employers cannot observe workers’ actual effort 
(Banker and Hwang 2008)—thus lowering the moral hazard risk. Taking reputation 
ratings as effective signals, employers use their beliefs about the capabilities and effort of 
workers to differentiate them. As a result, workers with high capability-related and effort-
related reputations enjoy higher winning probabilities and price premiums (Ba and 
Pavlou 2002; Moreno and Terwiesch 2014). One unintended consequence of reputation 
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systems, however, is that they create an entry barrier for qualified workers who have not 
yet established their reputations on a particular platform—known as the cold-start 
problem (Pallais 2014).   
Second, IT-enabled monitoring systems, which have become increasingly popular 
among online platforms (Aron et al. 2007; Agrawal et al. 2014), serve as an effective 
means for employers to obtain detailed information on the actions of workers, thus 
mitigating moral hazard by addressing the hidden action issue (Bolton and Dewatripont 
2005). The effectiveness of monitoring for increasing workers’ effort and thus leading to 
better performance has been shown in multiple offline employment contexts, such as the 
trucking industry (Hubbard 2000), schools (Duflo et al. 2012), restaurants (Pierce et al. 
2015), and hospitals (Staats et al. 2016). On online platforms where work is typically 
done remotely with the use of a suite of IT-enabled monitoring technologies, employers 
can observe workers’ progress through screenshots, webcams, and even keystroke 
recordings from automatically archived log files, which offer firsthand information about 
workers’ effort and can help alleviate employers’ concerns about moral hazard among 
workers. However, these log files and tracked work hours are produced only after the 
contract is written; therefore, they are not useful for precontractual screening of worker 
capabilities and cannot alleviate the hidden information problem. In summary, 
monitoring is more effective for mitigating hidden action than for alleviating hidden 
information.  
While a significant amount of research effort has been devoted to the design, 
evaluation, and optimization of reputation systems (Banker and Hwang 2008; Bockstedt 
and Goh 2011; Dellarocas 2006; Yoganarasimhan 2013) and the effectiveness of 
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monitoring systems in mitigating moral hazard problems in offline settings (Drago 1991; 
Duflo et al. 2012; Hubbard 2000; Pierce et al. 2015), the effect of monitoring systems and 
reputation systems are usually investigated separately, without considering how they can 
jointly mitigate hidden action problems or whether they can serve as substitutes for or 
complements to each other (Demiroglu and James 2010; Diamond 1991). Therefore, a 
key research gap in the literature involves disentangling the roles of monitoring systems 
and reputation systems in addressing hidden action and hidden information problems. In 
particular, it is also important to theoretically and empirically differentiate the interaction 
between monitoring and capability-related reputation, versus the interaction between 
monitoring and effort-related reputation. To fill this research gap, we extend extant work, 
such as Lin et al.’s (2016), by isolating the moderating effect of the monitoring system, 
from that of contract type, on the effectiveness of reputation. Moreover, while there is a 
strand of literature investigating the complementarities between information technology 
(IT) and organizational practices (e.g., performance pay, human resource analytics 
practices, human capital) (Aral et al. 2012; Tambe and Hitt 2012; Brynjolfsson and 
Milgrom 2013), our study is distinct in that we focus on the effect of an important IT 
artifact on employers’ hiring decisions and workers’ bidding behaviors instead of 
focusing on the productivity of a relatively stable cohort of workers. The differences 
between our paper and these two related prior studies (i.e., Lin et al. 2016; Aral et al. 
2012) are summarized in our theoretical supplement. Last but not least, given that 
monitoring systems may reduce employers’ reliance on reputation for deterring moral 
hazard, an immediate follow-up question is whether monitoring systems can help to 
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alleviate the cold-start problem (Pallais 2014), the unintended drawback of reputation 
systems. Specifically, we attempt to address the following two research questions:  
• How does IT-enabled monitoring moderate the effect of worker reputation on 
employer contracting decisions? Does the moderation effect vary for effort-related 
versus capability-related reputation?   
• How does IT-enabled monitoring influence entry decisions by workers? Does it affect 
less experienced workers differently than more experienced workers?   
To answer the above research questions, our analyses leverage a quasi-natural 
experiment on Freelancer, when the platform first introduced an IT-enabled monitoring 
system on February 5, 2014. This quasi-natural experiment offers an appropriate research 
design for identifying the effects of IT-enabled monitoring systems in online labor 
markets. Our econometric identification hinges on the fact that monitoring was 
implemented for time-based projects, but not for fixed-price projects, which allows us to 
use time-based projects as the treatment group and fixed-price projects as the control 
group. Using a dataset from Freelancer.com, one of the leading online labor markets, we 
first performed propensity score matching (and also coarsened exact matching) to match 
fixed-price projects to time-based projects. The resulting matched sample of 5,383 fixed-
price projects and 3,099 time-based projects are comparable in terms of any observable 
characteristic. We then use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to identify the 
treatment effect of the introduction of the monitoring system on employers’ worker 
choices and on worker entry decisions. Our analyses suggest that after the introduction of 
the IT-enabled monitoring system, employers place less weight on workers’ effort-related 
reputation information, but not on capability-related reputation information. Further, 
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using fixed-price projects as the baseline, the introduction of the monitoring system 
increases the number of bid entries in time-based projects by an average of 24.7%, 
primarily from bidders with no prior experience on the platform.  
Our study contributes to the literature on IT-enabled monitoring on three fronts. First, 
most prior studies have extensively focused on the effect of monitoring on worker 
performance in offline contexts (e.g., Pierce et al. 2015; Staats et al. 2016; Ranganathan 
and Benson 2017), whereas this study focuses on the impact of an IT-enabled monitoring 
artifact on both demand-side (employer) preferences and supply-side (worker) entry 
barriers on online platforms. Second, our study advances prior literature on the 
interrelationship between monitoring systems and reputation systems for online platforms 
(Bakos and Dellarocas 2011; Lin et al. 2016) by showing that the introduction of 
monitoring systems reduces employers’ preference for workers with high effort-related 
reputations, but does not affect preference for workers with high capability-related 
reputations. Building on recent work suggesting that the effect of reputation is less 
significant for time-based projects than for fixed-price projects (Lin et al. 2016), our 
study’s setting allows us to identify the causal effect of implementing the monitoring 
system on both the supply and demand sides of an online labor market, and also allows us 
to disentangle effort-related reputation from capability-related reputation. Third, our 
study shows that the introduction of an IT-enabled monitoring system can lower the entry 
barrier for inexperienced workers, by reducing the need for the ex ante screening of 
effort-related reputation.   
Table 1. A Summarization of the Significant Differences between Our Study and 
Highly-Related Prior Studies 
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Criterion 
Lin et 
al. 
(2016) 
Aral et 
al. 
(2012) 
The 
present 
study 
Specific differences and contributions 
The impact of the 
IT-enabled 
monitoring system 
on hiring 
decisions 
X X ✓ 
This paper leverages a quasi-natural experiment for 
the causal identification of the introduction of the IT-
enabled monitoring system on employers’ hiring 
decision. 
 
In the research context of Lin et al. (2016), time-
based projects always come with monitoring 
systems. Due to the lack of variation in the presence 
of monitoring systems, the authors are not able to 
isolate whether the reduced effectiveness of 
reputation is coming from the monitoring system or 
time-based projects 
 
Aral et al. (2012) focuses on the impact of human 
capital management (HCM) software adoption on the 
output (or productivity) instead of hiring decisions.  
 
This is also in line with the difference between online 
labor platforms and offline organizations. A unique 
advantage of online labor platforms is to help to 
increase the efficiency of the matching between 
employers and workers, especially for short-term 
contracts. As such, we underscore the impact of 
monitoring on employers’ hiring decisions. On 
contrary, labor contracts in offline organizations are 
usually long-term and the workforce is relatively 
stable. Aral et al. (2012) mainly investigate how 
incentive plans and the adoption of human capital 
management (HCM) software influence the 
productivity of the relatively stable cohort of 
workers.  
The impact of the 
IT-enabled 
monitoring system 
on entry barrier 
X X ✓ 
Hinging on a quasi-natural experiment, this paper 
theoretically proposes and empirically evaluates an 
important unintended benefit of monitoring systems: 
lowering the entry barrier for inexperienced workers. 
The interaction 
between the IT-
enabled 
monitoring system 
and reputation 
system 
 
X X ✓ 
This paper is the first to empirically investigate the 
interaction between the IT-enabled monitoring 
system and the reputation system. 
The effect of 
reputation on 
hiring decisions in 
two contract 
forms  
 
✓ X ✓ 
Similar to Lin et al. (2016), we also consider the 
effect of reputation on hiring decisions in both time-
based and fixed-price contracts. 
The differential 
effect of different 
dimensions of 
X X ✓ 
This paper extends Lin et al. (2016) by considering 
both the capability-related and effort-related 
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reputation on 
hiring decisions 
reputation, and separating their effects on alleviating 
hidden information and hidden action. 
The impact of the 
IT-enabled 
monitoring system 
on productivity 
X ✓ ✓ 
Aral et al. (2012) suggests that the three-way 
complementarities among information technology 
(IT), performance pay, and human resource analytics 
practices have a positive impact on the output (or 
productivity) of hired workers.  
 
This paper focuses on the impact of the IT-enabled 
monitoring system, a prime example of IT artifacts, 
on employers’ hiring decisions and workers’ entry 
decisions. Our additional analyses in Appendix C 
further explores the impact of the IT-enabled 
monitoring system on various measures of project 
outcomes. 
 
1.2. Research Context and Hypotheses 
1.2.1. Research Context 
The research context of this study, online labor markets, is a web-based two-sided 
platform that facilitates contracting labor services around the world (Chan and Wang 
2017; Lin et al. 2016; Horton and Golden 2015). In recent years, online labor markets 
have grown significantly. It is reported that 25 percent of jobs in the U.S. are outsourced 
offshore (Blinder and Kruger 2013), with a substantial portion delegated through online 
labor markets.2 Because of spatial and temporal separations between employers and 
workers, workers’ capabilities are difficult to observe and their actual effort is difficult to 
monitor. Therefore, information asymmetry is prevalent on these platforms (Hong and 
Pavlou 2017), making the agency problem and its mitigation major research topics in the 
literature on online labor markets. Our research context has two notable characteristics 
regarding its platform design and composition of participants: (1) The reputation system 
                                                 
2 http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2014/10/21/the-next-big-thing-in-e-commerce-online-labor-
marketplaces  
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used by our platform has been in place since the inception of the platform, whereas the 
IT-enabled monitoring system was implemented years later. Moreover, during our 
observation period, the reputation system presented multidimensional ratings of workers, 
provided by previous employers (if any). The variation in the presence of the monitoring 
system enables us to identify the potential interactions between the monitoring system 
and two distinct dimensions of reputation: capability and effort. (2) The platform 
approximates a free-flowing environment, which attracts incoming new workers with no 
prior ratings. This underscores the importance of addressing the cold-start problem facing 
new workers. 
1.2.2. Hypothesis Development 
We propose three hypotheses for this study. First, we propose a nuanced substitution 
effect between monitoring and reputation (H1). Second, we propose that the monitoring 
system attracts more bids (H2a) and lowers entry barriers for inexperienced workers 
(H2b) for time-based projects. To further justify our hypotheses, we also provide a 
stylized analytical model that investigates how increasing monitoring efficiency affects 
the value of effort-related reputation and the height of the entry barrier. This model is for 
illustration purpose and is provided in our theoretical supplement. 
1.2.2.1. Nuanced Relationship between Monitoring and Reputation 
Based on the previous literature, monitoring systems and reputation systems are two 
prevalent mechanisms for alleviating information asymmetry (Table 2). Specifically, 
monitoring systems are mainly found to effectively mitigate moral hazard and hidden 
action in offline employment contexts (Duflo et al. 2012; Hubbard 2000; Pierce et al. 
2015; Ranganathan and Benson 2017; Staats et al. 2016). Meanwhile, reputation systems 
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not only help mitigate moral hazard by deterring shirking behaviors, but they also help 
alleviate adverse selection by enabling precontractual screening. Given the differential 
effects of monitoring systems and reputation systems, instead of exploring the effect of 
general reputation, we segment reputation into two types, according to the specific type 
of information asymmetries that reputation can mitigate: (a) capability-related reputation, 
which helps to alleviate adverse selection (i.e., ex ante information asymmetry); and (b) 
effort-related reputation, which is effective in mitigating moral hazard (i.e., ex post 
information asymmetry). Additionally, we propose a nuanced substitution relationship 
between reputation and monitoring: monitoring can substitute for effort-related reputation 
by alleviating moral hazard, but cannot substitute for capability-related reputation. 
 
Table 2. A Comparison between Reputation and Monitoring in Alleviating Information 
Asymmetry 
Asymmetric 
information  
Hidden information Hidden action 
Reputation systems 
Provide precontractual 
screening in online service 
markets (e.g., Banker and 
Hwang 2008; Tadelis 
1999) 
Deter shirking in online trading 
and service markets (e.g., 
Dellarocas 2006; Bakos and 
Dellarocas 2011) 
Monitoring systems Not applicable 
Mitigate moral hazard in multiple 
offline employment contexts (e.g., 
Duflo et al. 2012; Staats et al. 
2016) 
 
Different dimensions of reputation information tend to play differential roles in 
alleviating adverse selection and moral hazard. Specifically, capability-related reputation, 
or reputation information describing workers’ capabilities (e.g., expertise, skills), serves 
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as an effective quality signal that reflects a worker’s capabilities. Employers will 
generally expect workers with better capability-related reputations to be more capable 
and to achieve better project outcomes. Accordingly, they tend to prefer workers with 
higher capability-related reputations, all else being equal. Meanwhile, reputation 
information based on workers’ effort in completing previous projects—namely, effort-
related reputation—disincentivizes workers from shirking because the potential negative 
feedbacks may be observable to future employers (Tadelis 2016). Therefore, effort-
related reputation holds the potential to alleviate moral hazard.  
The importance of effort-related reputation also depends on whether monitoring 
systems are in place. When monitoring systems are not available, the probability of 
workers’ shirking going unnoticed is relatively high due to a lack of real-time 
information on effort, leading to employers’ high reliance on effort-related reputation. In 
particular, due to the spatial and temporal separation between the workers and the 
employers, manual monitoring through instant audio or video communication tools 
provided by the platform is not cost-effective or practical for employers. Therefore, in 
order to mitigate moral hazard, employers tend to exploit effort-related reputation 
information. Specifically, we expect employers to prefer workers with better effort-
related reputations for the following two reasons: First, effort-related reputations may 
reveal the workers’ “commitment type,” given that the reputation system serves as a 
sanctioning device that, to some extent, locks workers into choosing the “not shirking” 
strategy (Fudenberg and Levine 1989, 1992; Atakan and Ekmekci 2014). Although the 
stability of this strategy may depend on contextual factors, such as the possibility of 
receiving unfair ratings (Dellarocas 2006) and the stage of the workers’ career life cycle 
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(Holmstrom 1999), employers tend to expect that workers with better effort-related 
reputations would be more likely to cooperate and exert sufficient effort to complete their 
projects on time. Second, employers tend to prefer workers with better effort-related 
reputations not only because they expect more effort from them, but also because it can 
lower cost uncertainty due to delay and risk of failure (Mani et al. 2012). As workers with 
better effort-related reputations are expected to be less likely to fall behind on preplanned 
work schedules, or even fail to complete projects, they will be perceived as less likely to 
cause a budget overrun for time-based projects. 
 Introducing an IT-enabled monitoring system allows employers to observe workers’ 
effort more precisely and cost efficiently. In this way, such a monitoring system can 
reduce employers’ reliance on effort-related reputation for deterring workers’ shirking 
behaviors, leading employers to emphasize effort-related reputation less in their hiring 
decisions. First, monitoring efficiency significantly increases with the introduction of an 
IT-enabled monitoring system, which subsequently decreases the probability of workers’ 
shirking going unnoticed. In such cases, workers’ expected payoff from shirking 
decreases remarkably because they get little or no compensation if they are caught 
shirking. Therefore, a higher percentage of workers, including workers with lower effort-
related reputations, will choose to cooperate and expend more effort after the introduction 
of a monitoring system. As such, when monitoring systems are in place, effort-related 
reputations become less informative, because they are less likely to be used to separate 
workers in terms of their commitment types. Second, monitoring systems offer employers 
real-time information about workers’ performance (e.g., offer timely updates of project 
progress, workflow, etc.) and employers can thus terminate the project at the first sign of 
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potential shirking behavior. Therefore, irrespective of the workers’ effort-related 
reputations, employers can reduce cost uncertainty, due to potential delay in progress or 
project failure, by consistently monitoring worker performance, which reduces the 
disparities in expected productivity and cost uncertainty between workers with high 
effort-related reputations and those with low effort-related reputations. 
We also argue that information generated by IT-enabled monitoring systems does not 
effectively alleviate the problem of hidden information. Therefore, monitoring cannot 
substitute for capability-related reputation. First, monitoring is implemented after the 
hiring decision. Therefore, despite a monitoring system in place, employers still need to 
rely on workers’ capability-related reputations to infer worker capabilities in order to 
make informed hiring decisions. In fact, previous research suggests that the signaling 
effect of capability-related reputation exists even when moral hazard problems are 
completely resolved, since adverse selection problems continue to persist (Tadelis 1999). 
Second, the disparities between workers with high capability-related reputations and 
those with low capability-related reputations cannot be reduced by monitoring systems. 
After monitoring systems are implemented, the work quality of low-capability workers 
will still be inferior to that of the high-capability workers, even given the same level of 
effort. Therefore, implementing monitoring systems has little effect on employers’ 
preference for workers with high capability-related reputations, given that monitoring 
cannot effectively mitigate the problem of adverse selection. Therefore, we propose:  
H1: Introduction of an IT-enabled monitoring system leads employers to place less 
emphasis on workers’ effort-related reputations for time-based projects, but not on their 
capability-related reputations. 
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1.2.2.2. Monitoring, Entry Barrier and Worker Competition 
Now we consider the effect of IT-enabled monitoring systems on the worker (supply) 
side. Absent such monitoring systems, employers must rely on reputation information for 
purposes of precontractual screening and moral hazard mitigation. This leads to a 
significant advantage for workers who enter the platform early, as they are able to accrue 
platform-specific work experience and establish a reputation. Specifically, due to ex ante 
information asymmetry, employers tend to mitigate adverse selection issues by inferring 
workers’ actual capabilities based on capability-related reputations. Given the lack of 
capability-related reputation information about inexperienced workers, employers can 
only infer workers’ capabilities based on their beliefs about the distribution of workers’ 
capabilities in a specific market. Thus, employers will tend to prefer workers with high 
capability-related reputations to inexperienced workers, even though some of the latter 
are, in fact, highly capable. Similarly, due to ex post information asymmetry and the lack 
of effort-related reputations for inexperienced workers, employers tend to infer that they 
would expend an average level of effort in the market. As such, employers would tend to 
prefer to hire workers with high effort-related reputations, instead of inexperienced 
workers, because the workers with better reputations invoke less uncertainty about 
“commitment type” and presumably present lower probabilities of budget overrun. As 
employers tend to prefer hiring workers with platform reputations (Pallais 2014), 
inexperienced workers, who have not yet established their reputations for capability and 
effort, are less likely to participate in the market because they are less likely to land 
contracts. Moreover, inexperienced workers will presumably only be considered if they 
propose and accept poorer treatment than reputable workers—namely, less compensation 
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(Friedman and Resnick 2001). Consequently, the high entry barrier created by the 
reputation system discourages inexperienced workers from participating in the market.  
However, the introduction of an IT-enabled monitoring system allows employers to 
observe workers’ effort based on procedural track records, rather than relying solely on 
workers’ effort-related reputations. In particular, by increasing monitoring efficiency, 
monitoring systems deter moral hazard by lowering the probability of shirking going 
unnoticed; thus, workers are incentivized to expend sufficient effort and disincentivized 
from padding hours, delaying progress or even failing to complete projects. Thus, the 
introduction of the monitoring system increases the expected market-average effort 
level—which is also equivalent to the expected effort level of inexperienced workers—
and thus decreases the disparities in expected effort level between workers with high 
effort-related reputations and inexperienced workers. Therefore, although the entry 
barrier due to capability-related reputation is not affected by the introduction of the 
monitoring system, the entry barrier due to accumulated effort-related reputation 
decreases (Demiroglu and James 2010) in time-based contracts, relative to fixed-price 
contracts. Because of the decreased entry barrier into time-based projects with IT-enabled 
monitoring, more workers will be likely to bid for time-based contracts when monitoring 
is in place. Specifically, we expect that the lower entry barrier in time-based projects will 
disproportionately attract more bids from workers who are qualified but have not yet 
established their effort-related reputations. Bearing the above in mind, we propose: 
H2a: Introduction of an IT-enabled monitoring system leads more bidders to bid for time-
based projects.  
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H2b: Introduction of an IT-enabled monitoring system leads to a higher percentage of 
workers with no platform experience bidding for time-based projects.  
1.3. Data 
1.3.1. Data Source 
We obtained our data from www.freelancer.com (Freelancer), one of the largest 
online labor market platforms. At Freelancer, an employer can post a project with a 
description, estimated budget, and required skills. The employer can choose between two 
contract types: fixed price contract (Figure 1-a) for which the employer provides the 
estimated budget for the entire project; or time-based contract (Figure 1-b) for which the 
employer provides the estimated hourly budget for the project in dollars per hour.   
 
Figure 1. Screenshots of Web Pages for a Fixed-Price versus a Time-Based Project 
Typically, a project is open for bidding for one week and any worker is interested in 
the project can bid on it. For fixed-price projects, each bidder (worker) submits a bid 
amount for the entire project, whereas for time-based projects, each bidder submits a bid 
in terms of hourly rate. At the end of the bidding period, the employer reviews bidders’ 
information, including bid amount, former employer ratings, and past project experience. 
Additionally, sorting tools are available to enable the employer to sort bidders according 
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to their reputations. Once the employer finds a bidder who best satisfies his or her 
requirements, the employer can award that worker a contract. 
1.3.2. Sample and Variables 
We obtained a unique archival dataset from Freelancer that includes detailed project 
information and worker information from September 1, 2013 to August 31, 2014. 
Following Lin et al. (2016), we construct a matched sample from fixed-price projects for 
time-based projects. To construct the matched sample, we consider contingent factors 
that previous studies suggest are associated with contract decisions (Dey et al. 2010; 
Bajari and Tadelis 2001). Specifically, we limited our sample to awarded projects 
reflecting realistic labor demand without the contamination of resubmitted projects. 
Further, to reduce possible selection bias and the association between various 
pretreatment covariates and contract choices, we matched fixed-price and time-based 
projects (Abadie 2005; Ho et al. 2007) based on distributions of important covariates 
suggested by the previous literature (details reported in Table 6) using Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM). Our final sample includes 5,383 fixed-price projects and 3,099 time-
based projects. The dataset includes the following attributes: (1) project-level information 
(e.g., project description, project budget, contract type, number of bidders, average bid 
price); (2) worker-level information (e.g., ratings, the amount of reviews); (3) bid-level 
information (e.g., bid price). The descriptive statistics of the aforementioned dataset 
variables are shown in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5, respectively. 
 
Table 3. Definitions and Summary Statistics of Project-Level Variables 
Variable  Variable definition Mean SD Min Max 
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Budget_min 
The minimum of project budget 
set by the employer 
45.17 117.46 0.00 1965.00 
Budget_max 
The maximum of project budget 
set by the employer 
127.81 212.22 0.00 3000.00 
Bid_min 
The minimum of bid prices for 
each project 
56.92 122.94 2.00 1965.00 
Bid_max3 
The maximum of bid prices for 
each project 
200.26 562.43 2.00 22272.00 
Time-based 
A dummy variable; =1 if the 
project is a time-based project; 
=0 if the project is a fixed-price 
project 
0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Bid_count 
Total number of bids received by 
the project 
12.64 13.53 1.00 137.00 
Bid_mean 
Average bid price for each 
project 
94.70 174.75 2.00 2670.68 
Paid_amount 
Amount of dollars paid by the 
employer after the project was 
completed 
129.26 250.04 0.00 2000.00 
Project_title_length 
Number of words in the project 
title 
5.64 3.21 1.00 40.00 
Project_desc_length 
Number of characters in the 
project description 
375.06 386.54 1.00 4088.00 
Note: Summary statistics are calculated based on the matched sample. We dropped outliers with the Stata 
command “bacon”, using the top 10th quantile of the Mahalanobis distance as a cutoff. 
 
Table 4. Definitions and Summary Statistics of Worker-Level Variables for Dual-Typed 
Bidders 
Variable Variable definition Mean SD Min Max 
Quality 
Average quality rating given by 
all the employers (ranging from 0 
to 5) 4.82 0.34 1.00 5.00 
Communication 
Average communication rating 
given by all the employers 
(ranging from 0 to 5) 4.83 0.34 1.00 5.00 
Expertise 
Average expertise rating given by 
all the employers (ranging from 0 
to 5) 4.82 0.34 1.00 5.00 
Professionalism 
Average professionalism rating 
given by all the employers 
(ranging from 0 to 5) 4.84 0.33 1.00 5.00 
Hire-again rating 
Average hire-again rating given 
by all the employers (ranging 
from 0 to 5) 4.82 0.36 1.00 5.00 
                                                 
3 The large variation in Bid_max is driven by outliers. In rare cases, workers asked for unreasonably high 
prices. 
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Overall 
Average overall employer-entered 
ratings for the worker 4.83 0.33 1.00 5.00 
Review_count 
Total number of reviews which 
were written by previous 
employers 89.24 202.63 1.00 4128.00 
Completion_rate  
Percentage of awarded projects 
which were successfully 
completed as scheduled 0.78 0.19 0.02 1.00 
Note: Summary statistics are calculated based on the matched sample wherein the bids are submitted by 
workers who bid for both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-typed workers”) (Lin et al. 
2016). We dropped outliers with the Stata command “bacon”, using the top 10th quantile of the 
Mahalanobis distance as a cutoff. 
 
Table 5. Definitions and Summary Statistics of Bid-level Variables 
Variable Variable definition Mean SD Min Max 
Bid_price Bid price submitted by the worker 114.94 263.04 2.00 22272.00 
Hire_before 
A dummy variable; =1 if the worker 
has been hired by the employer 
before 
0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
No_rating 
A dummy variable; =1 if the worker 
has not received any ratings when 
he/she submitted the bid 
0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Bidder_tenure_ 
Month 
The worker’s tenure at Freelancer 
measured in months 
35.49 25.85 1.00 178.00 
Bid_rank 
The bidder’s ranking among all the 
candidates, Freelancer 
automatically sorts all the bidders 
according to its own ranking 
algorithm which is mainly based on 
bidders’ employer-entered reviews  
13.02 13.31 1.00 132.00 
Bid_order_rank 
The sequence order in which the 
bidders’ bids were submitted 
14.45 14.43 1.00 135.00 
Preferred_ 
freelancer 
A dummy variable; =1 if the worker 
gets a special Preferred Freelancer 
badge because of their workmanship 
and customer service abilities  
0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Local_freelancer 
A dummy variable; =1 if the worker 
works for offline jobs nearby 
0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Note: Summary statistics are calculated based on the matched sample. We dropped outliers with the Stata 
command “bacon”, using the top 10th quantile of the Mahalanobis distance as a cutoff. 
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1.4. Research Methodology 
1.4.1. Identification: A Quasi-Natural Experiment 
While a field experiment with the random assignment of contract types is the most 
ideal design, the difficulty in persuading employers to make contract choices without 
altering the employers’ and bidders’ would-be choices makes it almost impossible to 
implement such a large-scale experiment in the field. As such, following the prior studies 
on policy change (e.g., Autor 2003; Chan and Ghose 2014; Chen et al. 2017), we 
combine a quasi-natural experiment design based on the observed panel data with DID 
estimation, matching methods, and a series of robustness checks, which is a reasonable 
design for causal inference (Atasoy et al. 2016; Hong 2013; Hirano et al. 2003; 
Bergemann et al. 2009). 
 
Figure 2. A Timeline of Our Observation Window 
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Figure 3. Screenshots of the Freelancer Monitoring System 
 
Specifically, we leverage a quasi-natural experiment based on Freelancer’s initial 
release of its monitoring system on February 5, 2014. Note that the monitoring system is 
only available for time-based contracts. The monitoring system is a software application 
that allows employers to effortlessly monitor freelancers. Freelancer encourages workers 
with time-based contracts to download and install the application on its Facebook, 
Twitter, and official blog. Once installed,4 the monitoring system randomly takes several 
screenshots about every ten minutes, and continuously tracks the number of minutes the 
worker has spent on each time-based project.5 Specifically, it automatically tracks when 
and for how long the worker has worked, the accumulated compensation the worker has 
earned, and the corresponding screenshots with precise timestamps. Therefore, it 
effectively keeps a detailed record of the workers’ effort, providing the employer with 
                                                 
4 If workers who work on time-based projects do not use this monitoring application to track their work 
hours, they are not guaranteed to get paid for their work. Moreover, it is worth noting that whether 
employers install this monitoring application or not, they can always check the monitoring records from the 
Freelancer website. 
5 The application does not track time spent on fixed-price projects, because workers can only find time-
based contracts, rather than fixed-price contracts, through this application.  
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up-to-date information on the progress of the project. The employer can file a dispute to 
the platform regarding the worker’s effort or claimed hours with the detailed monitoring 
records as evidence of the worker’s shirking behavior. Figure 3 is a screenshot of the 
monitoring application provided by Freelancer. 
Since the use of the monitoring system is advocated for all time-based projects and 
not used for fixed-price projects, this provides us with a unique research opportunity. In 
this study, we leverage a difference-in-differences (DID) design with fixed-price projects 
as the control group to examine the effect of the IT-enabled monitoring system on time-
based projects, relative to fixed-price projects, comparing employers’ hiring decisions 
and workers’ entry behaviors across the two types of projects before and after the 
introduction of the monitoring system. The DID model is used extensively in IS research 
when exogenous changes are available (e.g., Chan and Ghose 2014, Huang et al. 2017; 
Wang et al. 2018; Zhang and Li 2017). 
1.4.2. Econometric Analyses 
1.4.2.1. Propensity Score Matching  
In order to satisfy the common support requirement and reduce potential disparities 
across time-based projects and fixed-price projects, we use the PSM method to generate a 
comparable sample. The PSM approach for matching has been widely applied in the 
information systems literature (Hong et al. 2016; Lin et al. 2016; Xu et al. 2016; Xue et 
al. 2010). First, following related prior literature (Banerjee and Duflo 2000; Gopal and 
Sivaramakrishnan 2008; Lin et al. 2016; Roels et al. 2010), we identify project 
characteristics and employer characteristics that might correlate with employers’ choices 
of contract type (Table 6). Moreover, to better match employers’ needs and their task 
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requirement, we generate the project-skill matrix with the top 20 skills ranked by 
frequency. In addition, to further match the two types of projects on the aspects of 
employers’ uncertainty and their quality sensitivity (Dey et al. 2010; Bajari and Tadelis 
2001), we ranked the importance score of each token in predicting the contract type by 
applying the gradient boosting algorithm to the subsample posted prior to the introduction 
of the monitoring system with the Text2vec and Xgboost packages in R.6 Further, we 
reduce the dimension of the project-term matrix by limiting the list to the 20 tokens with 
highest information gains. Then we predict the propensity scores and match fixed-price 
projects with time-based projects. Furthermore, we compare the distribution of the 
propensity score and perform a balance check for all observed covariates (Xu et al. 2016). 
As Table A1 in the Empirical Appendix A shows, the matching process significantly 
reduces the difference between the control and treatment groups, and the means of all 
covariates are not statistically different across the two types of projects after the matching 
process. Based on the full sample with 12,467 projects posted on Freelancer, we generate 
our final matched sample, which includes 5,383 fixed-price projects and 3,099 time-
based projects. 
 
Table 6. Pre-treatment Covariates Used to Adjust for Potential Selection Bias 
Dimension Variable Variable Description 
Task complexity, risk 
of project (Gopal and 
Sivaramakrishnan 
2008) 
Project category 
dummies 
Dummy variables for various project 
categories, including software, design, 
marketing, administrative, etc. 
                                                 
6 We use the decision-tree boosting method provided by the Xgboost package in R to conduct the text-
mining analysis. To reduce the possibility of the importance score being affected by the introduction of 
monitoring systems, we only include projects posted prior to the introduction date.  
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Project title length 
(Lin et al. 2016) 
Project_title_length Number of characters in the project 
title  
Project description 
length (Lin et al. 
2016) 
Project_desc_length Number of characters in the project 
description shown on the project page 
Project description Description token 
dummies 
The description token dummies which 
are used to control the employer’s 
uncertainty about his/her project need  
 
Skill requirements Skill requirement 
dummies 
The skill requirement dummies 
describing project task requirement 
Client level of 
knowledge (Lin et al. 
2016) 
Employer_tenure_m
onth; 
Employer_overall_r
ating 
Employer’s tenure at Freelancer 
measured in months, which is also a 
proxy of employers’ experience and 
relevant knowledge; employers’ 
overall rating indicating employers’ 
reputations  
 
1.4.2.2. Principal Component Analysis for Dimension Reduction 
Freelancer employs a multidimensional reputation system, which prominently 
displays multiple indicators when the cursor hovers over the bidder’s username. We 
collapse the six dimensions of reputation information into a few informative scalars in 
order to capture the effect of reputation in reducing employers’ uncertainty. As high 
correlations are observed among some rating dimensions, we employ Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) for dimension reduction, which generates two principal 
components by using ~1 as the cutoff for eigenvalues and 80% as the threshold of the 
cumulative variance explained, as shown in Table 7. The first component (PC1) 
comprises dimensions of ratings entered by previous employers after the transactions, 
which largely helps to reduce future employers’ uncertainty regarding workers’ 
capability. The second component (PC2) has high loadings on the workers’ project 
completion rate, which was computed by the system based on the percentage of projects 
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completed out of all contracted projects. This component largely indicates a worker’s 
effort at work because project incompletion is typically due to workers’ lack of effort in 
completing the milestones set by the employer on time.7 Therefore, the second 
component helps to alleviate employers’ uncertainty regarding workers’ effort.  
In summary, the five items with significant loadings on the first component help to 
mitigate ex ante information asymmetry (hidden information), whereas the one item with 
significant loading on the second component helps to alleviate ex post information 
asymmetry (hidden action). In addition, to better understand how employers perceive 
workers’ reputation signals, we analyze data from a survey of employers with the aid of 
Freelancer’s management team, which confirms our PCA results indicating that 
employers are generally concerned about freelancers’ capabilities and service effort. 
Therefore, guided by the two dimensions of employers’ uncertainty about workers and 
the item loadings of raw reputation information, we label PC1 as “Capability” and PC2 as 
“Effort.” This label assignment is further confirmed by interviewing a number of 
Freelancer employers on how they perceive the reputation signals of workers. We report 
the item loadings, and eigenvalues/cumulative variance explained in Table 7 and Table 8, 
respectively. In addition, the results are highly consistent when we use two raw measures 
of reputation information—namely, the overall rating and completion rate. 
 
                                                 
7 According to Freelancer.com, “Projects are marked as completed once the freelancer is paid in full with 
Milestone Payments. If a freelancer has a high Completion Rate, employers will have the security of 
knowing that their projects will be completed and will not be abandoned by an unreliable freelancer.” This 
suggests that the worker needs to spend sufficient effort and finish milestones following the schedule set by 
the employer to get the project marked as “completed” (source: 
https://www.freelancer.pl/faq/topic.php?id=2). 
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Table 7. Item Loadings of Two Principal Components with Varimax Rotation 
Variable 
Eigenvectors 
1 2 
Quality 0.449 -0.003 
Communication 0.432 0.008 
Expertise 0.451 -0.004 
Professionalism 0.452 0.001 
Hire-again rating 0.451 -0.002 
Completion Rate 0.000 1.000 
 
Table 8. Eigenvalues and Variance Explained by Two Principal Components 
Label Component Eigenvalue Diff Proportion 
of variance 
explained 
Cumulative 
variance 
explained 
Capability 1  4.374   3.381   0.729   0.729  
Effort 2  0.994   0.741   0.166   0.895  
 
1.4.2.3. Estimating Employer Preference 
To estimate employer preference for workers (H1) in terms of their observable 
characteristics, we formulate a model for each worker’s hiring outcome within each 
project. Specifically, we estimate the employer’s hiring decision regarding whether 
bidder 𝑘 is awarded in project 𝑗 as 𝑃𝑟𝑗𝑘.  
𝑃𝑟𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽1𝑡𝑗𝐶𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑗𝐶𝑗𝑘+𝛽3𝑡𝑗𝑇𝑗𝐶𝑗𝑘+𝛽4𝑡𝑗𝐸𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑗𝐸𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑗𝑇𝑗𝐸𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽7𝑡𝑗𝑃𝑗𝑘 +
𝛽8𝑇𝑗𝑃𝑗𝑘+𝛽9𝑡𝑗𝑇𝑗𝑃𝑗𝑘 + γ𝐵𝑘 + δ𝑍𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗𝑘 (1) 
In Equation (1), 𝑡𝑗is the period dummy variable, which is set to 1 if project 𝑗 is posted 
after the introduction of the monitoring system. 𝑇𝑗 is the contract type dummy variable, 
which is set to 1 if project 𝑗 is a time-based project. 𝐶𝑗𝑘 denotes bidder k’s reputation 
related to his or her capabilities based on the principal component analysis. 𝐸𝑗𝑘 denotes 
bidder k’s reputation related to his or her effort based on principal component 
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analysis. 𝑃𝑗𝑘 denotes the bid price submitted by bidder 𝑘. 𝑍𝑗𝑘 represents a set of other 
project-bidder paired characteristics, including the bidder k’s ranking based on his/her 
reputation and experience among all the competitors, the order of bidder k’s bid based on 
the sequence of all the bids were submitted, whether the bidder k has worked for this 
employer before. 𝐵𝑘 captures bidder k’s individual characteristics, including whether 
bidder k has received any ratings or not (or the number of ratings entered by bidder k’s 
previous employers), whether bidder k gets a special “Preferred Freelancer” badge, and 
whether bidder k also works for local projects.8 The employer’s hiring decision could be 
estimated with a linear probability model (Heckman and Snyder 1997; Greenwood and 
Agarwal 2015) or a logit model (Lin et al. 2016; Liu et al. 2015). Given our focus on the 
existence of the treatment effect, in our main analyses, we use a linear probability model 
by clustering 𝜀𝑗𝑘 at the project level. We also estimate a conditional logit model and 
observe highly consistent results. 
1.4.2.4. Difference-in-Differences Models 
To assess workers’ entry decisions (for H2), we estimate standard difference-in-
differences models (Bertrand et al. 2004; Angrist and Pischke 2008): 
 𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑏𝑖𝑑_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗 +
𝜏𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     (2) 
                                                 
8 Based on our review data, workers’ average ratings were basically constant during our observation period. 
In particular, the median changes in workers’ cumulative average rating within a quarter was only 0.009. 
This low variation suggests that for workers with high reputations, the negative impact of their potential 
shirking behaviors might be small given the large number of total projects they have completed. This is 
also in line with one of the motivations of our study (i.e., reputation systems are not the perfect tool for 
deterring moral hazard). 
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 𝑃𝑐𝑡_𝑛𝑜_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑗            (3) 
In equation (2), the dependent variable is the log transformation of the total number 
of bids for each project 𝑗 posted by employer 𝑖, 𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑏𝑖𝑑_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 . In equation (3), the 
dependent variable  𝑃𝑐𝑡_𝑛𝑜_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 denotes the percentage of inexperienced bidders 
(i.e., bidders without ratings) in project 𝑗 posted by employer 𝑖. The contract type is 
indicated by 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗, which equals 1 if project 𝑗 is a time-based project, and 0 if it 
is a fixed-price project. 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗 is the dummy variable indicating whether project 𝑗 is 
awarded after the introduction of the monitoring system. The coefficient of the 
interaction term 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗 (𝛽2) thus identifies the effect of the introduction 
of the IT-enabled monitoring system on time-based projects relative to fixed-price 
projects. To control for project heterogeneity, we also add other project characteristic 
controls (𝛿𝑗), a vector of employer fixed-effects (𝛾𝑖), and a vector of time fixed-effects 
(𝜏𝑡) into the DID model and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 denotes the robust standard errors clustered on 
employers. 
1.4.3. Empirical Results 
1.4.3.1. Employer Preference Estimation 
The results of the linear probability model are reported in Table 9.9 We observe that, 
before and after the IT-enabled monitoring system was implemented, the coefficients for 
                                                 
9 Given that the linear model helps ensure consistency of the estimation results and provides a meaningful 
interpretation of coefficients for the interaction terms (Greenwood and Agarwal 2015), we estimate the 
change in employer preference with the linear probability model. The results are highly consistent with 
those of the conditional logit model.  
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the reputation of workers’ capabilities, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑜𝑓_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟, remain unchanged at 
0.006. This finding indicates that employers’ preference for workers with high capability-
related reputations does not change due to the presence of the monitoring system. 
Notably, we observe a different pattern regarding the coefficients for the worker’s effort-
related reputation, 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑎𝑡_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘.  As Table 9 attests, the coefficient of the effort-
related reputation is 0.026 and 0.051 for fixed-price and time-based projects, 
respectively, before the introduction of the monitoring system, suggesting that employers 
prefer to hire workers with high effort-related reputations. After the introduction of the 
system, for fixed-price projects, the employer preference remains at a similar level, since 
the coefficient of 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑎𝑡_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 is insignificant. In contrast, for time-based 
projects, there is a relatively large decrease in employer preference (i.e., the coefficient of 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑎𝑡_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 is significantly negative), indicating that 
employers’ preference for workers with high effort-based reputations decreases after the 
monitoring system was introduced. This significant decrease in employers’ emphasis on 
workers’ effort-related reputations and the insignificant change in the importance of 
workers’ capability-related reputations for employers suggest that the introduction of the 
monitoring system helps mitigate moral hazard and lower the wage premium acquired by 
workers with high effort-related reputations, but has a limited effect on alleviating 
adverse selection, as predicted in H1. We also find that the magnitude of employers’ 
price-sensitivity for time-based projects increases (from |−0.053| to |−0.109|) after the 
introduction of the monitoring system, while that for fixed-price projects remains 
unchanged, further confirming that the alleviation of moral hazard problems makes 
employers more sensitive to bid prices. Overall, the findings suggest that there exists a 
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partial substitution relationship between monitoring and reputation such that monitoring 
substitutes for some of the effort-related reputation but not for the capability-related 
reputation.   
Table 9. Estimation Results of the Linear Probability Model 
 
Notes: (a) We limit our sample to those projects with more than one bid and awarded to only one worker. 
Our results are based on all the workers who bid for both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as 
“dual-typed workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). (b) Since we do not have any capability-related or effort-related 
reputation information for workers who have not received any ratings from employers, we add the No_rating 
dummy and set their capability-related and effort-related reputation component scores as zeros. We also 
estimate the model with only those workers with reputations and add the Review_count variable instead of 
the No_rating dummy. (c) Results are highly consistent when we estimate the treatment effect with 
conditional logit models. (d) Robust standard errors clustered on projects are reported in parentheses. (e) * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 Dependent variable: Bid_selected 
Capability_of_worker 0.006***(0.001) 
Capability_of_worker* Time_based 0.001      (0.001) 
Capability_of_worker*After 0.002      (0.001) 
Capability_of_worker* Time_based *After -0.002      (0.002) 
Effort_at_work 0.026***(0.002) 
Effort_at_work* Time_based 0.025***(0.003) 
Effort_at_work* After 0.000      (0.003) 
Effort_at_work* Time_based *After -0.015***(0.005) 
Log_bid_price -0.087***(0.004) 
Log_bid_price* Time_based 0.034***(0.006) 
Log_bid_price*After 0.006      (0.006) 
Log_bid_price*Time_based *After -0.056***(0.010) 
Hire_before 0.538***(0.015) 
No_rating -0.044***(0.004) 
Log_bidder_rank -0.020***(0.001) 
Log_bid_order_rank 0.014***(0.001) 
Preferred_freelancer 0.007**  (0.003) 
Local_freelancer -0.027***(0.007) 
Observations     69,975 
Clusters (projects)     5,694 
R-squared      0.115 
Log likelihood     -1278 
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1.4.3.2. Bidding Behavior and Entry Barrier 
As employers are less willing to pay high wage premiums to workers with high 
effort-related reputations when the monitoring system is in place, we expect that the entry 
barrier for inexperienced (or new) workers into the time-based project will become lower, 
leading to more bids for a given time-based project. Specifically, our analysis regarding 
workers’ entry decisions proceeds as follows. Before we report our DID estimates, based 
on the matched sample, we first present some model-free evidence of the change in both 
dependent variables (i.e., the number of bids and percentage of bidders with no rating). 
As Figure 4 shows, both dependent variables significantly increase for time-based 
projects but not for fixed-price projects without controlling for the effect of project 
characteristics and employer characteristics. 
  
Note: The matched sample is used. The bars represent the average number of bids (Bid_count) and the 
average percentage of bidders with no rating (Pct_no_rating) in fixed-price projects and time-based projects 
before and after the introduction of the monitoring system. Error bars represent the 95% confidence 
intervals of standard errors. 
 
Figure 4. Model-free Evidence of the Change in Dependent Variables  
Among the Matched Sample 
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Furthermore, the DID regression results reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 
still show a consistent result. Column (1) of Table 10 reports the results based on the DID 
analysis of the effect of the monitoring system on the number of bids. We find the 
coefficient (𝛽3) of the interaction term 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗 to be significantly 
positive, which suggests that the introduction of the monitoring system significantly 
increases the number of bids (𝐵𝑖𝑑_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗) for time-based projects. Further, the 
coefficient of the interaction term of 0.221 translates to a 24.7% increase in number of 
bids,10 supporting H2a.  
We further assess the conjecture that the monitoring system reduces the entry barrier 
for new bidders into time-based projects. We compare the percentage of inexperienced 
workers (workers with no reputation score) among all the bidders in time-based contracts 
before and after the introduction of the IT-enabled monitoring system. We create a binary 
variable, No_rating, denoting whether the worker has received any ratings (Lin et al. 
2016). Then we use the percentage of workers (𝑃𝑐𝑡_𝑛𝑜_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗) who haven’t 
accumulated any reputation records from employers, as a proxy for the entry barrier for 
inexperienced workers. We include employer-level fixed effects and project 
characteristics to control for unobserved heterogeneity across employers and the 
heterogeneity across projects. The estimation results are reported in Table 10. The 
marginal effect of the 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗 dummy is insignificant, indicating that the 
                                                 
10 Based on the estimation results in Column (1) of Table 10, before the introduction of monitoring 
systems, the partial correlation 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗  dummy and 𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑏𝑖𝑑_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 is 0.349. This partial coefficient 
becomes 0.570 after the introduction. Since the dependent variable takes the log transformation, we 
transform the change in the coefficient with the exponential function to obtain the actual percentage change 
in the number of bids. Exp(0.221) - 1=24.7%. 
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percentage of inexperienced bidders for time-based projects is roughly the same as the 
percentage of inexperienced bidders for fixed-price projects before the introduction of the 
monitoring system. However, after the introduction of the monitoring system, the 
coefficient of 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗 increases significantly (by 0.085). This increase suggests 
that, all other things being equal, the percentage of workers with no ratings increases 
more for time-based projects than for fixed-price projects. Specifically, the marginal 
effect estimate based on the delta method indicates that the percentage increases by 
8.50%. The fact that disproportionately more inexperienced workers participate in time-
based projects after the introduction of the monitoring system validates H2b that the 
monitoring system lowers the entry barrier for inexperienced workers.  
Overall, the results regarding the number of bids and percentage of inexperienced 
bidders provide support for our hypothesis that the monitoring system attracts more bids 
by lowering the entry barrier for inexperienced workers and alleviates the cold-start 
problem. Both Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b are thus supported.  
Table 10. Estimation Results of the DID Models 
Model (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Log_bid_count Pct_no_rating 
Time_based 0.349***(0.105) 0.013       (0.015) 
Time_based*After 0.221**  (0.091) 0.085***(0.015) 
Log_budget_max 0.147***(0.027) -0.003       (0.004) 
Log_title_length -0.075       (0.056) 0.003       (0.009) 
Log_desc_length 0.132***(0.030) 0.001       (0.005) 
Category dummies Yes Yes 
Month dummies Yes Yes 
Employer dummies Yes Yes 
Clusters (employers) 1,261 1,261 
Observations 2,976 2,976 
R-squared 0.314 0.106 
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Notes: (a) The results are highly consistent when we control for the week dummies instead of month dummies. 
(b) Robust standard errors clustered on employers are reported in parentheses. (c) The results are consistent 
when we use the top 1, 5, or 10 quantile of the Mahalanobis distance as a threshold to separate outliers from 
nonoutliers. (d) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
1.5. Robustness Checks 
Given that the contract types of projects are not randomly assigned in the field, the 
control group and the treatment group may differ in terms of both observables and 
unobservables. To further evaluate the credibility of our result, we conduct a series of 
robustness checks to evaluate and address these potential identification concerns (Table 
11). Since our fixed-effects specification is immune to time-invariant selection issues, we 
focus on addressing potential problems regarding time-varying selection on observables 
and unobservables. 
First, to further alleviate the issue of selection on observables, we employ alternative 
matching algorithms (e.g., coarsened exact matching and matching in causal inference) 
and obtain highly consistent results.  
Second, we use two strategies to address the issue of selection on unobservables. The 
first strategy uses an alternative quasi-experiment design by identifying two different 
subgroups from the time-based projects that could be used as the treatment group and 
control group respectively. Given that both the new control group and the treatment 
group are derived from the time-based projects, the design of these quasi-natural 
experiment settings tends to alleviate the concern of selection on unobservables 
(Manchanda et al. 2015). The results from these alternative quasi-natural experiment 
designs are highly consistent. The second strategy employs the instrumental variable 
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approach to estimate the local average treatment effect, which again lends support to our 
main finding.  
Third, we conduct several additional robustness checks to further rule out the 
possibility of a spurious relationship. For instance, we show that our data satisfies the 
parallel trend assumption. Additionally, we conduct two placebo tests, one regarding the 
placebo treatment time and the other regarding the placebo treatment assignment. 
Furthermore, we find that our results are highly consistent when we rule out outliers or 
use alternative measures of reputation. 
Table 11. Overview of the Analyses 
Section Analysis Objective 
Section 
1.4.3. 
Selection on observables:  
Baseline DID estimation in the matched sample  
Quantifying the treatment effect;  
controlling for selection on 
observables; 
Section 
1.5.1. 
Selection on observables:  
DID estimation with coarsened exact matching  
Controlling for selection on 
observables; 
Section 
1.5.2. 
Selection on unobservables:  
DID estimation with a subgroup of time-based 
projects as the control group 
Alleviating potential issues regarding 
selection on unobservables and 
double counting the treatment effect 
Section 
1.5.3. 
Selection on unobservables:  
IV Estimation 
Control for potential biases due to 
employers’ self-selection11 
 
Section 
1.5.4. 
Placebo test/shuffling (placebo treatment time and 
placebo treatment assignment) 
Checking the assumption of DID 
models; avoiding spurious causality 
with alternative variance-covariance 
specifications 
Appendix B Parallel trend assumption Checking the assumption of DID 
models 
Appendix C Additional analysis on project outcomes Exploring other impacts on the 
platform 
Note: Except for those analyses reported in Sections 1.4 and 1.5, all the other robustness checks listed in 
the above table are included in our Online Empirical Supplementary Appendices. 
 
                                                 
11 It’s worth noting that employers’ self-selection may not be a concern if those unobservables affecting 
selection are not revealed to bidders, which is likely the case in our context given the anonymity of employers. 
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1.5.1. Selection on Observables: Alternative Matching Method 
For our main analysis, we perform Propensity Score Matching to generate the 
matched sample that is balanced on the distributions of observed characteristics between 
the treatment and control groups. To further alleviate the concern of selection on 
observables, we employ another matching algorithm— Coarsened Exact Matching 
(CEM)—to regenerate a comparable sample (Iacus et al. 2012; Blackwell et al. 2009; 
Subramanian and Overby 2016). CEM enables us to explicitly match fixed-price projects 
with time-based projects within the same category and with similar skill requirements and 
descriptions. As such, CEM increases the homogeneity between the two types of projects 
from a multivariate perspective and lends support to the causality of our findings. We 
rerun the DID models on the CEM-matched samples and report the results in Table 12 
and Table 13. Overall, the results based on the CEM-matched sample are consistent with 
our main results. Again, we find that after the introduction of the monitoring system, 
employers placed less emphasis on workers’ effort-related reputations, and that the 
number of bids and the percentage of inexperienced bidders significantly increase. 
Additionally, we retest our results using two alternative matching strategies: Inverse 
Probability of Treatment Weighting method (Blackwell 2013) and pruning posttreatment 
pairs to alleviate the potential concern of composition change in time-based projects 
(Keele et al. 2016). Both produce consistent findings. 
Table 12. Linear Estimation of Employers’ Preference with Time-based Projects  
based on the CEM-Matched Sample 
Variable      Bid_Selected 
Capability_of_worker 0.004*** (0.001) 
Capability_of_worker* Time_based 0.002 (0.001) 
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Capability_of_worker*After 0.004** (0.002) 
Capability_of_worker* Time_based *After -0.002 (0.003) 
Effort_at_work 0.029*** (0.003) 
Effort_at_work* Time_based 0.023*** (0.004) 
Effort_at_work* After -0.001 (0.005) 
Effort_at_work* Time_based *After -0.013** (0.007) 
Log_bid_price -0.098*** (0.006) 
Log_bid_price * Time_based 0.050*** (0.009) 
Log_bid_price *After -0.002 (0.008) 
Log_bid_price *Time_based *After -0.046*** (0.014) 
Hire_before 0.583*** (0.018) 
No_rating -0.045*** (0.005) 
Log_bidder_rank -0.021*** (0.002) 
Log_bid_order_rank 0.013*** (0.002) 
Preferred_freelancer 0.006 (0.004) 
Local_freelancer -0.023** (0.009) 
Observations 40,742 
Clusters(projects) 3,479 
R-squared 0.131 
Log likelihood  -1252 
Notes: (a) We limit our sample to those projects with more than one bid and awarded to only one worker. 
Our results are based on all the workers who bid for both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as 
“dual-typed workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). (b) Since we do not have any capability-related or effort-related 
reputation information for those workers who have not received any ratings from employers, we add the 
No_rating dummy and set their capability-related and effort-related reputation component scores as zeros. 
(c) Robust standard errors clustered on projects are reported in parentheses. d) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
Table 13. Estimation Results of the DID Models based on the CEM-Matched Sample 
Model (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Log_bid_count Pct_no_rating 
Time_based 0.147      (0.141) -0.010      (0.020) 
Time_based*After 0.252**  (0.121) 0.112***(0.021) 
Log_budget_max 0.072      (0.045) -0.008      (0.006) 
Log_title_length 0.108      (0.087) 0.006      (0.013) 
Log_desc_length 0.165***(0.042) -0.000      (0.006) 
Category dummies Yes Yes 
Month dummies Yes Yes 
Employer dummies Yes Yes 
Clusters (employers) 719 719 
Observations 1,601 1,601 
R-squared 0.291 0.115 
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Notes: (a) Robust standard errors clustered on employers are reported in parentheses. (b) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
1.5.2. Selection on Unobservables: DID Estimation with a Subgroup of Time-based 
Projects as a Control Group 
Instead of using matched fixed-price projects as counterfactual, we consider an 
alternative approach, and identify a subgroup of the time-based projects as the control 
group. This approach leverages project category heterogeneity, and is less likely to be 
susceptible to the selection on unobservables issue (Manchanda et al. 2015). Specifically, 
we investigate the treatment effect of the introduction of the monitoring system by 
leveraging the variation of the efficacy of behavior-based controls (e.g., monitoring 
systems) across project categories. According to the literature on organizational theory, 
the efficacy of behavior-based controls, such as monitoring, is dependent on outcome 
measurability (Ouchi 1979; Eisenhardt 1985, 1989). Outcome measurability refers to the 
extent to which the project performance can be reliably, validly and easily measured 
(Ouchi 1979; Eisenhardt 1985, 1989). When the value of project outcome mainly 
depends on the quantity (i.e., count of units the worker finished), its outcome 
measurability is high (Wüllenweber et al. 2009). In contrast, projects focusing on product 
quality instead of unit count tend to have low outcome measurability (Wüllenweber et al. 
2009). Moreover, for projects with high outcome measurability, such as administrative 
projects (e.g., customer service, HR service, accounting service) and marketing projects 
(e.g., adding Facebook fans, voting), employers can deter workers’ moral hazard by 
checking the count of small tasks finished by workers (e.g., number of calls, number of 
replies, number of votes). Thus, the monitoring system, a prime example of a behavior-
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based control tool, does not add much value for projects with outcomes that are relatively 
easy to measure. Conversely, behavior-based control tools are more effective for projects 
with outcomes that cannot be easily measured by counting, such as design or html jobs. 
Therefore, we expect that for projects with highly measurable outcomes, the impact of 
implementing the monitoring system will be relatively lower than for projects with low 
outcome measurability. As such, among all the time-based projects, we consider projects 
with high outcome measurability (i.e., administrative projects and marketing projects) as 
the control group and the other projects (i.e., software, writing, translation, design, and 
others) as the treatment group.  
Estimating the DID models identical to our main analysis, we find that the 
introduction of the monitoring system significantly lowers employers’ preference for 
workers with high effort-related reputations (Table 14), and that it lowers the entry 
barrier and increases the number of bids for time-based projects with low outcome 
measurability (Table 15). These results lend support to our main analysis.  
Moreover, we perform another robustness check with a “Regression-Discontinuity” 
style control group in which date is the running variable. In particular, we use time-based 
projects posted before the introduction date of the monitoring system as the control group 
and time-based projects posted after the introduction date as the treatment group. Our 
results are highly consistent. 
Table 14. Linear Estimation of Employers’ Preference with Time-based Projects  
with High Outcome Measurability as the Control Group 
Variable      Bid_Selected 
Capability_of_worker 0.007** (0.003) 
Capability_of_worker* Low_outcome_measurability -0.000 (0.003) 
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Capability_of_worker*After -0.003 (0.004) 
Capability_of_worker* Low_outcome_measurability *After 0.004 (0.005) 
Effort_at_work 0.042*** (0.007) 
Effort_at_work* Low_outcome_measurability 0.009 (0.008) 
Effort_at_work* After 0.001 (0.012) 
Effort_at_work* Low_outcome_measurability *After -0.022* (0.013) 
Log_bid_price -0.041*** (0.016) 
Log_bid_price * Low_outcome_measurability -0.027 (0.017) 
Log_bid_price *After -0.067** (0.026) 
Log_bid_price * Low_outcome_measurability *After 0.019 (0.029) 
Hire_before 0.564*** (0.022) 
No_rating -0.065*** (0.005) 
Log_bidder_rank -0.003 (0.003) 
Log_bid_order_rank 0.017*** (0.002) 
Preferred_freelancer 0.021*** (0.006) 
Local_freelancer -0.047*** (0.012) 
Observations 23,639 
Clusters (projects) 2,159 
R-squared 0.141 
Log likelihood      -1301 
Notes: (a) We limit our sample to those projects with more than one bid and awarded to only one worker. 
Our results are based on all the workers who bid for both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as 
“dual-typed workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). (b) Since we do not have any capability-related or effort-related 
reputation information for those workers who have not received any ratings from employers, we add the 
No_rating dummy and set their capability-related and effort-related reputation component scores as zeros. 
(c) Robust standard errors clustered on projects are reported in parentheses. (d) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
Table 15. Estimation Results of the DID Models with Time-based Projects  
with High Outcome Measurability as the Control Group 
Model (1) (2) 
Sample Time-based projects Time-based projects 
Dependent Variable Log_bid_count Pct_no_rating 
Low_outcome_measurability -0.342 (0.301) -0.032 (0.071) 
Low_outcome_measurability 
*After 
0.320* (0.173) 0.145*** (0.050) 
Log_budget_max 0.162*** (0.062) -0.003 (0.015) 
Log_title_length 0.028 (0.080) 0.008 (0.017) 
Log_desc_length 0.080 (0.050) -0.023*** (0.008) 
Category dummies Yes Yes 
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Month dummies Yes Yes 
Employer dummies Yes Yes 
Clusters (employers) 435 435 
Observations 1,126 1,126 
R-squared 0.118 0.097 
Notes: (a) Robust standard errors clustered on employers are reported in parentheses. (b) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
1.5.3. Selection on Unobservables: IV Estimation 
Within the quasi-natural experiment settings, our DID estimation may be biased in 
the context of time-varying unobservables that simultaneously affect employers’ contract 
choices and dependent variables regarding entry behavior. It’s worth noting that selection 
on time-varying unobservables may not be a concern if the unobservables affecting 
selection are not revealed to bidders, which appears to be a reasonable condition given 
the anonymity of employers. To assess and alleviate concerns regarding the selection on 
time-varying unobservables that are also revealed to bidders, we employ the instrumental 
variable (IV) approach to estimate the local average treatment effect (Angrist and Imbens 
1994; Angrist and Krueger 2001)—i.e., the causal effect of the monitoring system on 
bidding behavior and entry barrier. Specifically, we need instruments that are associated 
with the employer’s contract choice for project j (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗) but not with the error 
term (𝜀𝑖𝑗) in bidders’ decisions to bid for project 𝑗. In particular, we employ the 
“residual” type IV (Dobbie et al. 2017; Arnold et al. 2018) and the Hausman type IV 
(Hausman et al. 1994; Hausman 1996; Schneider 2010; Ghose et al. 2012).  
The first instrument, i.e., the “residual” type IV, is the mean of the residuals from the 
prediction of employers’ contract choices in their previous projects. We predict 
employers’ contract choices with various project characteristics and time dummies, and 
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then estimate the residual for each project. The “residual” type IV is a combination of the 
employer’s time-invariant tendency to use time-based contracts and the effect of some 
idiosyncratic unobserved features of previous projects on previous contract choices, 
which correlate with this employer’s contract choice for the current project (relevance). 
But this is unlikely to correlate with the effect of time-varying unobservables on bidders’ 
entry decisions for project 𝑗 after controlling employers’ fixed effects (exogeneity). 
Additionally, when the time-invariant tendency to use time-based contracts are stronger 
or the idiosyncratic unobserved features of previous projects that are more likely to nudge 
employers to use time-based projects, we expect them to monotonically increase the 
probability of employers using time-based contracts for project 𝑗 (monotonicity). 
The second instrument is the Hausman type IV, which is the percentage of time-based 
projects posted by other employers from the same country within the same week of 
project 𝑗 (Schneider 2010). The Hausman type IV has been well applied in the previous 
literature (Hausman et al. 1994; Hausman 1996; Schneider 2010; Ghose et al. 2012). In 
our data, a high variation exists in the percentage of time-based projects across employer 
countries. We suspect that the leave-out average percentage of time-based projects 
probably correlates with the contract choice of the employer of project j due to the 
common economic environment in their countries (e.g., the short-term interest rate) or 
common cultural background (relevance). Moreover, as suggested by a prior study 
(Schneider 2010), this leave-out average percentage of time-based projects does not 
correlate with bidders’ entry decisions, after controlling for fixed effects on time and 
employers. This instrument seems to be exogenous to any platform-wide variation in 
unobserved bidding preference that correlates with two dependent variables (i.e., number 
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of bids and percentage of bidders with no rating), such as workers’ idiosyncratic distaste 
for a specific project requirement (exogeneity). Additionally, these common 
environmental factors are likely to affect the contract decisions of the employers from the 
same country in a similar way (monotonicity). 
With the linear model framework, we employ the 2SLS method into the DID 
estimation. In our model for bidders’ entry decisions, there are two endogenous variables, 
i.e., 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗, 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗. Since the timing of when the platform 
decided to implement monitoring systems (𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗) is an exogenous factor, we can have 
four instrumental variables: 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑡_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖, 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗 ×
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑡_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗, 𝑃𝑐𝑡_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑗, and 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗 ×
𝑃𝑐𝑡_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑗 (Wooldridge 2010). Similarly, we also construct instruments for 
six potential endogenous variables in the linear model for employers’ preference. For 
instance, regarding the endogenous variable related to workers’ capability-related 
reputations, 𝐶𝑗𝑘 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗, we use 𝐶𝑗𝑘 × 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑡_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖 and 
𝐶𝑗𝑘 × 𝑃𝑐𝑡_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑗 as its instruments. 
As Table 16 shows, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics of all the models are 
higher than Stock-Yogo weak IV test critical values, which suggests that we can firmly 
reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. Moreover, the Hansen J statistic indicates 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restriction is valid. As 
Table 16 and Table 17 show, the results regarding bidders’ entry decisions and 
employers’ preference are highly consistent with our main results. 
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Table 16. IV Estimation of the DID Models 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Instrument(s) “Residual” IV 
“Residual” IV & 
 “BLP” IV 
“Residual” IV 
“Residual” IV & 
 “BLP” IV 
Dependent Variable Log_bid_count Log_bid_count Pct_no_rating Pct_no_rating 
Time_based 0.495* (0.271) 0.495* (0.271) 0.030 (0.032) 0.032 (0.031) 
Time_based*After 0.328** (0.144) 0.328** (0.144) 0.074*** (0.026) 0.076*** (0.026) 
Log_budget_max 0.194*** (0.057) 0.194*** (0.057) 0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.007) 
Log_title_length -0.048 (0.065) -0.048 (0.065) 0.000 (0.011) -0.002 (0.011) 
Log_desc_length 0.058* (0.035) 0.058* (0.035) -0.005 (0.005) -0.006 (0.006) 
Hansen J statistic    0.374 (0.829)   0.374 (0.829) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F statistic 
25.001 12.756 25.001 12.756 
Category dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employer dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clusters(employers) 820 806 820 806 
Observations 2,234 2,185 2,234 2,185 
R-squared 0.052 0.055 0.079 0.082 
Note: (a) Robust standard errors clustered on employers are reported in parentheses. (b) The significance 
levels and standard errors of all the coefficients are also very consistent if we calculate the standard errors 
with 100 bootstrap cycles. (c)* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 17. IV Estimation of Employers’ Preference with the Linear Probability Model 
Variable      Bid_Selected      Bid_Selected 
Instrument(s) “Residual” IV 
“Residual” IV & 
 “BLP” IV 
Capability_of_worker 0.002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 
Capability_of_worker* Time_based 0.005** (0.002) 0.005** (0.003) 
Capability_of_worker*After 0.004 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 
Capability_of_worker* Time_based 
*After -0.003 (0.005) -0.004 (0.005) 
Effort_at_work 0.021*** (0.004) 0.020*** (0.004) 
Effort_at_work* Time_based 0.027*** (0.007) 0.027*** (0.007) 
Effort_at_work* After 0.006 (0.006) 0.007 (0.006) 
Effort_at_work* Time_based *After -0.039*** (0.010) -0.039*** (0.010) 
Log_bid_price -0.072*** (0.006) -0.072*** (0.006) 
Log_bid_price * Time_based 0.032*** (0.012) 0.033*** (0.012) 
Log_bid_price *After -0.007 (0.009) -0.009 (0.009) 
Log_bid_price *Time_based *After -0.055*** (0.021) -0.052** (0.021) 
Hire_before 0.519*** (0.016) 0.517*** (0.016) 
No_rating -0.049*** (0.005) -0.048*** (0.005) 
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Notes: (a) We limit our sample to those projects with more than one bid and awarded to only one worker. 
Our result is based on all the workers who bid for both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-
typed workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). (b) Since we do not have any capability-related or effort-related reputation 
information for those workers who have not received any ratings from employers, we add the No_rating 
dummy and set their capability-related and effort-related reputation component scores as zeros. (c) Robust 
standard errors clustered on projects are reported in parentheses. (d) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
1.5.4. Placebo Tests 
To assess the parallel trends assumption of the DID models and rule out the 
possibility of a spurious causal relationship, we conduct a series of placebo tests. First, 
we reassign the intervention to the middle of our pre-treatment period (November 1st, 
2013) and check for the existence of a pretreatment tendency in the observation window 
before the actual introduction of the monitoring system. As the placebo treatment does 
not exist, we do not expect to observe a significant effect from that placebo treatment. As 
Table 18 shows, the interaction between the placebo treatment time (𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜) 
and the contract type (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑) is insignificant.  
Second, following Abadie et al. (2015), we conduct another placebo test by randomly 
reassigning the treatment to projects within our sample. Again, since only projects that 
are actually treated (time-based projects) should be affected by the introduction of the 
monitoring system, if we randomly assign treatment to projects, we should not see a 
treatment effect. We simulate this permutation procedure 1000 times and capture the 
Log_bidder_rank -0.007*** (0.002) -0.007*** (0.002) 
Log_bid_order_rank 0.015*** (0.002) 0.015*** (0.002) 
Preferred_freelancer 0.019*** (0.004) 0.020*** (0.004) 
Local_freelancer -0.042*** (0.009) -0.042*** (0.009) 
Hansen J statistic   8.209 (0.223) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 28.122 16.352 
Observations 30,824     30,239 
Clusters (projects) 2,695     2,647 
R-squared 0.178     0.177 
Log likelihood       1080     1017 
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distribution of the placebo effects based on the randomly assigned placebo treatments. 
Table 19 summarizes the permutation result. After comparing the estimated coefficient of 
the actual treatment to the distribution of placebo effects, the probability of a similar size 
treatment effect happening by chance is close to zero (outside the 99% confidence 
interval), indicating that the significant finding is robust to alternative variance-
covariance specifications.   
Lastly, in another related robustness check, we conduct a dynamic DID analysis, 
reported in Empirical Appendix B. We observe that all the relative time parameters are 
insignificant prior to the introduction while some of the relative time parameters in two 
models are significant after February 2014 when Freelancer introduced the IT-enabled 
monitoring system. As such, the results of the relative-time model lend further support to 
the validity of the parallel trend assumption and also to our main findings. 
Table 18. Estimation Results of the DID Models based on Placebo Treatment Time 
Model (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Log_bid_count Pct_no_rating 
Time_based -0.141      (0.196) -0.003      (0.031) 
Time_based* After_placebo 0.173      (0.155) -0.009      (0.024) 
Log_budget_max 0.045      (0.054) -0.001      (0.007) 
Log_title_length 0.117      (0.095) 0.016      (0.014) 
Log_ desc_length 0.180***(0.055) -0.003      (0.008) 
Category dummies Yes Yes 
Month dummies Yes Yes 
Employer dummies Yes Yes 
Clusters (employers) 510 510 
Observations 1,159 1,159 
R-squared 0.220 0.081 
Notes: (a) Robust standard errors clustered on employers are reported in parentheses. (b) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
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Table 19. Placebo Effects of Random Assignment Model 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Log_bid_count Pct_no_rating 
Placebo effects (mean) 0.003 0.003 
Placebo effects (st.d.) 0.083 0.013 
Actual treatment effects 0.221**  (0.091) 0.085***(0.015) 
Replication 1000 1000 
z-score (H0: placebo = actual effect) 2.635 6.236 
p-value 0.008 0.000 
 
1.6. General Discussion 
In this research, we report evidence that demonstrates that the introduction of an IT-
enabled monitoring system reduces employers’ preference for workers with high effort-
related reputations and lowers entry barriers for inexperienced workers. Our estimation 
results are based on a unique quasi-natural experiment at Freelancer that implemented a 
monitoring system for time-based projects but not for fixed-price projects. This allows us 
to use the DID framework to estimate the causal effects of implementing a monitoring 
system. We report two main findings. First, after the introduction of the IT-enabled 
monitoring system, while employers’ preference for the capability-related reputation for 
both fixed-price and time-based projects remains unchanged, employers place less 
emphasis on effort-related reputation for time-based projects (but not for fixed-price 
projects). Second, the introduction of the IT-enabled monitoring system lowers the entry 
barrier for inexperienced workers and attracts more bids for time-based projects. This 
finding suggests a nuanced substitution relationship between monitoring and reputation 
such that monitoring partially substitutes for effort-related reputation but cannot 
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substitute for capability-related reputation. It further suggests that IT-enabled monitoring 
can alleviate the cold-start problem. 
Our study contributes to several streams of IS research. First, this is the first large-
scale empirical research to examine the causal impact of deploying an IT system on the 
mitigation of moral hazard on a leading online labor platform. Specifically, we examine 
the role of the IT-enabled monitoring system in matching the demand and supply of 
online labor. Unlike the previous literature, which mainly examines the effect of 
monitoring systems in a firm setting (Gopal and Koka 2010; Pierce et al. 2015; 
Ranganathan and Benson 2017), we analyze the impact of a monitoring system on a two-
sided online labor platform, which enables us to identify unique aspects of online 
platforms and systematically study the effect of the IT-enabled monitoring system on 
both the demand and supply sides of the online labor platform. Second, our study extends 
the previous research on the effect of reputation systems on digital platforms (Ba and 
Pavlou 2002; Bockstedt and Goh 2011; Dellarocas 2005, 2006; Lin et al. 2016; Moreno 
and Terwiesch 2014). The previous literature on reputation systems commonly views 
reputation as a signal of workers’ competence (Banker and Hwang 2008), which 
motivates workers to expend more effort (Dellarocas 2006). This paper adds to the 
understanding of reputation by underscoring the distinct impacts of capability-related 
reputation and effort-related reputation. Our results suggest that while IT-enabled 
monitoring has no significant impact on the importance of capability-related reputation, it 
can serve as a substitute for the signaling effect of effort-related reputation, which 
alleviates moral hazard by providing more precise and timely information about workers’ 
actions (Agrawal et al. 2014; Pierce et al. 2015). This suggests that future research on 
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reputation systems should also take the availability of monitoring systems into account as 
a critical contingency factor. Third, our research suggests that the IT-enabled monitoring 
system is not simply a partial substitution for reputation systems. By substituting for 
effort-related reputation, IT-enabled monitoring systems reduce agency costs by lowering 
the entry barrier for workers who have no prior experience on a focal platform. 
Therefore, our finding underscores a critical role of IT-enabled monitoring in overcoming 
a significant limitation of reputation systems that has hitherto been ignored in the IS 
literature: they create entry barriers for qualified workers who have not yet established 
reputations on a platform. Notably, IT-enabled monitoring could lower the entry barrier 
due to the effort-related reputation. 
Our research also provides important managerial implications for the design of online 
labor markets (Hong et al. 2016) and online platforms in general (Ghasemkhani 2017). 
There is a large body of research suggesting that reputation helps to mitigate moral 
hazard by acting as both a stimulus for high effort (Horton and Golden 2015) and a 
sanctioning mechanism (Dellarocas 2006). Meanwhile, it has been suggested that 
monitoring systems are highly effective in improving agents’ performance (Duflo et al. 
2012; Hubbard 2000; Pierce et al. 2015). Our study suggests that there is a nuanced 
substitution relationship between monitoring and reputation. Specifically, monitoring 
partially substitutes for effort-related reputation but does not substitute for capability-
related reputation. Hence, our study deepens our understanding of the optimal design of 
online labor platforms (Hong et al. 2016) by emphasizing the potential interaction effect 
between effort-related reputation and monitoring. 
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We acknowledge a number of limitations of this study, which open up avenues for 
future research. First, we note that due to data limitations, employers’ actual usage of 
records from monitoring systems is not available. Second, we only focused on testing the 
effect of the IT-enabled monitoring system on employers’ preference and workers’ 
bidding behaviors. Future research should consider exploring the long-term effect of the 
IT-enabled monitoring system on workers’ skill investment. Third, though we show that 
the sign and the existence of the treatment effect are robust to various alternative 
specifications (e.g., an alternative control group), the point estimates of the treatment 
effects in our main analysis may be amplified to some extent due to limited enforceability 
(Cooley et al. 2014). Finally, our study is conducted in the context of online labor 
markets and our findings may be limited in their generalizability to other online 
platforms. Although moral hazard is a universal issue on most online platforms, the IT 
artifact examined in this study—a monitoring system—may not be applicable to 
platforms focusing on the transaction of physical products, such as eBay. Further research 
should explore the effects of other monitoring systems that may be suitable for other 
online platforms.   
1.7. Concluding Remark 
Using a large-scale dataset from one of the major platforms that facilitate labor 
contracting, we utilize matching methods in tandem with a quasi-natural experimental 
difference-in-differences analysis to identify and quantify the effects of implementing an 
IT-enabled monitoring system on employers’ preference and workers’ entry decisions. 
Our results demonstrate a nuanced substitution relationship between monitoring and 
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reputation, such that monitoring partially substitutes for effort-related reputation but not 
for capability-related reputation. Our findings further suggest that implementing a 
monitoring system lowers the entry barrier for inexperienced workers with no prior 
reputation and thus attracts more bids. Overall, our results provide support for the 
effectiveness of IT-enabled monitoring in mitigating moral hazard and alleviating the 
cold-start problem in online labor markets and carry important implications for designing 
two-sided digital platforms. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HOME BIAS IN ONLINE EMPLOYMENT: 
 EVIDENCE FROM AN ONLINE LABOR MARKET 
 
We study the nature of home bias in online employment—an employer preference for 
workers from his or her home country. Using a unique large-scale data set from a major 
online labor market containing employers’ consideration sets of workers and their 
ultimate selection of workers, we first estimate employers’ home bias in their online 
employment decisions.  Further, we disentangle two types of home bias—statistical and 
taste-based home bias—using a quasi-natural experiment based on the introduction of a 
monitoring system on an online employment platform, which enables employers to easily 
observe workers’ effort on time-based projects. After matching comparable fixed-price 
projects as a control group using coarsened exact matching, our difference-in-differences 
estimations indicate that home bias in online employment is partially driven by statistical 
discrimination. Finally, we study heterogeneity in home bias across employers from 
different countries with a post-treatment sample with minimal statistical discrimination. 
We find that, consistent with the in-group favoritism literature, employers from countries 
with stronger traditional values, lower cultural diversity, and smaller populations tend to 
have a stronger home bias. Taken together, these findings shed light on the coexistence of 
statistical and taste-based home bias. 
 
Keywords: home bias, employment, statistical discrimination, taste-based discrimination, 
quasi-natural experiment, gig economy, online labor market 
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2.1. Introduction 
Employers often make hiring decisions under significant uncertainty due to 
information asymmetry (Kugler and Saint-Paul 2000). Hiring uncertainty leads 
employers to rely on observed worker characteristics (e.g., race and gender) that are not 
directly related to their capabilities or diligence (Hendricks et al. 2003; Fryer and Jackson 
2008). The global expansion of online employment platforms has created employment 
arrangements that allow the employer and the worker to come from different parts of the 
world (Hong and Pavlou 2017), leading to the potential for another form of 
discrimination: home bias, according to which employers might prefer hiring workers 
from the same country. 12 Anecdotes have suggested that this form of discrimination 
exists even in offline employment. For example, managers at Oracle, predominantly 
Asians, were recently involved in a lawsuit because of their discrimination against 
qualified white workers and in favor of applicants who mostly immigrated to the U.S. 
from Asian countries.13 
The literature has documented home bias in a variety of contexts (Hortaçsu et al. 
2009; Lin and Viswanathan 2015; Chan and Ghose 2014) such as portfolio management 
(Coval and Moskowitz 1999), peer-to-peer lending (Lin and Viswanathan 2015), and 
product purchase (Hortaçsu et al. 2009). While this topic has not yet been formally 
examined, the existence of home bias in online employment settings is potentially 
                                                 
12 Note that such geographic based preference can be rational or irrational. Following the previous literature, 
we use the term “home bias” instead of geographic-based preference. In the previous literature, home bias 
refers to the phenomenon of individuals preferring to conduct transactions with counterparts within a shorter 
geographic distance (Hortaçsu et al. 2009; Lin and Viswanathan 2015). 
13 http://fortune.com/2017/01/18/labor-department-oracle/ 
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harmful to the platforms because it may decrease the potential for global labor arbitrage 
(Roach 2003; Gefen and Carmel 2008) and may thus lead to significant inefficiencies 
(Gong et al. 2018). Furthermore, home bias may be one type of bias that makes 
employment decisions unfair to some workers (Bertrand et al. 2005) and thus leads to 
entry losses for labor market platforms. Important as this question is, there is no study on 
home bias in employment settings yet. Prior studies on employment predominantly focus 
on offline settings where home bias is unlikely to be an issue because labor contracting in 
such settings often takes place locally. Further, even when there are ample variations in 
workers’ home countries, recruiting data is difficult to obtain, due to the proprietary and 
confidential nature of recruiting. In addition, the recruiters are oftentimes not the 
employers who will be directly working with prospective workers, further compounding 
the challenges in using offline employment data to analyze home bias. In contrast, owing 
to the global nature of online labor markets with fine-grained worker data enabled by 
web-based information technology and direct observations of the employers’ 
consideration sets and hiring choices, the online employment context offers an excellent 
venue for exploring and identifying home bias in employment decisions. 
It is important to understand the mechanisms responsible for home bias in online 
employment. Previous literature offers explanations for home bias in investment 
portfolios and international trade contexts (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000). Generally, the 
identification of overall home bias relies simply on the estimation of preferences for 
transactions with partners from the same country (Lin and Viswanathan 2015; Hortaçsu 
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et al. 2009).14 However, it is the understanding of the mechanisms that drive home bias 
that offers important theoretical and policy implications. In fact, home bias can be driven 
by either the statistical discrimination mechanism (Cooper and Kaplanis 1994; Helliwell 
2000) or the taste-based discrimination mechanism (Lewis 1999; Lin and Viswanathan 
2015). For example, in the investment example, statistical discrimination refers to 
investors’ preferences for domestic portfolios or trade because of the associated higher 
expected returns based on signal extraction from the group-level characteristics and the 
product-specific characteristics (Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973). In other words, investors 
tend to expect that domestic portfolios or trade will perform better than foreign ones with 
the same observable characteristics, due to their higher trust or confidence in domestic 
ones. In contrast, taste-based discrimination arises from a priori liking for domestic 
portfolios or trade, which is not related to the signal extraction or utility function (Becker 
1971). This line of literature suggests that home bias can be driven either by statistical 
discrimination for rational reasons—such as established institutional factors and the 
possibility of direct contract enforcement (French and Poterba 1991; Hortaçsu et al. 
2009)—or by the taste-based discrimination based on irrational reasons or prejudicial 
tastes, such as individuals’ reluctance to share risks with foreigners (Lewis 1999).  
Due to the heterogeneous nature of different countries, taste-based home bias could 
also be heterogeneous. As workers’ locations (countries) are highlighted in many leading 
global online labor markets (e.g. Upwork, Freelancer), employers may use geographic 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that some previous studies define and explore the home bias phenomenon at a more 
granular level (e.g., the state level or city level) (Lin and Viswanathan 2015; Hortaçsu et al. 2009). In our 
paper, we focus on employers’ home bias at the country level because it is a salient cue for the employers 
during the hiring process. In the robustness check section, we also show that employers have additional home 
bias at the city level too. 
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information as a salient cue for social categorization when they evaluate workers. In 
doing so, employers may have a higher nonpecuniary utility when hiring local workers 
who are the same social groups with them due to in-group favoritism (Chen and Li 2009). 
While the literature on in-group favoritism generally finds it to be positive, the magnitude 
of such irrational biases may vary according to social-environmental factors, such as 
group norms (Sagiv and Schwartz 1995), within-group similarity (or lack of diversity) 
(Luijters et al. 2008), and group size (Brewer and Kramer 1986; Simon and Hamilton 
1994). In a similar vein, the strength of employers’ home bias may depend on contingent 
factors such as norms in the country (e.g., traditional values), diversity in the country 
(e.g., cultural diversity within national population), and group size (e.g., size of country 
population).  
Home bias in employment decisions bears some similarities to international trade in 
terms of potential mechanisms. It is, however, also distinct from international trade in 
terms of the significant hidden-action issues involved in employment decisions. 
Specifically, unlike trade decisions concerning standardized products or commodities, 
involving only ex ante information asymmetry of hard-to-observe qualities, online 
employment involves noncontractible elements of labor, and thus imposes severe 
information asymmetry between the workers and employers (Hong and Pavlou 2017)—
especially the ex post information asymmetry on hard-to-observe worker efforts. On the 
one hand, information asymmetry and the consequences thereof—for example, 
unpredictable project performance—may induce employers to more carefully 
contemplate potential economic outcomes, rather than relying solely on the home country 
heuristic. On the other hand, asymmetric information might make the employment 
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decision more effortful and resource-consuming, thus exacerbating the employers’ 
reliance on their preexisting liking of local workers.15 More importantly, the interpersonal 
nature of employment relationship may reinforce employers’ optimism bias (Strong and 
Xu 2003) on local workers. Therefore, it is not clear which mechanism would primarily 
drive home bias in online employment settings. Bearing the above in mind, we seek to 
extend the previous literature on home bias by examining employment decisions in online 
labor markets; specifically, we address the following three research questions:  
• Q1 (existence): Does home bias exist for employment decisions in online labor 
markets?  
• Q2 (mechanism): Which mechanism (statistical versus taste-based) drives home 
bias in online labor markets? 
To answer these questions, we obtained a unique, large-scale data set from an online 
labor market (Freelancer.com), in which we are able to reliably observe both the 
employer and workers’ countries (and other attributes), the employers’ consideration sets 
of workers who applied for projects, and the employers’ hiring choices. Since online 
labor markets are global, this research setting allows us to examine home bias in online 
employment because it offers the desired variation in the workers’ countries of origin. 
We first quantify home bias in our sample and then disentangle the mechanisms for home 
bias by leveraging a quasi-natural experiment—the introduction of a monitoring system 
on Freelancer.com. The introduction of the monitoring system constitutes a significant 
event serving as an exogenous shock to the level of information asymmetry between 
employers and workers. By contrasting the theoretical predictions of the statistical versus 
                                                 
15 In our paper, we use “local workers” to refer to workers residing in the same country as employers. 
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taste-based mechanisms, we identify the underlying mechanism of the observed home 
bias. Specifically, because the monitoring system lowers employers’ reliance on group-
specific signal extraction by providing information on ex post individual-specific effort, 
we expect that the introduction of the monitoring system will lower home bias driven by 
statistical discrimination. At the same time, we believe that taste-based home bias will 
remain unchanged, as it will not be affected by the change in the availability of 
individual-specific information. Our econometric identification further hinges on the fact 
that the monitoring system is applicable only to time-based projects, and not to fixed-
price projects, which allows us to use a difference-in-differences (DID) framework for 
causal analyses. Additionally, based on the sample during the post-treatment period, 
which is characterized by very little statistical home bias, we explore whether there is 
heterogeneity of home bias across employers, in order to examine the existence of taste-
based home bias. Based on our analyses, we observe three key findings. First, there is a 
robust observation of the existence of home bias after controlling for language, time-
zone, and currency differences. Second, after the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) of 
comparable fixed-price projects as a control group for the time-based projects that 
received the exogenous information shock, our difference-in-differences estimations 
show that the home bias in online employment is partially driven by statistical 
discrimination. Lastly, consistent with the in-group favoritism literature, we find that 
employers from countries with high traditional values, lower diversity, and a smaller user 
base (or population size), tend to have a stronger home bias. This lends support to the 
existence of taste-based home bias. As a whole, our study provides compelling evidence 
of the coexistence of statistical and taste-based home bias. 
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Our paper contributes to several related streams of literature. First, our study 
contributes to the home bias literature, being among the first studies to investigate the 
existence and mechanisms of home bias in the employment setting with a quasi-natural 
experiment. Our study extends previous home bias research in financial and trade 
transactions—which has focused mainly on decisions under ex ante information 
asymmetry—to the employment decision, which is threatened by both ex ante and ex post 
information asymmetry. Moreover, since most of the previous discrimination literature on 
labor markets does not distinguish statistical discrimination due to ex ante information 
asymmetry (e.g. worker capabilities) or ex post information asymmetry (e.g. worker 
effort), we add to this strand of literature by specifically examining whether alleviating ex 
post information asymmetry helps to reduce home bias. Further, given that some expect 
online employment to soon comprise the majority of the U.S. workforce,16 this paper 
advances the employment discrimination research by demonstrating the impact of the 
home country affiliation between employers and workers using detailed data at the 
individual level and precise information about the employer’s consideration set. 
Additionally, beyond confirming the existence of home bias, our study differentiates 
statistical home bias from taste-based home bias and further highlights that heterogeneity 
in taste-based home bias can be explained by in-group favoritism. Second, our paper adds 
to the understanding of discrimination in the online gig economy and, to the best of our 
knowledge, represents the first attempt to investigate the potential of monitoring systems 
in attenuating statistical home bias, and more broadly, statistical discrimination. While 
                                                 
16 See more on https://www.upwork.com/press/2017/10/17/freelancing-in-america-2017/; 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/08/why-the-future-of-work-could-lie-in-freelancing 
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the gig economy seems to provide a frictionless avenue of low-entry barrier for the two-
sided matching, some emerging research suggests that it can also develop into a breeding 
ground of discrimination (Ge et al. 2016; Edelman et al. 2017; Chan and Wang 2017), 
which is legally prohibited yet not enforced in the online gig economy (Todisco 2014; 
Edelman et al. 2017; Belzer and Leong 2018). One easy solution is to restrict the 
availability of information that employers have shown to discriminate against. However, 
this does not eliminate statistical discrimination but only shift it from one type of 
information (e.g., criminal records) to another (e.g., race) (Agan and Starr 2016; Doleac 
and Hansen 2016). Our study suggests that monitoring can effectively alleviate statistical 
discrimination. 
2.2. Theoretical Background  
2.2.1. Home Bias 
Home bias is a phenomenon that is well-documented in the literature on financial 
markets (Forman et al. 2009, 2012; Sorenson and Stuart 2001; Lin and Viswanathan 
2015) and international trade (Brunetti et al. 1997; Ghani et al. 2014; Helliwell 2000; 
Hortaçsu et al. 2009). Studies on home bias have primarily focused on offline contexts 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff 2001). For instance, Lewis (1999) finds that the reluctance to share 
the risks associated with international equity helps to explain the observed equity-home-
bias, characterized by investors who have a much higher percentage of equity in domestic 
assets than the optimal ratio which has the minimum variance for investment return. 
Moreover, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) suggest that investors also strongly prefer the 
  67 
stocks of firms that are geographically closer when making domestic investment 
decisions.  
As online trade and online financial markets emerge, recent work starts to explore the 
geography-based preference in online settings. These related studies focus on how 
rational explanations and irrational factors potentially lead to home bias. On the one 
hand, some studies conclude that the preference for shorter geographic distance is driven 
by rational considerations. For instance, Hortaçsu et al. (2009) find that contract 
enforcement and localized consumption of goods jointly contribute to home bias in the 
online trade context (such as eBay). Other rational explanations regarding home bias in 
traditional financial markets include established institutional factors (French and Poterba 
1991; Helliwell 2000; Brunetti et al. 1997) and investors’ rational desires to hedge 
specific sources of risk (Cooper and Kaplanis 1994). On the other hand, a few studies on 
online financial markets suggest that the geography-based preference is more consistent 
with taste-based preference. For example, Lin and Viswanathan (2015) explore the home 
bias in online peer-to-peer markets and identify that part of home bias is driven by 
lenders’ taste-based preferences. Ghani et al. (2014) find that Indians show ethnic 
discrimination when making outsourcing decisions, and that this discrimination is also 
more consistent with the prediction of taste-based preferences. Overall, the evidence 
regarding the mechanisms of home bias is mixed (Hortaçsu et al. 2009; Ghani et al. 2014; 
Lin and Viswanathan 2015). Additionally, despite the rich literature on home bias in 
offline and online financial markets and trade, no research has explored home bias in the 
employment setting. In financing or trade contexts, assets or products for sale are usually 
standardized and ex ante information asymmetry regarding worker capabilities is the only 
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potential trigger for statistical home bias. In contrast, for the employment context, 
employers’ benefits depend on both the capabilities of workers and the effort expended 
by workers, which involves both ex ante information asymmetry and ex post information 
asymmetry. The unique information structure in the employment context may cause the 
strength and mechanism of home bias to be different than in other contexts explored by 
previous literature (Hortaçsu et al. 2009; Ghani et al. 2014; Lin and Viswanathan 2015). 
For the identification of home bias, scholars employ different empirical approaches 
according to their levels of analysis. When researchers only have access to macro-level 
data (e.g., country pairs or city pairs), a commonly used approach is the gravity equation 
approach (Bergstrand 1985). Modeled after the gravity equation in physics, the gravity 
equation for international trade is a power function of the inverse of the distance between 
two parties, the economy volume of each party (e.g., GDP measurements) (Wolf 2000), 
and other associated factors such as the “remoteness” of two parties in relation to other 
parties (Anderson 1979) and the observed quality of trade (Burtch et al. 2014). The 
gravity model assumes identical expenditure functions among all parties, with smaller 
parties naturally modeled as having stronger home bias, given the small ratio of their 
GDP to the global GDP. As such, the estimator in the gravity model tends to be biased 
(Anderson 1979). Therefore, when microlevel data are accessible, researchers typically 
prefer alternative methods such as choice models (Ghani et al. 2014) or the potential-
dyads approach (Lin and Viswanathan 2015). When the decision makers’ consideration 
sets are not well specified, potential-dyads analysis considers all available alternatives in 
the model to explore whether the decision makers have a stronger preference for 
transaction partners from their home countries by assuming that all potential alternatives 
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are included in the consideration set. However, the potential-dyads approach is threatened 
by the nonindependence concern, given that each dyad is also directly or indirectly 
associated with other dyads, leading to the common-actor effect (Lincoln 1984; Stuart 
1998). Moreover, this approach may also be biased by the inflated number of dyads, 
which are highly unlikely in reality (Stuart 1998), and which may influence the estimate 
of all coefficients and usually cannot be fully corrected by adding dyad-specific fixed 
effects (Sorenson and Stuart 2001). Hence, when the decision makers’ consideration sets 
are well specified, choice models are preferable. Owing to the granular data about each 
employer’s consideration sets and selection choices, we employ choice models instead of 
potential-dyads analysis without imposing strong and untestable assumptions. 
2.2.2. Overview of the Home Bias Mechanisms 
Due to limited worker information or prejudicial distaste, employers often rely on 
heuristics based on the workers’ identity characteristics to extrapolate individual workers’ 
capabilities and expected effort, and to evaluate the potential utility of hiring these 
workers. This process tends to result in discrimination. Discrimination refers to 
employers’ systematic differential treatment of workers based on their group or 
demographic characteristics that are not directly related to productivity (Arrow 1973). 
These characteristics include, for example, race (Altonji and Blank 1999; Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2004; Fryer and Levitt 2004; Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vazquez 2014; 
Ge et al. 2016), gender (Chan and Wang 2017; Bertrand and Duflo 2017; Neumark et al. 
1996; Goldin and Rouse 2000; Edelman et al. 2017), and immigrant identity (Åslund et 
al. 2014). Multiple mechanisms have been proposed to explain the sources of 
discrimination. Based on its mechanism, discrimination can be classified as 
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rational/statistical discrimination or as taste-based discrimination (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2004). Specifically, statistical discrimination assumes that employers are 
rational and use group identity to infer individual workers’ capabilities or effort (Arrow 
1973). For instance, if the employer learns that local workers are more skilled and 
diligent based on his or her private information, the employer might use location 
information (e.g., local vs. foreign) as a signal to infer workers’ capabilities or effort. 
Conversely, taste-based discrimination is purely based on employers’ prejudicial distaste 
of foreign workers, which does not involve the rational inference of worker capabilities 
or effort that would affect utility for the employer (Becker 1971; Heckman 1998; Ghani 
et al. 2014).  
A key challenge in this research stream is to empirically disentangle statistical 
discrimination from taste-based discrimination. In general, there are two ways of 
identifying statistical discrimination, namely, the static and dynamic approaches 
(Rubineau and Kang 2012). The static approach measures the static difference among 
between-group pairs after accounting for other observable productivity characteristics 
(Bertrand and Duflo 2017). Statistical discrimination diminishes among between-group 
parties when there is more information or stronger signals concerning productivity 
characteristics. However, Heckman and Siegelman (1993) suggest that the differences 
among between-group parties are difficult to measure or control for. As such, the static 
approach is usually plagued by omitted variable bias and relies heavily on assumptions 
about the distribution of unobservable characteristics. 
 The dynamic approach, in contrast, that measures how the discrimination of 
between-group pairs changes with information shocks that address or alleviate 
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information asymmetry (Rubineau and Kang 2012), serves as a better means of 
identification. When there is a significant information change, individuals will update 
their beliefs, which alleviates information asymmetry and its consequence, statistical 
racial discrimination. However, researchers observe that students tend to show stronger 
discrimination after a year of training, which suggests that it is not statistical 
discrimination that drives racial disparities (Rubineau and Kang 2012). Based on the 
dynamic predictions of statistical discrimination, information changes such as removing 
gender information (Goldin and Rouse 2000) or criminal background information 
(Doleac and Hansen 2016) will lead to a change in the magnitude of discrimination. In 
summary, the dynamic approach verifies whether the pattern change of observations is 
consistent with the expectation of statistical discrimination to provide a reliable way of 
identifying statistical discrimination. 
As List (2004) suggests, information asymmetry tends to drive statistical 
discrimination, and information changes can influence statistical discrimination by 
reducing ex ante information asymmetry (e.g. worker capabilities) or ex post information 
asymmetry (e.g. worker effort). Here, ex ante information asymmetry refers to 
unobserved or hard-to-observe worker capabilities or productivity characteristics, and ex 
post information asymmetry denotes unobserved or hard-to-observe actions that are 
related to worker productivity, such as their effort. However, given that most of the 
previous studies either primarily focus on ex ante information asymmetry (Rubineau and 
Kang 2012) or do not distinguish between ex ante and ex post information asymmetry 
(Goldin and Rouse 2000; Doleac and Hansen 2016), it is still unknown whether ex post 
information asymmetry plays a critical role in employment discrimination. Furthermore, 
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examining and demonstrating whether marketplace designs helping to mitigate ex post 
information asymmetry (e.g., monitoring systems) can alleviate employment 
discrimination have important managerial implications for digital platforms. 
2.2.3. In-group Favoritism 
The home bias phenomenon is also related to the literature on in-group favoritism 
(Chen and Li 2009), wherein individuals prefer in-group members over out-group 
members (Allen and Wilder 1975; Efferson et al. 2008; DiDonato et al. 2011). In-group 
favoritism takes a few forms, including in-group bias (Chen and Li 2009), in-group 
altruism (Brewer and Kramer 1986; Sun et al. 2015), in-group trust (Falk and Zehnder 
2013), and out-group comparison (Reynolds et al. 2000). In the context of online labor 
markets, countries of residence are typically included in public information saliently 
shown on workers’ profiles. Therefore, country of residence, as a group characteristic of 
workers, is expected to serve as a basis for social categorization. In particular, employers 
may consider local workers as in-group members and show a preference for them, as 
compared to foreign workers with similar characteristics. Moreover, despite the positive 
effects for in-group favoritism generally reported in the literature, the magnitude of such 
favoritism may vary with multiple group-level contingent factors, including group norms 
(Sagiv and Schwartz 1995), within-group similarity (or lack of diversity) (Luijters et al. 
2008), and group size (Brewer and Kramer 1986; Simon and Hamilton 1994). 
Specifically, as in-group social norms and the conformity with norms become stronger, 
in-group favoritism tends to be stronger. Moreover, the strength of in-group favoritism is 
weaker in more diverse groups versus homogeneous groups. In addition to within-group 
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diversity, group size also matters. Individuals tend to show stronger in-group favoritism 
in smaller groups versus larger groups. 
2.2.4. Online Labor Markets  
Online labor markets facilitate the procurement of on-demand labor services across 
the borders of cities or countries. Recently, online labor markets have experienced 
tremendous growth and are projected to play a prominent role in the U.S. labor market.17 
Due to the low barrier to entry for workers from various countries and well-established 
arbitration systems, online labor markets enable employers to access a broad set of 
prospective workers by reducing search and transaction costs (Chen and Horton 2016; 
Chan and Wang 2017). That being said, online labor markets are also limited because of 
their impersonal nature. Specifically, unlike traditional labor markets in which employers 
can assess and verify workers’ capabilities through field interviews and their effort 
through manual monitoring, due to spatial and temporal separations, online labor markets 
have a higher degree of information asymmetry between workers and employers 
(Kokkodis and Ipeirotis 2015). In general, there are two forms of information asymmetry 
in online labor markets: ex ante information asymmetry associated with hard-to-observe 
worker capabilities or other productivity characteristics (Fong Boh et al. 2007; Huang 
and Zhang 2016), and ex post information asymmetry associated with hard-to-observe 
actions or effort. In many cases, employers make hiring decisions based on the limited 
information provided by the platform, such as reputation and workers’ countries of 
residence, and make inferences about workers’ quality and effort. Given that the worker 
                                                 
17 http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2014/10/21/the-next-big-thing-in-e-commerce-online-labor-
marketplaces/#5f62eb9c6117 
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country is a salient information cue, like reputation and wages, employers may consider it 
a cue for social categorization and use it to form their expectations about workers’ 
capabilities or effort expenditures, which will thus affect hiring decisions. Employers 
may therefore overvalue their expectations of local workers’ capabilities or effort due to 
higher trust in them or merely show home bias resulting from in-group bias.  
Moreover, home bias in online labor markets could be driven by either a statistical or 
taste-based mechanism. Specifically, the taste-based mechanism is due to employers’ 
inherent tastes or to stereotypes rooted in the cultural environment offering employers a 
higher nonpecuniary utility derived from working with in-group members (i.e., local 
workers) versus out-group members (i.e., foreign workers), whereas the statistical 
mechanism is mostly due to the aforementioned lack of information on worker 
capabilities and effort. Since employers’ taste-based home bias tends to be stable and 
persistent (Becker 1971), a feasible way of reducing the inefficiency costs associated 
with home bias would be to target employers’ statistical home bias with information 
shocks. 
2.3. Research Context and Data 
Most online labor markets follow a reverse, buyer-determined hiring mechanism 
(Hong et al. 2015). To hire workers in online labor markets, an employer first posts a 
project on a web-based platform such as Upwork, Freelancer, or Guru. Detailed 
information about the project such as requirements and budget are provided in the 
dedicated webpage for the project. Workers who are interested in the job opportunity then 
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bid on the project. After that, the employer makes a hiring decision based on the bid 
prices and workers’ characteristics (e.g., reputation, country) (Ye et al. 2014).18  
Compared to conventional offline labor markets, online labor markets offer a more 
suitable context for exploring employers’ home bias because of the following reasons. 
First, a key confounding factor in the estimation of employers’ home bias is the more 
common referrals given for local employers. For example, in offline labor markets, local 
employers may be more likely to hire local workers because of a potential direct social 
relationship between them or due to the higher reliability of job referrals from common 
acquaintances. Therefore, it is difficult to disentangle home bias from the unobserved 
differences in the number and reliability of referrals for local workers versus those for 
foreign workers. Owing to the impersonal nature of the online labor market, a social 
relationship between employers and prospective workers would be highly unlikely, which 
helps reduce concerns about the confounding influence of referrals. Further, while local 
employers can obtain more private information regarding prospective workers through 
field interviews, interviews in the offline setting tend to be proprietary and confidential, 
and thus usually unobservable to researchers. By contrast, because of the general lack of 
field interviews for online employment, employers’ hiring choices are generally 
attributed mainly to observable variables, which are also available to researchers. 
Moreover, in most cases, precise information about employers’ consideration sets and 
their hiring decisions in offline labor markets is not available to researchers, which forces 
researchers to rely on other untestable assumptions (e.g. independence of irrelevant 
                                                 
18 In rare cases a project can have multiple winners. In our main analysis, projects with more than one winner 
are dropped. The results of our analysis are consistent if we keep the projects with more than one winner. 
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alternatives (IIA), random missing values in decisions). Given the apparent advantages of 
online labor markets for the estimation of home bias, we opt to use a data set from 
Freelancer (www.freelancer.com), one of the largest online labor market platforms. 
On Freelancer, the employer may specify the project as a fixed-price project or a 
time-based project, and an employer pays a fixed amount or hourly wages, respectively, 
to the hired worker. Workers can browse active or ongoing projects on the website and 
selectively bid on them. Freelancer imposes a limit on the number of bids each worker 
can submit each month.19 It is therefore in the interest of the worker to bid on projects for 
which they are likely to be hired that maximize their expected total compensation.  
To rule out the effect of the auction format on employers’ choices, we limit our 
analysis to projects using the most common public, open-bid auction format. As such, 
special projects, such as those with NDA, featured projects, sealed bid projects, and full-
time projects are dropped from our sample. Further, to construct a homogenous sample of 
projects, we focus on projects in the most popular category, i.e., “IT, Software & 
Website.” In addition, in order to avoid the potential disproportionate influence of 
observations from several small countries, we restrict our sample to projects posted by 
employers from the top 25 employer countries, which account for 83.8% of total projects 
on Freelancer. It’s worth noting that our sample comprises 96.8% of projects including at 
least one bidder from the employer country. The definition and basic statistics of the key 
variables in our final sample are provided in Table 20. As Table 20 shows, on average, 
only 5% of bids are submitted from workers from the employer’s home country. 
                                                 
19 Free members could submit 8 bids per month. Gold members could submit more. However, the percentage 
of gold members in our data set is less than 0.1%. 
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Moreover, bidders vary greatly in terms of account tenure, project experience, and rating. 
Additionally, the percentage of bidders whose self-reported primary language is the same 
as the employer’s is as high as 76%, which is probably due to the dominance of English 
on Freelancer. Meanwhile, the percentage of bidders who reside in the same time zone 
and use the same currency as the employers is 2% and 45%, respectively. 
Table 20. Definitions and Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable Variable definition Mean SD Min Max 
A. Bids’ Characteristics     
Bid price The bid price posted by the worker 306.70 491.00 2.00 5000.00
20
 
Milestone 
percentage 
A feature provided by Freelancer, it 
denotes the percentage of controlled 
payments paid to the worker during 
the project 
73.72 33.31 0.00 120.0021 
Bidder tenure  
The worker's tenure at Freelancer 
measured in months 
31.60 28.70 0.00 183.00 
Homecountry 
A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the 
worker and the employer live in the 
same country  
0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Bid order rank 
The sequence order of the worker’s 
bid 
19.63 20.07 1.00 263.00 
Preferred 
freelancer 
A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the 
worker won the “Preferred 
Freelancer” badge 
0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Review count 
The number of reviews entered by 
previous employers 
81.67 175.14 0.00 3937.00 
Same language 
A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the 
employer’s primary language is the 
same as that of the worker on this 
platform 
0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Avg rating 
The average overall employer-entered 
ratings for the bidder  
4.00 1.60 0.00 5.00 
Same time zone 
A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the 
time zone in which the employer lived 
is the same as that of the worker. 
Inferred, based on the IP address 
0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Same currency 
A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the 
employer’s primary currency is the 
0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
                                                 
20 Because there are unreasonably large values in maximum bid prices and the win rate of those bids are all 
zeros, we dropped the top 1%. The results of our main analysis are consistent if we keep all the bids in our 
full sample. 
21 For time-based projects, there are a few cases in which the milestone percentage is larger than 100. This 
means that employers pay more than one hourly salary to workers when workers finish part of work. 
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same as that of the worker on the 
platform 
B. Project 
Characteristics 
     
Time-based 
A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the 
project is a time-based project; =0 if it 
is a fixed-price project 
0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Log (employer 
overall rating) 
The average overall worker-entered 
ratings for the employer (log-
transformed) 
1.77 0.15 0.00 1.79 
Language Eng 
A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the 
project is described in English 
0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Log (paid 
amount) 
Amount (in USD) paid by the 
employer after the project was 
completed (log-transformed) 
4.44 1.31 0.00 11.00 
Log (budget max) 
The maximum of bid prices for this 
project set by the employer (log-
transformed) 
4.74 1.44 0.69 11.78 
Log (title length) 
Number of characters in the project 
title (log-transformed) 
1.61 0.52 0.00 3.85 
Log (description 
length) 
Number of characters in the project 
description posted by the employer 
(log-transformed) 
2.77 0.30 0.00 3.26 
Employer 
developed 
A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the 
employer comes from a developed 
country 
0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 
C. Country 
Characteristics 
     
Trad value 
The average traditional value reported 
in the World Value Survey (Inglehart 
and Welzel 2010) 
-0.36 0.59 -1.58 1.48 
Cultural diversity 
The cultural diversity index measured 
by Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
0.26 0.15 0.02 0.67 
Log popu 
The log-transformed population size 
(in thousands) reported by the World 
Bank22 
11.39 1.37 8.41 14.13 
 
2.4. Empirical Evidence of Home Bias 
2.4.1. Model-free Evidence of Employers’ Home Bias 
To provide some model-free evidence of the existence of home bias, we summarize 
the basic statistics for the employment choice made by employers from the top 25 
                                                 
22 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?page=2 
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countries in Table 21.23 For each country, we first identify all employers from that 
country and then calculate the ratio of their projects assigned to bidders from his/her 
home country for each employer. Meanwhile, we also calculate the average ratio of 
projects assigned to bidders from each country on a whole. By checking the difference 
between these two ratios (the last column of Table 21), we find that most employers tend 
to prefer bidders from their home countries. This finding suggests that employers may 
have a home bias. Next, we will present our econometric identification strategies.  
Table 21. Country Distribution of International Employers’ Employment Decisions 
Employer’s 
country 
The awarded bidder’s country 
Share of 
projects 
assigned to 
bidders from 
that country 
Diff 
country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 
country1 4.11% 1.21% 0.43% 1.02% 38.26% 0.24% 0.04% 0.20% 2.61% 1.49% 
country2 2.41% 2.09% 0.28% 1.05% 40.48% 0.14% 0.05% 0.16% 1.22% 0.87% 
country3 2.05% 1.26% 2.57% 0.88% 43.12% 0.23% 0.02% 0.23% 0.53% 2.04% 
country4 3.59% 1.03% 0.39% 2.36% 36.77% 0.00% 0.10% 0.16% 0.95% 1.41% 
country5 1.69% 0.46% 0.09% 0.40% 59.65% 0.09% 0.06% 0.12% 41.58% 18.07% 
country6 2.72% 1.44% 0.15% 0.45% 36.61% 1.51% 0.00% 0.00% 0.24% 1.28% 
country7 1.85% 1.15% 0.09% 0.44% 42.03% 0.35% 0.18% 0.18% 0.05% 0.13% 
country8 1.64% 0.70% 0.47% 0.00% 47.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.23% 0.18% 0.05% 
Note: “Diff” refers to the difference between the share of projects assigned to bidders from country X among 
all the projects posted by employers from country X and the share of projects assigned to bidders from country 
X among all the projects. 
 
 
 
Table 21. Country Distribution of International Employers’ Employment Decisions 
(Cont’d) 
                                                 
23  Employment decision is a two-sided matching process, if no domestic workers bid on the project, 
employers’ hiring decision for that specific project will not influence the identification of employers’ home 
bias.  
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Employer’s 
country 
The awarded bidder’s country Share of 
projects 
assigned to 
bidders 
from that 
country 
Diff country
9 
country10  country11  country 
12 
 country 
13 
 country14 country15  country16 
country9 3.57% 0.12% 0.00% 0.00% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 12.33% 0.21% 3.37% 
country10 0.00% 2.23% 0.12% 0.00% 0.50% 0.25% 0.12% 8.44% 0.22% 2.02% 
country11 0.00% 0.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.45% 0.15% 0.00% 9.08% 0.10% -0.10% 
country12 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.16% 0.65% 0.00% 0.00% 8.87% 0.04% 0.13% 
country13 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.53% 0.14% 0.14% 7.82% 0.59% 3.93% 
country14 0.45% 0.75% 0.00% 0.00% 0.60% 3.00% 0.15% 9.30% 0.19% 2.81% 
country15 0.38% 0.19% 0.00% 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 0.58% 11.73% 0.08% 0.50% 
country16 0.12% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 21.91% 10.99% 10.92% 
Note: “Diff” refers to the difference between the share of projects assigned to bidders from country X 
among all the projects posted by employers from country X and the share of projects assigned to bidders 
from country X among all the projects. 
 
Table 21. Country Distribution of International Employers’ Employment Decisions 
(Cont’d) 
Employer’
s country 
The awarded bidder’s country 
 Share of 
projects 
assigned to 
bidders 
from that 
country 
Diff  country17  country18  country19  country20  country21  country22  country23  country24  country25 
country17 0.37% 0.00% 0.56% 0.93% 0.19% 0.00% 3.74% 3.93% 0.75% 0.10% 0.27% 
country18 0.00% 1.02% 0.61% 2.25% 0.20% 0.00% 1.02% 3.68% 0.82% 0.10% 0.92% 
country19 0.18% 0.36% 1.61% 2.14% 0.18% 0.00% 2.86% 6.61% 1.61% 0.40% 1.21% 
country20 0.24% 0.24% 0.71% 9.95% 0.00% 0.00% 2.61% 4.03% 0.71% 1.96% 8.00% 
country21 0.00% 0.00% 0.48% 2.14% 2.38% 0.48% 2.62% 5.95% 1.90% 0.43% 1.95% 
country22 0.30% 0.00% 0.30% 1.48% 0.30% 0.30% 1.18% 6.51% 0.59% 0.14% 0.16% 
country23 0.00% 0.00% 0.86% 0.58% 0.00% 0.29% 12.39% 3.75% 0.00% 2.37% 10.02% 
country24 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.34% 0.26% 0.00% 1.56% 29.09% 0.00% 5.07% 24.02% 
country25 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.49% 0.00% 0.00% 1.46% 3.88% 2.91% 1.01% 1.91% 
Note: “Diff” refers to the difference between the share of projects assigned to bidders from country X among 
all the projects posted by employers from country X and the share of projects assigned to bidders from country 
X among all the projects. 
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2.4.2. Identification Challenges 
In our context, we can precisely observe employers’ consideration sets, their location, 
reputation, and other individual-specific information, as well as detailed workers’ 
information. This offers a more fine-grained identification, and the omitted variable bias 
tend to be a smaller concern, compared to the gravity-equation based home bias analysis 
in the prior literature (Hortaçsu et al. 2009). We further control for the effect of static 
unobserved factors by employing models with project-specific fixed effects. In addition, 
we address the following identification challenges: First, geographical distance is 
confounded with some productivity-related factors for online employment that may add 
to friction between the employer and the worker (Hong and Pavlou 2017). To address this 
concern, we control for key differences between the bidder home country and the 
employer home country (language, time zone, currency). Second, workers from some 
countries with low GDPs are more desired, because they demand lower wages, and those 
countries (e.g., Pakistan) may be very different from countries where the majority of 
employers reside. To tackle this potential confounding factor, we control for bidders’ 
country effects via dummy variables. Moreover, in the robustness check section, we also 
control for the country-month two-way fixed effect to account for the potential time-
varying variations in terms of competitiveness and “market tightness”24 from a worker’s 
fellow countrymen in different projects.  
                                                 
24 We assume that as the number of bidders increase, the market competition becomes fiercer and the market 
tightness increases. 
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2.4.3. Identifying the Existence of Home Bias 
Following Ghani et al. (2014) and Lin et al. (2016), we estimate the extent of home 
bias with a conditional logit model, as well as a linear probability model (LPM) with 
project-level fixed-effects. Taking the conditional logit model as an example, the utility 
that the employer of project i obtains from hiring bidder j is constructed as follows: 
U (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖_𝑏𝑦_𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑗) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗    (4) 
where 𝛼𝑖 represents the project-level fixed effect, which nests the employer-level 
fixed effects, since every project only has one employer. The focal variable, 
𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗, denotes whether the employer of project i and bidder j are from the 
same country. In addition, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗)  includes various characteristics related to 
bidder 𝑗 and his or her bid—such as bidders’ review count, cumulative average rating, 
tenure, bid order rank, bid price, “Preferred Freelancer” badge, and whether bidder j 
shares the same language, uses the same currency, or is located in the same time zone as 
the employer, as well as bidder country dummies.25 It is assumed that 𝜀𝑖𝑗 follows the 
type-I extreme value distribution (Train 2009). A significant positive effect of 
𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 (captured by ?̂?1) suggests that, on average, employers in the focal online 
labor market hold a home bias. 
As mentioned before, there are two potential threats to our identification of the above 
model. First, time-invariant differences may exist across countries. For example, workers 
from some countries may be more competitive or require lower wages systematically. In 
response to this issue, we include 25 dummies for the top 25 countries in our sample and 
                                                 
25 Within data, a worker’s average rating is almost constant during our observational period. Therefore, we 
don’t treat the worker rating as a time-variant variable here.  
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one dummy for the rest of the bidder countries. Second, the productivity of workers may 
suffer from differences in languages and time-zones, which may result in a spurious 
home bias. Moreover, employers may also prefer local workers due to currency exchange 
frictions. To alleviate these concerns, we use additional dummies to control, respectively, 
for whether employers and workers speak the same primary language, use the same 
currency, and reside in the same time zone.  
As Model (1) in Table 22 suggests, without controlling for the similarities in 
language, currency, and time zone, employers show a preference for local workers. 
Employers’ home bias slightly decreases after we control for the language, currency, and 
time zone effects (see Model 3), but the magnitude of home bias is still quite significant. 
To better understand the economic impact of home bias, we use Equation (2) to compute 
its monetary value, a common approach adopted by previous studies (Leung 2017; Dahl 
and Sorenson 2010). According to the results estimated by the conditional logit model in 
Model (3) of Table 22, employers are willing to pay local workers 24.97% more than 
foreign workers. 26 
Δ𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝛽ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒                                                                                             (5) 
Table 22. Estimation Results of Employers’ Home Bias 
Sample Full sample Full sample 
Model (1) Logit (2) LPM (3) Logit (4) LPM 
Homecountry 0.516***(0.041) 0.042***(0.004) 0.387***(0.047) 0.032***(0.004) 
Same language   0.416***(0.026) 0.018***(0.001) 
Same currency   0.062***(0.021) 0.004***(0.001) 
Same time zone   0.255***(0.057) 0.025***(0.005) 
Log bid price -1.735***(0.018) -0.090***(0.001) -1.736***(0.018) -0.090***(0.001) 
Log milestone 
percentage -0.068***(0.016) -0.003***(0.001) -0.067***(0.016) -0.003***(0.001) 
Log review count 0.099***(0.007) 0.005***(0.000) 0.096***(0.007) 0.005***(0.000) 
                                                 
26 Exp(0.387/1.736)-100%=24.97%. 
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Log avg rating 0.102***(0.009) 0.003***(0.000) 0.103***(0.009) 0.003***(0.000) 
Log bid order rank -0.327***(0.013) -0.017***(0.001) -0.313***(0.014) -0.016***(0.001) 
Preferred freelancer 0.499***(0.018) 0.027***(0.001) 0.471***(0.018) 0.026***(0.001) 
Bidder country 
dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 371,968 371,968 371,968 371,968 
R-squared 0.486 0.043 0.494 0.044 
LogLik -47,740  -47,557  
AIC 95,542  95,182  
BIC 95,877  95,550  
Number of projects 23,943 23,943 23,943 23,943 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are 
dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is not 
included in our model because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly 
consistent if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly 
consistent if we control for the country-month two-way fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels 
of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results are highly consistent if we limit our 
sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-
type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). The results are highly consistent if we include the original bid price 
instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors clustered by projects are 
reported in parentheses. e) R-squared in the logit model is calculated based on the maximum likelihood R-
squared. f)* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
2.4.4. Robustness Checks 
Controlling for worker countries dummies in the main analyses reduces the potential 
existing differences of worker competitiveness across countries, and time-varying or 
project-specific contingent factors may influence the estimate of home bias. Here we use 
a multitude of measures to check the robustness of the results. First, we consider the 
potential time-varying variation in terms of competitiveness and “market tightness” from 
a worker’s fellow countrymen in different projects as potential confounding factors. We 
assume that as the number of bidders increases, the market competition becomes fiercer 
and the market tightness increases. Therefore, we calculate and control for the number of 
workers and the average rating of workers from each country within the employer’s 
specific consideration set. We find all the analysis, including the existence of home bias 
and the heterogeneity of home bias, to be highly consistent. Additionally, to further 
control for the potential time-varying worker competitiveness or cost difference across 
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countries, we control for the country-month two-way fixed effect and reexamine our 
analysis. For instance, workers from some countries may have a labor cost advantage 
owing to the lower purchasing power parity (PPP) of their countries or the lower 
exchange rate of local currencies. In such cases, the country-month two-way fixed effects 
should help to control for the time-varying difference in workers from different countries. 
Again, the results are highly consistent.  
Table 23. Robustness Results of Employers’ Home Bias 
Sample Full sample Full sample 
Model (1) Logit (2) LPM (3) Logit (4) LPM 
Homecountry 0.388***(0.046) 0.030***(0.004) 0.376***(0.047) 0.030***(0.004) 
Same language 0.413***(0.026) 0.017***(0.001) 0.418***(0.027) 0.017***(0.001) 
Same currency 0.064***(0.021) 0.004***(0.001) 0.067***(0.022) 0.004***(0.001) 
Same time zone 0.255***(0.057) 0.025***(0.005) 0.254***(0.057) 0.025***(0.005) 
Log bid price -1.735***(0.018) -0.090***(0.001) -1.744***(0.018) -0.090***(0.001) 
Log milestone percentage -0.068***(0.016) -0.003***(0.001) -0.072***(0.016) -0.003***(0.001) 
Log review count 0.097***(0.007) 0.005***(0.000) 0.098***(0.007) 0.005***(0.000) 
Log avg rating 0.102***(0.010) 0.001***(0.000) 0.101***(0.010) 0.001***(0.000) 
Log bid order rank -0.312***(0.013) -0.016***(0.001) -0.315***(0.014) -0.016***(0.001) 
Preferred freelancer 0.475***(0.018) 0.026***(0.001) 0.476***(0.018) 0.026***(0.001) 
log avg country rating 0.000      (0.011) 0.009***(0.001) 0.005      (0.012) 0.009***(0.001) 
log country bidder -0.093***(0.015) -0.002*    (0.001) -0.077***(0.015) -0.001      (0.001) 
Bidder country dummies Yes Yes -- -- 
Bidder country and 
month two-way fixed 
effects 
-- -- Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 371,968 371,968 371,968 371,968 
R-squared 0.490 0.045 0.487 0.048 
LogLik -47,538  -359,447  
AIC 95,148  720,063  
BIC 95,538  726,386  
Number of projects 23,943 23,943 23,943 23,943 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are 
dropped. Moreover, our sample is only limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is 
not included in our model because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly 
consistent if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly 
consistent if we control for the country-month two-way fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels 
of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results are highly consistent if we limit our 
sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-
type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). The results are highly consistent if we include the original bid price 
instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors clustered by projects are 
reported in parentheses. e) R-squared in the logit model is calculated based on the maximum likelihood R-
squared. f)* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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2.4.5. Additional Analysis: Home Bias at the City Level 
In line with the previous literature suggesting that consumers also have home bias at 
the state and city levels (Hortaçsu et al. 2009; Lin and Viswanathan 2015), we reexamine 
whether employers show additional bias toward local workers by leveraging the fact that 
Freelancer provides detailed users’ location information. As Table 24 shows, after 
controlling for the differences in language, currency, time zone, and country, employers 
have a significant positive preference for workers located in the same city as them. This 
city-level home bias may be mainly related to statistical discrimination, as living in the 
same city opens up the possibility of direct contract enforcement (Hortaçsu et al. 2009). 
Table 24. Estimation Results of City-level Home Bias  
Sample Full sample  
Model (1) Logit (2) LPM 
                                      DV: whether the bidder is awarded 
Same city 0.898***(0.142) 0.120***(0.022) 
Homecountry 0.363***(0.047) 0.029***(0.004) 
Same language 0.417***(0.026) 0.018***(0.001) 
Same currency 0.062***(0.021) 0.004***(0.001) 
Same time zone 0.239***(0.057) 0.024***(0.005) 
Log bid price -1.736***(0.018) -0.090***(0.001) 
Log milestone percentage -0.066***(0.016) -0.003***(0.001) 
Log review count 0.096***(0.007) 0.005***(0.000) 
Log avg rating 0.104***(0.009) 0.003***(0.000) 
Log bid order rank -0.313***(0.014) -0.016***(0.001) 
Preferred freelancer 0.471***(0.018) 0.026***(0.001) 
Country dummy Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 371,968 371,968 
R-squared 0.486 0.044 
LogLik -47,539  
AIC 95,148  
BIC 95,527  
Number of projects 23,943 23,943 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience 
with the employer are dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with 
only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is not included in our model because it 
is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly consistent if 
we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are 
highly consistent if we limit our sample to bids submitted by workers who bid 
on both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-type workers”) 
(Lin et al. 2016).  The results are highly consistent if we include the original bid 
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price instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard 
errors clustered by projects are reported in parentheses. e) R-squared in the 
Logit model is calculated based on the maximum likelihood R-squared. f)* 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
In summary, we find that employers show a significant positive preference for local 
workers, even after controlling for the effects of language, currency, and time zone. 
Moreover, employers from a country with stronger traditional values, a smaller user base 
(or population size), and lower diversity, tend to have a stronger home bias. The analysis 
of heterogeneity deepens our understanding of potential country characteristics associated 
with home bias, and it provides some correlational insights into the existence of the taste-
based home bias mechanism. Since the mechanism by which home bias manifests 
provides actionable implications about potential approaches to alleviate worker 
discrimination and loss of market efficiency, it is crucial to further understand the 
underlying driver of home bias in a causal framework. Therefore, to identify the 
mechanism of employers’ home bias, we take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in 
which ex post information asymmetry regarding workers’ effort was exogenously 
reduced following the introduction of an IT-enabled monitoring system. We explain the 
research setting and our identification strategy in the next section. 
2.5. Exploring the Mechanisms for Home Bias 
2.5.1. Identification Strategy Regarding the Mechanisms of Home Bias 
2.5.1.1. Testing Statistical Home Bias: A Quasi-Natural Experiment with Information 
Shock 
In this study, guided by the dynamic approach, we propose a new identification 
strategy by examining changes in information that reduce ex post information asymmetry 
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by providing detailed monitoring records reflecting each individual worker’s effort. On 
February 5, 2014, Freelancer started implementing a monitoring system, enabling 
employers to conveniently monitor the progress of time-based projects. This monitoring 
system automatically takes screenshots and keeps track of workers’ effort input (Figure 
5). This monitoring system potentially affects employers in the following two ways: 1) 
the monitoring system can ensure the production of high-quality work, especially when 
hiring foreign workers. The monitoring system automatically takes a screenshot every 
few minutes and allows employers to provide detailed instructions or comments 
regarding any step in the work process. As such, the monitoring system can improve 
efficiency for employers working with freelancers in an online setting. 2) The monitoring 
system allows employers to keep track of each individual worker’s work, so that 
employers have access to more verified information about individual worker efforts. Note 
that, according to the platform policy, the monitoring system is obligatory for all time-
based projects, but is not applicable to fixed-price projects. Given that there is an 
exogenous change in the availability of ex post information asymmetries among time-
based projects alone, we use time-based projects and fixed-price projects as the treatment 
and control groups, respectively, to investigate whether this information change caused 
by the monitoring system reduces employers’ home bias, which subsequently enables 
inferring whether the statistical discrimination mechanism accounts for home bias. Our 
rationale for this identification approach is that it explicitly anchors on examining 
whether monitoring decreases the role of worker country in shaping employers’ 
expectations about worker effort and can potentially lower employers’ statistical home 
bias in online labor markets.  
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Figure 5. Screenshots of the Monitoring System27 
According to the previous literature on statistical discrimination (Arrow 1973) and 
taste-based discrimination (Becker 1971), we make two distinct predictions about the 
underlying mechanisms of home bias following the introduction of the monitoring 
system. First, the introduction of an effective monitoring system, as a vital change in 
technology applied to online labor markets to alleviate ex post information asymmetry, 
will reduce employers’ reliance on trust as a means of mitigating workers’ opportunistic 
behaviors (Gulati 1995), which will thus attenuate employers’ statistical home bias. 
Without a monitoring system in place, employers tend to have limited information 
regarding workers’ effort and use trust to deter moral hazard (Barney and Hansen 1994; 
Lazzarini et al. 2008). In particular, the previous literature defines trust as one party’s 
confidence in the other party’s future benevolent behavior (Ring et al. 1992; Pavlou and 
                                                 
27 https://www.freelancer.com/community/articles/what-you-need-to-make-remote-collaboration-work 
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Dimoka 2006; Lado et al. 2008) and low likelihood of choosing opportunistic behavior 
(Gulati 1995), implying low expected moral hazard risk (i.e., higher expected effort) 
(Barney and Hansen 1994). Employers tend to have higher trust in local workers due to 
perceived familiarity (Gulati 1995; Ba and Paul 2002) and their beliefs in the societal 
norms and cultural values of their own countries (Hofstede 1980; Doney et al. 1998). As 
such, employers expect local workers to be less likely than foreign workers to exhibit 
shirking behaviors, and they therefore show statistical home bias for local workers. 
However, if an effective monitoring system is in place, employers can prevent employee 
shirking, regardless of workers’ home countries. This suggests that in the presence of an 
effective monitoring system, the difference in expected effort levels between local and 
foreign workers—and thus the level of statistical home bias—will be minimal. We thus 
predict that the information change imposed by the monitoring system will decrease 
employers’ statistical home bias. 
Our second prediction concerns taste-based discrimination, which is irrelevant to the 
availability of information and expected productivity, since it is based on personal likes 
or tastes, (Becker 1971; Rubineau and Kang 2012). Models of taste-based discrimination 
usually assume that employers show a constant distaste for foreign workers irrelevant to 
the unobservable characteristics of these workers (Becker 1971). If employers’ home bias 
is taste-based, they discriminate against foreign workers simply on the basis of their 
animus or prejudice toward them, rather than because of any beliefs about foreign 
workers’ higher probabilities of opportunistic behavior (Levitt 2004). Therefore, we 
predict that the introduction of an effective monitoring system would affect statistical 
discrimination but not taste-based discrimination (Becker 1971; Fang and Moro 2010). If 
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statistical discrimination is at play, we will expect to observe a significant decrease in the 
level of home bias. Therefore, we propose the following predictions (Table 25):  
Table 25. Types of Discrimination and Predictions 
Forms of 
Discrimination 
Dynamic Predictions about the Change in Home Bias 
Statistical 
discrimination 
After the introduction of the monitoring system, compared to 
the control group, employers’ ex post information 
asymmetry related to worker effort decreases in the 
treatment group (i.e., time-based projects), leading to a lower 
home bias  
Taste-based 
discrimination 
After the introduction of the monitoring system, compared to 
the control group, employers’ home bias remains unchanged 
in the treatment group (i.e., time-based projects) 
  
 
2.5.1.2. Testing Taste-Based Home Bias: Heterogeneity Analysis Based on In-group 
Favoritism 
Unlike statistical home bias which varies according to information shocks, taste-
based home bias, similar to other types of in-group bias, tends to be stable and shaped by 
the long-existing cultural environment within each group. Building on the literature 
regarding in-group favoritism (Chen and Li 2009), we intend to explore the potential 
heterogeneity of home bias across different employer countries with various strengths of 
norms, diversities, and population sizes. By investigating whether the strength of home 
bias varies as predicted by in-group favoritism, we can better understand the 
heterogeneity of home bias and further infer whether employers’ home bias is partially 
driven by the taste-based discrimination mechanism. Specifically, since employers’ 
statistical home bias is expected to be small following the introduction of the monitoring 
system, we use only the matched sample during the post-treatment period to examine the 
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heterogeneity of employers’ home bias. Below we expound on how the literature on in-
group favoritism predicts the heterogeneity of taste-based home bias. 
First, in-group social norms encourage in-group collaboration as well as discouraging 
out-group collaboration. According to Sagiv and Schwartz (1995), in-group favoritism is 
positively related to conformity with norms and the importance of traditional values. 
Following this logic, in the context of online labor markets, employers from countries 
with a deep-rooted nationalistic public mindset and a strong tendency toward conformity 
to cultural norms are more likely to show in-group favoritism and a preference for 
workers from the same group (country). Therefore, we expect that employers residing in 
countries emphasizing traditional and nationalistic values will tend to have a home bias, 
as they are subject to a strong influence of social norms and national identity. Regarding 
the measure of the emphasis on social norms and nationalistic mindset across countries, a 
widely-used measure is the traditional values28 reported in the World Values Survey 
(WVS).29  
                                                 
28 According to the World Values Survey (WVS), country culture can be categorized based on the extent to 
which a society emphasizes traditional rather than secular values. Countries with high traditional values 
emphasize the importance of religion, deference to authority, traditional family values and have high levels 
of national pride (Inglehart and Welzel 2010). Compared with other measures such as those defined by 
Hofstede (1991, 2001), the WVS measure is based on more representative samples, and it has been 
employed to measure country culture in the IS literature (e.g. Burtch et al. 2014; Hong and Pavlou 2017). 
In this paper, we employ the traditional value estimated by WVS to measure the importance of social 
norms and national identity. 
29 WVS is a worldwide survey which mainly relies on face-to-face interviews. By now, WVS has been 
conducted in almost 100 countries comprising around 90 percent of the global population. It covers 
multiple thematic subsections, such as social values and stereotypes, societal well-being, trust and 
organizational membership, and economic values. It mainly adopts the full probability sampling on primary 
sampling units (PSU) and requires no replacements. Since the WVS is a longitudinal data set and the 
traditional values of different countries may slightly fluctuate, we calculate the average traditional values 
(denoted as “Trad value”) for each country by combing multiple waves of WVS. 
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 Second, within-group diversity tends to weaken the importance of shared social 
identity and reduce in-group favoritism. As Luijters et al. (2008) suggest, individuals’ 
perceived levels of cultural-value similarity are correlated with their levels of 
identification with the group. As a result, we expect that employers from countries with 
greater cultural diversity would exhibit less home bias. Moreover, the previous literature 
provides a measure for cultural diversity among residents within each country—i.e, the 
country-specific cultural diversity index (Fearon 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
Specifically, this cultural diversity index measures the probability that every two 
individuals, randomly drawn from a country, speak a similar language (Fearon 2003). 
High levels of cultural diversity imply the potential of a low resemblance between 
employers and workers from this country, and thus a low taste-based home bias.  
Third, in-group favoritism may be influenced by group size. The literature has 
documented evidence that as the group size decreases, individuals tend to be more 
prosocial toward other in-group members in their transactional relationships (Brewer and 
Kramer 1986; Simon and Hamilton 1994), leading to a stronger in-group favoritism. 
Along these lines, home bias is likely weaker for employers from countries that are more 
populous.  
In summary, we build on prior research on in-group favoritism (Allen and Wilder 
1975; Chen and Li 2009; Efferson et al. 2008; DiDonato et al. 2011) to explore how 
employers’ home biases vary according to the traditional values, diversity, and 
population size of their countries in online labor markets. If the heterogeneity of 
employers’ home bias following the introduction of an effective monitoring system is 
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consistent with our predictions based on in-group favoritism literature, this lends support 
to the existence of a taste-based mechanism.  
2.5.2. Main Results Regarding the Mechanisms of Home Bias 
2.5.2.1. Coarsened Exact Matching  
To balance the distribution of observables between the treatment and control group, 
we conduct CEM to generate a comparable sample (King et al. 2010; Iacus et al. 2012). 
CEM is a matching approach based on the Monotonic Imbalance Bounding (MIB) 
method which prunes observables to increase the balance of sample distribution between 
the treated and control groups (Stuart 2010). Moreover, unlike the Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) approach which matches samples merely based on the expected 
probability of outcome variable, CEM is designed to balance the distribution of multiple 
covariates which are related to the treatment assignment between two groups (Iacus et al. 
2012). As such, CEM has two advantages—that is, the lower model dependence and the 
better balance among various coarsened levels of covariates (Iacus et al. 2012). 
Specifically, by using CEM, we explicitly match the fixed-price projects with time-based 
projects based on all the observables that might affect employers’ choice of contract type 
(Wu et al. 2012), including the length of project description, the length of title, the 
number of bids, the size of project, employers’ experience and reputation, and the exact 
submit month of the project. CEM allows us to match two types of projects posted within 
the exactly same month, of similar size, and with similar level of information disclosure 
and level of competition, without being burdened by the curse-of-dimensionality issues of 
one-to-one exact matching (King et al. 2009). By matching fixed-price projects with 
time-based projects from a multivariate perspective, CEM helps demonstrate the 
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robustness of our findings within a balanced sample. Consistent findings using an 
alternative matching method, PSM, are explicated in Appendix F. 
2.5.2.2. DID Estimation Results 
To measure the decrease in employers’ home bias after the introduction of the 
monitoring system, we construct the differences-in-differences estimation in both the 
conditional logit model and the linear probability model with the project-specific fixed 
effects based on the matched sample. Using the logit model as an example, the DID 
specification is given by: 
U (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖_𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑗) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 ×
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 × 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 × 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 ×
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                (6) 
A significantly positive effect of 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 prior to the introduction of 
monitoring systems (captured by ?̂?1  + ?̂?2) suggests that employers previously held home 
bias. Moreover, based on our previous discussions, if ?̂?4 is significantly negative, it 
implies that employers adjust their home bias according to available information 
provided by the monitoring system, which is known as statistical discrimination 
(Rubineau and Kang 2012).  
As expected, the coefficient of the 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 × 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖 (?̂?4) is 
significantly negative, which suggests that, for time-based projects, employers’ additional 
preferences for bidders from their home countries decrease as the monitoring system 
makes more ex post individual-specific information available. The decrease in 
employers’ home bias due to the introduction of the monitoring system suggests that 
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employers’ home bias cannot be attributed to taste-based discrimination. This lends 
support to the role of the statistical discrimination mechanism in shaping employers’ 
home bias. To better understand the strength and the economic value of home bias, we 
next examine the sizes of related coefficients based on the full sample. Specifically, we 
focus on the coefficients based on the conditional logit model instead of the linear model, 
because the logit model better accounts for the interdependence among hiring decisions 
on all the bids for the same project. Before the introduction of the monitoring system, the 
total effect of 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 is 0.953 ( ?̂?1 +  ?̂?2  = 0.219 + 0.759 = 0.978) while the 
coefficient of log (bid price) is -1.736. In this sense, the change in the bid price required 
to reach parity in workers’ likelihood of winning projects from foreign employers versus 
local employers is 1.757 (exp(0.978/1.736)=1.757). Given that the average hourly wage 
of foreign workers in time-based projects is USD 19.44, the effect of home bias translates 
to a premium of USD 14.70830 for local workers. However, after deploying the 
monitoring system, the effect of 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 is reduced to 0.085, implying that local 
workers have to charge a lower price premium after the monitoring system was 
implemented, all else being equal. In other words, the economic value of 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 
decreases to 0.776 dollars.31 Since only the level of statistical discrimination decreases 
due to the availability of ex post individual-specific information, our bootstrap results 
suggest that roughly 89.94% of home bias is driven by statistical discrimination.32 Given 
                                                 
30 19.44*[exp(0.978/1.736)-1]=14.708 
31 19.44*[exp(0.085/1.736)-1]=0.976 
32 We calculate the percentage of statistical home bias for each bootstrap sample. Based on 1,000 bootstrap 
samples, we find that on average the statistical bias percentage is 89.94%, implying that at least 89.94% of 
home bias is driven by statistical discrimination. 
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that monitoring is very likely to be imperfect and that it is not capable of alleviating ex 
ante information asymmetry, the statistical discrimination is not likely to completely 
disappear after the introduction of the monitoring system. Therefore, this number is a 
conservative estimate. In fact, our finding that statistical discrimination is the primary 
driver is consistent with Arrow’s statement (1971) which implies that perfect competition 
tends to drive out taste-based discrimination. Since online labor markets are prime 
examples of competitive two-sided markets, taste-based discrimination should play a 
relatively small role in hiring decisions in this context.  
Table 26. DID Estimation of Employers’ Home Bias 
Sample Full sample Matched sample 
Model (1) Logit (2) LPM (3) Logit (4) LPM 
Homecountry 0.219***(0.076) 0.016***(0.006) 0.307**  (0.141) 0.041**  (0.016) 
Time-basedHomecountry 0.759***(0.175) 0.088***(0.020) 0.709***(0.223) 0.081***(0.028) 
AfterHomecountry 0.223***(0.083) 0.020***(0.007) 0.169      (0.151) 0.015      (0.018) 
Time-
basedAfterHomecountry -1.116***(0.232) -0.119***(0.025) -1.073***(0.288) -0.129***(0.034) 
Same language 0.415***(0.026) 0.018***(0.001) 0.385***(0.043) 0.026***(0.003) 
Same currency 0.063**  (0.021) 0.004***(0.001) 0.084**  (0.035) 0.008***(0.003) 
Same time zone 0.250***(0.057) 0.025***(0.005) 0.404***(0.091) 0.052***(0.010) 
Log bid price -1.736***(0.018) -0.090***(0.001) -1.849***(0.032) -0.139***(0.002) 
Log milestone percentage -0.066***(0.016) -0.003***(0.001) -0.198***(0.026) -0.016***(0.002) 
Log review count 0.096***(0.007) 0.005***(0.000) 0.092***(0.012) 0.007***(0.001) 
Log avg rating 0.103***(0.009) 0.003***(0.001) 0.080***(0.014) 0.003***(0.001) 
Log bid order rank -0.313***(0.014) -0.016***(0.001) -0.328***(0.024) -0.025***(0.001) 
Preferred freelancer 0.471***(0.018) 0.026***(0.001) 0.450***(0.032) 0.040***(0.003) 
Bidder country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 371,968 371,968 86,840 86,840 
R-squared 0.489 0.044 0.486 0.071 
LogLik -47,545  -14,823  
AIC 95,163  29,720  
BIC 95,564  30,067  
Number of projects 23,943 23,943 9,028 9,028 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are 
dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is not 
included in our model because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly 
consistent if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly 
consistent if we control for the country-month two-way fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels 
of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results are highly consistent if we limit our 
sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-
type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). The results are highly consistent if we include the original bid price 
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instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors clustered by projects are 
reported in parentheses. e) R-squared in the Logit model is calculated based on the maximum likelihood 
R-squared. f)* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
In line with the previous literature (Autor 2003; Burtch et al. 2018; Chen et al. 2017), 
we explicitly test the parallel trend assumption of the DID model (Angrist and Pischke 
2008) by checking whether the control group (fixed-price projects) has the same trend as 
the treatment group (time-based projects). Accordingly, we estimate the time-varying 
change in employers’ home bias for time-based projects based on the following equation: 
U(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖_𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑗) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 ×
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝜌𝜏𝑡 × 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇( 𝜏𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗 × 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗) +
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                                                             (6) 
where 𝜏𝑡 represents a vector of time dummies and {𝜇} denotes the matrix of relative 
time parameters of employer 𝑖’ home bias for bidder 𝑗 estimated at time 𝑡. Estimating the 
treatment effect at different time periods enables us to examine the potential pretreatment 
trend. Specifically, given that the monitoring system was implemented on February 5, 2014, 
we use the quarter prior to the actual treatment (from October 2013 to January 2014) as the 
baseline (Autor 2003). According to Table 27 and Figure 6, all the relative time parameters 
are insignificantly positive prior to the introduction, while most of the relative time 
parameters in both the conditional logit model and the linear probability model turn out to 
be negative. In summary, the results of such an event study design suggest that a preexisting 
downward trend is unlikely to exist prior to the introduction of the monitoring system. 
Table 27. Estimation Results of the Relative Time Model 
Sample Full sample Full sample 
Model (1) Logit (2) LPM 
Homecountry 0.260** (0.110) 0.025** (0.010) 
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Time-basedHomecountry 0.783*** (0.295) 0.100*** (0.035) 
Quarter𝑡−3 Homecountry 0.044 (0.184) -0.004 (0.015) 
Quarter𝑡−2 Homecountry -0.179 (0.165) -0.025* (0.013) 
Quarter𝑡−1 Homecountry Omitted baseline 
Quarter𝑡+0 Homecountry 0.024 (0.146) 0.008 (0.014) 
Quarter𝑡+1 Homecountry 0.188 (0.137) 0.015 (0.012) 
Quarter𝑡+2 Homecountry 0.229* (0.128) 0.008 (0.011) 
Quarter𝑡+3 Homecountry 0.276 (0.172) 0.017 (0.016) 
Quarter𝑡−3 Time-basedHomecountry -0.671 (0.462) -0.066 (0.056) 
Quarter𝑡−2 Time-basedHomecountry 0.469 (0.413) 0.025 (0.047) 
Quarter𝑡−1 Time-basedHomecountry Omitted baseline 
Quarter𝑡+0 Time-basedHomecountry -0.995** (0.439) -0.133*** (0.051) 
Quarter𝑡+1 Time-basedHomecountry -0.776** (0.385) -0.105** (0.044) 
Quarter𝑡+2 Time-basedHomecountry -1.413*** (0.394) -0.144*** (0.043) 
Quarter𝑡+3 Time-basedHomecountry -1.896*** (0.608) -0.167*** (0.051) 
Same language 0.413*** (0.026) 0.018*** (0.001) 
Same currency 0.063*** (0.021) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Same time zone 0.251*** (0.057) 0.025*** (0.005) 
Log bid price -1.737*** (0.018) -0.090*** (0.001) 
Log milestone percentage -0.065*** (0.016) -0.003*** (0.001) 
Log review count 0.096*** (0.007) 0.005*** (0.000) 
Log avg rating 0.103*** (0.009) 0.003*** (0.000) 
Log bid order rank -0.313*** (0.014) -0.016*** (0.001) 
Preferred freelancer 0.471*** (0.018) 0.026*** (0.001) 
Country dummy Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 371,968 371,968 
R-squared 0.490 0.044 
LogLik -47,537  
AIC 95,168  
BIC 95,677  
Number of projects 23,943 23,943 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are 
dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is 
not included in our model because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly 
consistent if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly 
consistent if we control for the country-month two-way fixed effect and the potential time-varying 
levels of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results are highly consistent if we 
limit our sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects 
(named as “dual-type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). The results are highly consistent if we include the 
original bid price instead of the log-transformed bid price to the model. d) The results are highly 
consistent if we limit our sample to the sample matched by the CEM method. e) Robust standard errors 
clustered by projects are reported in parentheses. f) R-squared in the logit model is calculated based on 
the maximum likelihood R-squared. g)* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Note: This graph is plotted by quarter-level relative time parameters. The dash vertical line denotes 
the quarter when Freelancer first implemented the monitoring system (from October 2013 to January 
2014). Error bars denote the 90% confidence intervals calculated based on clustered standard errors. 
Figure 6. Coefficients of the Relative Time DID Estimates of the Treatment Effect  
 
2.5.2.3. Heterogeneity of Home Bias 
As the model-free evidence in Table 21 shows, the preference of employers toward 
workers from home countries tends to vary across countries. However, since the model-
free evidence might be confounded by multiple differences across worker countries (e.g., 
lower labor costs), the heterogeneities of home bias require formal analyses. Therefore, 
we further investigate how the strength of home bias may be associated with the 
traditional values, diversity, and population size of the employer’s home country with the 
conditional logit model and the LPM.  
Based on the results reported in Tables 28-31, we find that employers show home 
bias before and after the introduction of the monitoring system. Specifically, we focus on 
the post-treatment sample because the statistical homebias is expected to be minimal with 
the accessibility of more detailed individual information. We find that the strength of 
employers’ home bias 1) is positively related to the traditional values of the employer 
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country, such that employers from countries with a strong nationalistic outlook among 
residents have a stronger home bias (Inglehart and Welzel 2010); 2) is negatively 
associated with the country-specific cultural diversity (Fearon and Laitin 2003); 3) is 
negatively related to the population size of the employer country after the introduction of 
the monitoring system. Moreover, the results remain highly consistent after controlling 
for the competition among workers from the same country. The marginal effects of these 
interactions are visualized in Figure 7. Based on the marginal effect estimation, one 
standard deviation increase from the average traditional values is associated with a 
0.0006 increase in the probability of being hired. Similarly, an increase of one standard 
deviation from both the average cultural diversity and the average log-transformed 
population size is associated with a decrease in the probability of being hired of 0.0005 
and 0.0006, respectively. Overall, the heterogeneous effects indicate that employers’ 
home bias is influenced by context-contingent factors, which seems to suggest that at 
least a portion of employers’ home bias is related to their stereotyped liking and 
preferences. 
 
Table 28. Estimation Results of Heterogeneity with Conditional Logit Model 
 (Pre-monitoring) 
Sample Pre-monitoring sample 
Homecountry 0.837***(0.129) 0.697***(0.165) 2.206***(0.724) 2.416***(0.615) 
Trad valueHomecountry 0.478***(0.163)   0.352***(0.111) 
Cultural 
diversityHomecountry 
 -0.659*    (0.374)  -1.086***(0.363) 
Log popu 
sizeHomecountry 
  -0.140**  (0.057) -0.113**  (0.057) 
Same language 0.363***(0.052) 0.355***(0.048) 0.355***(0.048) 0.433***(0.035) 
Same currency 0.022      (0.042) 0.039      (0.039) 0.036      (0.039) 0.068**  (0.027) 
Same time zone 0.350***(0.109) 0.249**   (0.103) 0.240**  (0.104) 0.286***(0.070) 
Log bid price -1.927***(0.037) -1.926***(0.034) -1.925***(0.034) -1.656***(0.024) 
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Log milestone percentage -0.054*    (0.028) -0.038      (0.026) -0.038      (0.026) -0.078***(0.023) 
Log review count 0.093***(0.014) 0.089***(0.013) 0.090***(0.013) 0.099***(0.009) 
Log avg rating 0.134***(0.018) 0.141***(0.017) 0.141***(0.017) 0.089***(0.012) 
Log bid order rank -0.418***(0.025) -0.413***(0.023) -0.413***(0.023) -0.267***(0.018) 
Preferred freelancer 0.508***(0.035) 0.496***(0.032) 0.496***(0.032) 0.475***(0.024) 
Bidder country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 95,030 110,794 110,794 95,030 
R-squared 0.535 0.534 0.534 0.536 
LogLik -12,685 -14,767 -14,765 -12678 
AIC 25,441 29,604 29,601 25,429 
BIC 25,772 29,940 29,938 25,779 
Number of projects 6,937 8,032 8,032 6,937 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are 
dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is not 
included in our model because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly 
consistent if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly 
consistent if we control for the country-month two-way fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels 
of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results are highly consistent if we limit our 
sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-
type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016).  The results are highly consistent if we include the original bid price 
instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors clustered by projects are 
reported in parentheses; e) R-squared is calculated based on the maximum likelihood R-squared; f) * p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Table 29. Estimation Results of Heterogeneity with Linear Probability Model 
(Pre-monitoring) 
Sample Pre-monitoring sample 
Homecountry 0.077***(0.015) 0.056***(0.014) 0.229***(0.073) 0.259**  (0.113) 
Trad valueHomecountry 0.059***(0.022)   0.057**  (0.025) 
Cultural 
diversityHomecountry 
 -0.057*     (0.033)  -0.078      (0.063) 
Log popu 
sizeHomecountry 
  -0.015***(0.006) -0.012      (0.011) 
Same language 0.014***(0.003) 0.014***(0.002) 0.014***(0.002) 0.015***(0.003) 
Same currency 0.004       (0.002) 0.005**  (0.002) 0.004*    (0.002) 0.004      (0.002) 
Same time zone 0.035***(0.009) 0.026***(0.009) 0.024***(0.009) 0.035***(0.009) 
Log bid price -0.108***(0.002) -0.107***(0.002) -0.107***(0.002) -0.108***(0.002) 
Log milestone percentage -0.004**  (0.002) -0.003**  (0.001) -0.003**(0.001) -0.004**  (0.002) 
Log review count 0.005***(0.001) 0.005***(0.001) 0.005***(0.001) 0.005***(0.001) 
Log avg rating 0.003***(0.001) 0.004***(0.001) 0.004***(0.001) 0.003***(0.001) 
Log bid order rank -0.025***(0.002) -0.024***(0.001) -0.024***(0.001) -0.025***(0.002) 
Preferred freelancer 0.031***(0.003) 0.030***(0.003) 0.030***(0.003) 0.031***(0.003) 
Bidder country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 95,030 110,794 110,794 95,030 
R-squared 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.056 
Number of projects 6,937 8,032 8,032 6,937 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are dropped. 
Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is not included in our model 
because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly consistent if we include Log (bidder 
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tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly consistent if we control for the country-month two-way 
fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results 
are highly consistent if we limit our sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based 
projects (named as “dual-type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016).  The results are highly consistent if we include the original 
bid price instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors clustered by projects are 
reported in parentheses; e) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 30. Estimation Results of Heterogeneity with Conditional Logit Model 
(Post-monitoring) 
Sample Post-monitoring sample 
Homecountry 0.598***(0.084) 0.881***(0.108) 2.932***(0.467) 2.416***(0.615) 
Trad valueHomecountry 0.414***(0.109)   0.352***(0.111) 
Cultural 
diversityHomecountry 
 -1.369***(0.244)  -1.086***(0.363) 
Log popu 
sizeHomecountry 
  
-0.205***(0.037) 
-0.113**  (0.057) 
Same language 0.442***(0.035) 0.440***(0.032) 0.441***(0.032) 0.433***(0.035) 
Same currency 0.068**  (0.027) 0.067***(0.026) 0.066**(0.025) 0.068**  (0.027) 
Same time zone 0.295***(0.071) 0.228***(0.068) 0.217***(0.068) 0.286***(0.070) 
Log bid price -1.654***(0.024) -1.654***(0.022) -1.654***(0.022) -1.656***(0.024) 
Log milestone percentage -0.077***(0.023) -0.091***(0.021) -0.091***(0.021) -0.078***(0.023) 
Log review count 0.099***(0.009) 0.101***(0.009) 0.102***(0.009) 0.099***(0.009) 
Log avg rating 0.089***(0.012) 0.087***(0.011) 0.086***(0.011) 0.089***(0.012) 
Log bid order rank -0.266***(0.018) -0.263***(0.017) -0.262***(0.017) -0.267***(0.018) 
Preferred freelancer 0.474***(0.024) 0.466***(0.022) 0.465***(0.022) 0.475***(0.024) 
Bidder country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 217,135 261,174 261,174 217,135 
R-squared 0.472 0.473 0.490 0.473  
LogLik -27,586 -32,671 -32,672 -27564 
AIC 55,241 65,413 65,414 55,202 
BIC 55,601 65,779 65,780 55,582 
Number of projects 13,557 15,911 15,911 13,557 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are 
dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is not 
included in our model because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly 
consistent if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly 
consistent if we control for the country-month two-way fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels 
of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results are highly consistent if we limit our 
sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-
type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016).  The results are highly consistent if we include the original bid price 
instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors clustered by projects are 
reported in parentheses; e) R-squared is calculated based on the maximum likelihood R-squared; f) * p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 31. Estimation Results of Heterogeneity with Linear Probability Model 
(Post-monitoring) 
Sample Post-monitoring sample 
Homecountry 0.053***(0.009) 0.079***(0.010) 0.271***(0.045) 0.217***(0.059) 
Trad valueHomecountry 0.039***(0.012)   0.036***(0.013) 
Cultural 
diversityHomecountry 
 -0.129***(0.022)  -0.116***(0.034) 
Log popu 
sizeHomecountry 
  
-0.019***(0.004) 
-0.009*    (0.005) 
Same language 0.019***(0.001) 0.019***(0.001) 0.019***(0.001) 0.019***(0.001) 
Same currency 0.004**  (0.001) 0.003**  (0.001) 0.003**(0.001) 0.004**  (0.001) 
Same time zone 0.030***(0.006) 0.024***(0.006) 0.023***(0.006) 0.030***(0.006) 
Log bid price -0.085***(0.001) -0.083***(0.001) -0.083***(0.001) -0.085***(0.001) 
Log milestone percentage -0.003***(0.001) -0.004***(0.001) -0.004***(0.001) -0.003***(0.001) 
Log review count 0.005***(0.000) 0.005***(0.000) 0.005***(0.000) 0.005***(0.000) 
Log avg rating 0.003***(0.001) 0.003***(0.000) 0.002***(0.000) 0.003***(0.001) 
Log bid order rank -0.013***(0.001) -0.012***(0.001) -0.012***(0.001) -0.013***(0.001) 
Preferred freelancer 0.026***(0.002) 0.025***(0.001) 0.025***(0.001) 0.026***(0.002) 
Bidder country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 217,135 261,174 261,174 217,135 
R-squared 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.042 
Number of projects 13,557 15,911 15,911 13,557 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are dropped. 
Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is not included in our model 
because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly consistent if we include Log (bidder 
tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly consistent if we control for the country-month two-way 
fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results 
are highly consistent if we limit our sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based 
projects (named as “dual-type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016).  The results are highly consistent if we include the original 
bid price instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors clustered by projects are 
reported in parentheses; e) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Note: All the marginal plots are generated with the assumption that fixed effect is zero. 
Figure 7. Heterogeneity of Marginal Effects of the Homecountry Dummy Based on Logit 
Model 
 
2.6. Robustness Checks regarding the Mechanisms for Home Bias 
In the research design for quasi-natural experiments, the identification challenges 
mainly come from two sources: 1) the violation of the differences-in-differences model 
assumption (Autor 2003; Abadie 2005), and 2) selection on observables (Abadie 2005; 
Altonji et al. 2005) and selection on unobservables (Dale et al. 2002; Altonji et al. 2005; 
Oster 2016). Next, we will explain how we deal with each of these identification 
challenges.  
First, to further examine whether the treatment group (time-based projects) and the 
control group (fixed-price projects) follow the parallel trend assumption, we provide two 
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related tests in our robustness check section. In our main analysis, we show that the 
control group follows the same trend as the treatment group prior to the introduction of 
the monitoring system. This result suggests that the control group serves as a valid 
counterfactual of the treatment group. Furthermore, we conduct a placebo test by testing 
whether our DID estimate is robust to alternative variance-covariance specifications. 
Again, the results shown in Section 2.6.3 lend support to the significant treatment effect 
on employers’ home bias. 
Second, we address the selection on observables issue by matching fixed-price 
projects with time-based projects, and we tackle the issue of selection on unobservables 
by employing instrumental variables (IV) and estimating the coefficient stability. 
Specifically, we employ both the CEM and PSM algorithms to generate matched samples 
and still find similar treatment effects on home bias in Appendix F. Further, we employ 
the IV method to estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) in Section 2.6.1 and 
further demonstrate that our results are unlikely to be explained by selection on 
unobservables in Section 2.6.2. Therefore, our results are robust to the omitted variable 
bias. 
2.6.1. Instrumental Variables Analysis 
With the introduction of the monitoring system that enables us to explore the 
mechanism of home bias through a quasi-natural experiment, there are two potential 
endogeneity concerns when unobserved characteristics might be correlated with 
employers’ hiring decisions: 1) there may be potential unobserved variables that affect 
both employers’ preference for contract type and hiring preference; 2) bidders may infer 
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employers’ preferences and determine their bid prices accordingly.33 To alleviate these 
concerns, we employ both the 2SLS and the conditional logit model with the control 
function method to estimate the local average treatment effect  (Angrist et al. 1996; 
Angrist 2004)—i.e., the causal effect of the monitoring system on the margin of home 
bias. 
First, regarding the potential endogenous contract type, we need instruments that are 
associated with the contract type but not with the error term (𝜀𝑖𝑗) for employers’ hiring 
decisions. Since employers’ time-invariant preference for time-based contracts is nested 
within the project-specific fixed-effects, we only need to instrument employers’ time-
varying preference for time-based contracts. Specifically, we employ two instruments: 1) 
the “residual” type IV (Dobbie et al. 2018; Arnold et al. 2018): a residualized, leave-out 
employers’ tendency to use time-based contracts that accounts for selection bias (Dahl et 
al. 2014; Dobbie et al. 2018); 2) the “Hausman” type IV (Hausman et al. 1994; Schneide 
2010; Ghose et al. 2012). Since the employers’ tendency to use time-based contracts 
might be related to employers’ characteristics, the simple leave-out mean of employers’ 
contract types or and the lagged term of employers’ contract types (the employer’s last-
used contract type) may still be influenced by the selection concern. Therefore, we 
predict employers’ contract type choices with employer-specific fixed-effect, observable 
project characteristics—i.e., time dummies—and calculate the residuals. Here, the 
residuals may capture the specific unobserved project characteristics or the match 
                                                 
33 Since employers’ hiring preference is estimated given the bid prices submitted by workers, this will not be 
a concern if we are only interested in the extent to which the statistical discrimination mechanism could 
explain employers’ home bias. We instrument for it to better estimate the monetary value of employers’ home 
bias. 
  108 
between the employers’ monitoring cost function and the specific project characteristics. 
Since these residuals capture the idiosyncratic features of the specific project, they are 
unlikely to correlate with the hiring decisions of a different project in the LPM with 
project-specific fixed effects or with the conditional logit setting. Therefore, we use the 
leave-out mean of residuals as the instrument for contract type. Moreover, following the 
previous literature (Hausman et al. 1994; Hausman 1996; Schneide 2010; Ghose et al. 
2012), we use the percentage of time-based contract types in other rivals’ projects which 
are submitted in the same week of the focal project as the instrument for employers’ 
contract type choice (Ghose et al. 2012). This variable is theoretically a valid instrument 
for the following reasons. First, similar to Hausman’s (1996) approach, after controlling 
for the project-specific fixed effect, worker characteristics, and bid characteristics, we 
assume that employer-specific utility from hiring worker j for project i is uncorrelated 
with other employers’ contract type choices (exogeneity). Second, the contract type 
choice of the employer for project i is correlated with other employers’ contract type 
choices within the same week because the employer’s choice is likely influenced by the 
common platform environment or the preference of other employers’ contract types given 
the common labor supply force (relevance). 
With regard to the second potential endogenous variable, workers’ bid price, we take 
advantage of the exogenous “cost-shifter” from the supply side (the exogenous variation 
in the exchange rate of different currencies relative to the U.S. dollar) as the instrumental 
variable (Nevo 2000; Hong and Pavlou 2017). Since the exchange rate of local currencies 
against the U.S. dollar is negatively correlated with the actual purchasing power of the 
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final payment and workers’ reservation wage,34 we expect the exogenous variation of 
normalized exchange rates of various currencies would be negatively related to workers’ 
bid prices.  
To estimate the treatment effect according to both the linear probability model and 
the conditional logit model, we employ the 2SLS and control function method, 
respectively. First, in the linear probability setting, there are three endogenous variables 
in the LPM, including 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑̂ 𝑖, 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 × 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 ×
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑̂ 𝑖 and bidders’ bid price 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒̂ 𝑖𝑗. Since bidder j’s bidding decision 
(𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗) and the platform’s decision to implement monitoring systems (𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖) 
are exogenous factors, we can have four instrumental variables by assuming that the error 
term in predicting project i’s contract type (𝜂𝑘𝑖) is uncorrelated with the error term in 
employers’ hiring decision equation (𝜀𝑖𝑗), including 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 ×
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑡_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖, 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 × 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖, 
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 × 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 × 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑡_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖and 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖  ×
𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒country𝑖𝑗 × 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖. In the logit model estimation scenario, we 
employ the control function to estimate the treatment effect. Specifically, following the 
previous literature (Petrin and Train 2009; Polyakova 2016), we assume the linearity and 
additive separability of the unobservables, and include the residuals of the first stage of 
the 2SLS model into the control function of the conditional logit model.  
Based on the first-stage of 2SLS, we find that all the four instrument variables related 
to contract types are significantly correlated with time-based contract dummy. 
                                                 
34 The final contract price is measured in the currency set by the employer. To rule out the unobserved 
workers’ preference for currencies, we rule out those projects whose currencies are not U.S. dollar. 
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Specifically, when there are more time-based projects posted by other employers within a 
certain week, it is less likely that employers will choose time-based projects. Moreover, 
the higher residualized, leave-out employers’ tendency to use time-based contracts 
implies that employers will be more likely to choose time-based projects. Additionally, 
when the exchange rate of local currencies against the U.S. dollar is higher, workers tend 
to bid lower prices. We also conduct the weak identification test and find that the Cragg-
Donald Wald F statistic is 78.97 and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic is 65.48, 
which are above the Stock and Yogo (2005) suggested cut-off values. Therefore, the 
week instrument issue is not a concern in our study. Our over-identification test statistic 
(Hansen J statistic is 0.552, Chi-sq(2) p-value is 0.7589) suggests that the failure to reject 
the null hypothesis that the instruments used are exogenous. 
Additionally, we adjust the standard error for the conditional logit model with the 
control function by calculating the bootstrap error clustering at the project level. As Table 
32 suggests, employers reduce their home bias after the introduction of the monitoring 
system. The results are highly consistent after employing the IV estimation on the 
matched sample.  
Table 32. IV Estimation of Employers’ Home Bias in the Quasi-Natural Experiment 
Sample Full sample Full sample 
Model                    (1) 2SLS  (2) Logit Control Function 
Homecountry 0.010 (0.008) 0.103 (0.104) 
Time-basedHomecountry 0.108*** (0.029) 0.989*** (0.275) 
AfterHomecountry 0.016* (0.009) 0.243** (0.113) 
Time-basedAfterHomecountry -0.156*** (0.037) -1.437*** (0.370) 
Same language -0.123*** (0.033) 0.307*** (0.095) 
Same currency 0.030*** (0.006) 0.050  (0.032) 
Same time zone 0.005** (0.002) 0.238*** (0.077) 
Log bid price 0.024*** (0.006) -1.737*** (0.031) 
Log milestone percentage -0.005*** (0.002) -0.090*** (0.020) 
Log review count 0.005*** (0.000) 0.103*** (0.008) 
Log avg rating 0.003*** (0.001) 0.098*** (0.011) 
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Log bid order rank -0.020*** (0.005) -0.310*** (0.015) 
Preferred freelancer 0.027*** (0.002) 0.464*** (0.023) 
Bidder country dummy Yes  Yes  
Project fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Observations 263,75235  234,736   
R-squared 0.041  0.466  
LogLik   -33,257  
AIC   66,595  
BIC   67,009  
Number of projects 20,255  17,903   
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are 
dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is 
not included in our model because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly 
consistent if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly 
consistent if we control for the country-month two-way fixed effect and the potential time-varying 
levels of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results are highly consistent if we 
limit our sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects 
(named as “dual-type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016).  The results are highly consistent if we include the 
original bid price instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors 
clustered by projects are reported in parentheses. e) the significance levels and standard errors of all 
the coefficients in the control function are calculated after 1,000 bootstrap cycles. f) R-squared in the 
logit model is calculated based on the maximum likelihood R-squared; g) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
2.6.2. Selection on Unobservables 
In the previous subsection, we employed the CEM approach and instrumental 
variables to address the concern that unobserved project features may drive both the 
contract type and employers’ home bias. It is possible that the average treatment effects 
estimated based on the matched sample, or the local average treatment effects estimated 
with instrumental variables, may tend to overestimate the treatment effect because the 
average causal effect for the “complier” group estimated by the IV approach may be 
higher than the average treatment effect for the whole population (Angrist et al. 1996). In 
order to assess the robustness of our findings among the more general population, we 
employ another method to alleviate the omitted variable bias concern—that is, selection 
                                                 
35 Because we obtain the monthly short-term interest rate of each worker country from the OECD data 
website: https://data.oecd.org/interest/short-term-interest-rates.htm, those workers whose home countries’ 
interest rate information is not provided by this website are ruled out of the IV estimation.  
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on unobservables (Altonji et al. 2005; Oster 2016). Though it is difficult to consider and 
control for all potential unobservables that simultaneously correlate with the project 
contract type and the employers’ hiring decisions in a systematic way, we use the 
selection on unobservables approach to estimate the sensitivity of our estimated home 
bias and treatment effect in terms of the selection issue (Altonji et al. 2005; Oster 2016). 
This method offers a way of assessing the degree of selection on unobservables based on 
the degree of selection on observables. In other words, we can evaluate the sensitivity of 
our estimated coefficients to the relevant unobservables by inferring from the movement 
of coefficients and R-squared.  
By employing the selection on unobservables approach, we assess the sensitivity of 
our findings to the omitted variable bias and generate the lower/upper bounds of reported 
home bias and treatment effect. First, we evaluate the possibility that the estimated home 
bias and treatment effect of monitoring may be driven by selection on unobservables. 
Following the previous literature (Dale and Krueger 2002; Altonji et al. 2005; Oster 
2016), we assess the minimum of selection on unobservables which can explain away the 
home bias and treatment effect found in the previous analysis. Specifically, we use 
parameter 𝛿 to denote the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables. 
We find that the selection on unobservables needs to be at least twice as strong as the 
selection of observables (|𝛿1| ≥ 3.414 for the reported home bias; |𝛿2| ≥ 2.601 for the 
estimated treatment effect) in order for the selection bias to completely explain away the 
observed home bias and treatment effect of monitoring. Further, since the previous 
literature (Dale and Krueger 2002; Altonji et al. 2005; Oster 2016) suggests that, at most, 
equal selection (|𝛿| ≤ 1) on unobservables and observables is a well-accepted 
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assumption, our results (|𝛿1| ≥ 3.414 and |𝛿2| ≥ 2.601) imply that it is very unlikely 
that the estimated home bias and treatment effect are driven by the omitted variable bias. 
The result with “|𝜙| ≥ 1” indicates that the estimate is not sensitive to the effect of 
unobservables. Specifically, |𝜙| = 1 refers to an extreme scenario—observables are 
randomly selected from all factors that can affect the outcome (Altonji et al. 2005). In our 
paper, we select observables that tend to have substantial explanatory power in contract 
choice and hiring choice—such as project-level fixed effects, project size, employers’ 
reputation and experience, and bidders’ reputation. Therefore, we have strong reasons for 
believing that the selection on unobservables is weaker than the selection on observables 
(Altonji et al. 2005). In other words, our results suggest that the reported home bias and 
the treatment effect of monitoring are not sensitive to the effect of unobservables. 
Second, as suggested by Oster (2016), we construct the lower bound and the upper 
bound of the estimated home bias and treatment effect, using 𝛿 = 0 (when there is no 
selection on unobservables) and 𝛿 = 1 (when the amount of selection on unobservables is 
equal to that of selection on observables) as the boundaries. As shown in Table 33, we 
find that both the upper bound and the lower bound of the coefficient of the 
“Homecountry” dummy are greater than zero, and that those bounds of the estimated 
treatment effect are negative. This result lends support to the existence of home bias, 
especially the statistical home bias. 
Table 33. Sensitivity Analysis of the Coefficients using the Method of Selection on 
Unobservables 
𝜃𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑟𝑦     Home bias 𝜃𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑟𝑦𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑  Treatment effect 
|𝛿1| when 𝜃𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑟𝑦 =0       |𝛿1| = 3.414 
|𝛿2| when  
𝜃𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑛𝑟𝑦𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒−𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 =0 
|𝛿2| =2.601 
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Lower bound       0.023 Lower bound -0.258 
Upper bound       0.027 Upper bound -0.098   
 
2.6.3. Placebo Tests 
To reinforce the credibility of our main findings, we conduct two placebo tests. First, 
we assign a placebo intervention to the middle of our pretreatment period (August 1, 
2013) and check whether a pretreatment tendency existed prior to the actual introduction 
of the monitoring system. As Table 34 shows, the interaction between the “pseudo” 
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 dummy and the 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 dummy is insignificant. Second, following Abadie et 
al. (2015), we randomly reassign the treatment to the projects and run the same model 
with the placebo treatment assignment. We replicate the analysis 1000 times and generate 
the distribution of the placebo treatment effects based on the “pseudo” treatments of the 
monitoring intervention (Greenwood and Wattal 2015; Ranganathan and Benson 2017).36 
By comparing the actual estimated coefficient of three key covariates to the whole 
distribution of “placebo” treatment effects (Table 35), we find that it would be very 
unlikely to observe a similar size of treatment effect by chance, which implies that our 
findings are robust to alternative variance-covariance specifications. 
Table 34. Estimation Results based on the “Placebo” Treatment Time 
Sample Full sample Matched sample 
Model (1) Logit (2) LPM (3) Logit (4) LPM 
Homecountry 0.196 (0.135) 0.010 (0.009) 0.197 (0.255) 0.024 (0.024) 
Time-
basedHomecountry 
0.734** (0.287) 0.078** (0.031) 0.786** (0.367) 0.078* (0.043) 
AfterplaceboHomeco
untry 
0.183 (0.152) 0.020* (0.011) 0.338 (0.295) 0.042 (0.031) 
Time-
basedAfterplacebo 
Homecountry 
0.111 (0.377) 0.023 (0.041) -0.161 (0.483) -0.006 (0.057) 
                                                 
36 We employ both the LPM with project-specific fixed effects and the conditional logit model to estimate 
the placebo treatment effects and find highly consistent results. We report conditional logit model results in 
Table 35. 
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Same language 0.349*** (0.049) 0.014*** (0.002) 0.328*** (0.086) 0.020*** (0.007) 
Same currency 0.045 (0.040) 0.005** (0.002) 0.077 (0.069) 0.010 (0.006) 
Same time zone 0.240** (0.107) 0.024*** (0.009) 0.480*** (0.174) 0.065*** (0.021) 
Log bid price -1.938*** (0.035) -0.108*** (0.002) -2.011*** (0.066) -0.164*** (0.005) 
Log milestone 
percentage 
-0.034 (0.027) -0.003* (0.002) -0.163*** (0.045) -0.016*** (0.004) 
Log review count 0.089*** (0.013) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.081*** (0.022) 0.007*** (0.002) 
Log avg rating 0.142*** (0.017) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.123*** (0.028) 0.006** (0.002) 
Log bid order rank -0.414*** (0.024) -0.024*** (0.001) -0.379*** (0.046) -0.035*** (0.004) 
Preferred freelancer 0.507*** (0.033) 0.031*** (0.003) 0.559*** (0.061) 0.057*** (0.008) 
Log 
avg_country_rating 
0.196 (0.135) 0.010 (0.009) 0.197 (0.255) 0.024 (0.024) 
Log country_bidder 0.734** (0.287) 0.078** (0.031) 0.786** (0.367) 0.078* (0.043) 
Bidder country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 104,653 104,653 21,797 21,797 
R-squared 0.539 0.056 0.515 0.087 
LogLik -13,933  -3,931  
AIC 27,940  7,936  
BIC 28,294  8,232  
Number of projects 7,602 7,602 2,625 2,625 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are 
dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is not 
included in our model because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly consistent 
if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly consistent if we 
control for the country-month two-way fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels of competitiveness 
from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results are highly consistent if we limit our sample to bids 
submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-type workers”) 
(Lin et al. 2016).  The results are highly consistent if we include the original bid price instead of the log-
transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors clustered by projects are reported in 
parentheses. e) R-squared in the logit model is calculated based on the maximum likelihood R-squared. f) 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 35. Placebo Effects of Random Assignment Model 
Variables  Homecountry Time-based×Homecountry 
Time-based ×After 
×Homecountry 
 of placebo  0.338 0.001 -0.004 
 of placebo  0.020 0.215 0.270 
Estimated  0.218 0.735 -1.120 
Replication      1000                1000            1000 
Z-score     -15.289 3.520 -4.113 
P-value    p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
Notes: a) The result of the placebo test based on the full sample is reported. b) All the bids which are submitted by 
bidders having previous collaboration experience with the employer before are dropped. Moreover, our sample is only 
limited to projects with only one winner. c)  Conditional logit model with project FE and bidder country dummies are 
included in the model; LPM provides consistent results. d) Robust standard errors clustered by projects are reported 
in parentheses.  
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2.6.4. Other Robustness Checks 
To further check the robustness of our conclusions, we conduct additional analyses 
that are reported in the Appendices. First, we rerun the model with a shorter-range 
observational window (six months before and after) and still find consistent results based 
on the full sample and matched sample (see Appendix D). Second, to ensure the workers 
are comparable and similar between the treatment group and the control group, we limit 
our sample to the bids submitted by those workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-
based projects. The results of the restricted sample are still highly consistent with our 
main findings (see Appendix E). Third, to show the robustness of our findings, we 
employ an alternative matching algorithm, PSM, to regenerate a matching sample, and 
our results are still consistent (see Appendix F). Fourth, similar to the robustness checks 
concerning the existence of home bias, we further control for the time-varying or project 
specific contingent factors influencing home bias. In particular, we control for the 
number of workers and the average rating of workers from each country within the 
employer’s specific consideration set and the country-month two-way fixed effect (see 
Appendix G). On the whole, all our robustness checks are consistent with our main 
findings.  
2.7. Additional Analysis: Is the Impact of Monitoring a Function of Task Routineness? 
We further explore whether the impact of the introduction of monitoring systems on 
home bias varies in a predictable way across job subcategories with different routines 
task levels. Assessing whether the impact of monitoring varies in a theoretically 
predictable way improves our confidence in our findings and provides a better 
  117 
understanding of the mechanism of employers’ home bias and the channel for reducing 
their statistical home bias. Specifically, as suggested by Ranganathan and Benson (2017), 
the effectiveness of monitoring tends to be stronger for routine tasks. Therefore, we 
expect that employers’ home bias will be less influenced by the introduction of 
monitoring systems when projects are less routine or more abstract.  
Following Autor et al. (2003), we employ the routine task-intensity (RTI) as a 
comprehensive proxy of the measure of task routineness. RTI refers to the ratio of routine 
task inputs to nonroutine task inputs (such as highly manual and abstract tasks) in each 
occupation. We calculate it based on the following equation (7). And it increases as 
routine tasks become more important for the specific occupation. In order to calculate 
RTI, we first search for the routine task input index, the manual task input index and the 
abstract task input index for each project based on the definition of its specific project 
subcategory. Specifically, we match the project subcategory list to the standard 
occupational classification (SOC) system,37 and then find the corresponding abstract, 
manual, routine task inputs for each occupation. 
RTI𝑘 = ln(𝑇𝑘,1980
𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒) − ln(𝑇𝑘,1980
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙) − ln (𝑇𝑘,1980
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡)                (7) 
Moreover, to show the heterogeneous treatment effect of monitoring, we rerun the 
DID model for those projects with high RTI and those with low RTI. Here, “high RTI” 
means the RTI of that job subcategory is higher than the mean RTI of the overall 
                                                 
37 To find the corresponding SOC code for each job subcategory, we put the subcategory name into the search 
field of the O*Net database (https://www.onetonline.org/find/quick?s=), and search for related occupations 
within the “IT, software & website” area. Further, we manually verify whether the definition of the 
occupation is consistent with the definition of the job subcategory. Based on SOC codes, we further find the 
corresponding 2000 ACS Occupation Codes (OCC) and then 1990 ACS Occupation Codes (OCC). Next, 
based on the 1990OCC codes, we find the corresponding occupational task data from Autor and Dorn (2013), 
which includes the abstract, manual, routine task inputs for each occupation. 
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software category and “low RTI” indicates the opposite scenario. As Table 36 shows, for 
those highly nonroutine and abstract projects, monitoring does not significantly affect 
employers’ home bias. However, for projects with high routine-task intensity, monitoring 
significantly decreases employers’ home bias. The result based on the full-sample also 
confirms the heterogeneous treatment effect of monitoring on projects with different RTI 
levels.  
Table 36. Estimation Results of Low RTI Sample versus High RTI Sample 
Sample 
Low RTI sample, 
before 
Low RTI sample, 
after 
High RTI sample 
before 
High RTI sample 
after 
Model (1) LPM (2) LPM (3) LPM (4) LPM 
Homecountry 0.039** (0.016) 0.021* (0.011) 0.012*** (0.005) 0.022*** (0.003) 
Time-
basedHomecountry 
0.035 (0.045) 0.025 (0.031) 0.064*** (0.014) -0.029*** (0.007) 
Same language 0.026*** (0.006) 0.024*** (0.003) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.001) 
Same currency -0.001 (0.005) 0.008** (0.003) 0.004** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Same time zone 0.025 (0.020) 0.027** (0.014) 0.016*** (0.006) 0.016*** (0.003) 
Log bid price -0.106*** (0.005) -0.087*** (0.003) -0.060*** (0.001) -0.051*** (0.001) 
Log milestone 
percentage 
-0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.003) -0.002* (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 
Log review count 0.006*** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 
Log avg rating 0.003 (0.002) 0.003** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 
Log bid order rank -0.025*** (0.003) -0.018*** (0.002) -0.013*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) 
Preferred freelancer 0.038*** (0.007) 0.025*** (0.004) 0.017*** (0.002) 0.016*** (0.001) 
Bidder country 
dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,999 48,471 162,829 351,339 
R-squared 0.060 0.049 0.031 0.024 
Number of projects 2,358 4,924 12,423 22,699 
Notes: a) The results are estimated based on the matched sample with the CEM approach. Our results are 
highly consistent if we estimate the model based on the full sample. b) All bids submitted by workers 
having prior collaboration experience with the employer are dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to 
projects with only one winner. c) Log(bidder tenure) is not included in our model because it is highly 
correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly consistent if we include Log(bidder tenure) instead 
of Log(count rating). d) The results are highly consistent if we control for the country-month two-way 
fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. 
The results are highly consistent if we limit our sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both 
fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). The results are highly 
consistent if we include the original bid price instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. e) 
Robust standard errors clustered by projects are reported in parentheses. f) R-squared in the logit model is 
calculated based on the maximum likelihood R-squared. g) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 37. Estimation Results of Low RTI Sample versus High RTI Sample After 
Matching 
Sample Low RTI sample High RTI sample 
Model (1) Logit (2) LPM (3) Logit (4) LPM 
Homecountry 0.317 (0.294) 0.048 (0.043) 0.299* (0.158) 0.040** (0.017) 
AfterHomecountry -0.050 (0.325) -0.010 (0.048) 0.244 (0.172) 0.020 (0.019) 
Time-
basedHomecountry 
0.568 (0.485) 0.079 (0.071) 0.747*** (0.252) 0.081*** (0.030) 
Time-basedAfter 
Homecountry 
-0.089 (0.616) -0.030 (0.088) -1.368*** (0.327) -0.150*** (0.037) 
Same language 0.421*** (0.093) 0.037*** (0.008) 0.369*** (0.049) 0.023*** (0.003) 
Same currency 0.043 (0.075) 0.006 (0.008) 0.092** (0.040) 0.008** (0.003) 
Same time zone 0.450** (0.200) 0.067** (0.029) 0.385*** (0.102) 0.048*** (0.011) 
Log bid price -1.870*** (0.072) -0.171*** (0.006) -1.844*** (0.036) -0.131*** (0.002) 
Log milestone 
percentage 
-0.213*** (0.058) -0.021*** (0.005) -0.195*** (0.029) -0.015*** (0.002) 
Log review count 0.106*** (0.025) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.085*** (0.013) 0.006*** (0.001) 
Log avg rating 0.088*** (0.030) 0.002 (0.003) 0.079*** (0.016) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Log bid order rank -0.380*** (0.052) -0.036*** (0.006) -0.317*** (0.028) -0.024*** (0.002) 
Preferred freelancer 0.443*** (0.073) 0.045*** (0.009) 0.459*** (0.035) 0.040*** (0.004) 
Bidder country 
dummy 
   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,647 15,647 71,193 71,193 
R-squared 0.501 0.104 0.485 0.065 
LogLik -2,982  -11,813  
AIC 6,038  23,699  
BIC            6,321  24,039  
Number of projects 2,153 2,153    6,875 6,875 
Notes: a) The results are estimated based on the matched sample with the CEM approach. The results are 
highly consistent if we estimate the model based on the full sample. b) All bids submitted by workers 
having prior collaboration experience with the employer are dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to 
projects with only one winner. c) Log(bidder tenure) is not included in our model because it is highly 
correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly consistent if we include Log(bidder tenure) instead 
of Log(count rating). d) The results are highly consistent if we control for the country-month two-way 
fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. 
The results are highly consistent if we limit our sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both 
fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). The results are highly 
consistent if we include the original bid price instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. e) 
Robust standard errors clustered by projects are reported in parentheses. f) R-squared in the logit model is 
calculated based on the maximum likelihood R-squared. g) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
2.8. General Discussion 
Using a large-scale proprietary data set from a leading online labor market, this paper 
examines the existence of and mechanisms associated with home bias, a type of 
discrimination based on the closeness or similarity between the employer and worker. 
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First, our estimation results suggest that a home bias against foreign workers does exist in 
online employment. Second, based on a quasi-natural experiment following the 
introduction of a monitoring system for time-based projects on an online employment 
platform, we explore the change in employers’ preference for local workers after the 
introduction of the monitoring system. The introduction of the monitoring system reduces 
the ex post information asymmetry regarding hidden actions and lowers employers’ home 
bias. Based on the different predictions from taste-based discrimination and statistical 
discrimination mechanisms, we suggest that employers’ home bias is primarily driven by 
statistical discrimination. Third, to further examine the existence of a taste-based 
mechanism, we investigate whether the potential heterogeneity of home bias across 
different employer countries is consistent with our predictions based on the literature on 
in-group favoritism. We find that employers from countries with high traditional values, 
lower cultural diversity, and smaller size of country population, tend to hold a stronger 
home bias, which lends support to the existence of taste-based home bias. Our study 
suggests that home bias in online employment is driven by both statistical and taste-based 
mechanisms. 
This paper makes several important contributions to the related literature. First, our 
study is among the first to formally examine the existence and mechanisms of home bias 
in an employment setting. Despite the rich literature on home bias in equity and trade, the 
existence of home bias in employment settings remains an open question. We extend 
prior studies by controlling for additional confounding factors and examining whether 
home bias exists in employment settings. We control for the effect of common language, 
time zone, and currency, which can lead to the overestimation of home bias. Also, unlike 
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prior studies (e.g., Åslund et al.’s (2014)), which fail to control for potential supply-side 
bias due to data limitations, we estimate employers’ preferences with precise data 
regarding their consideration sets and final choices. Second, we contribute to the 
emerging stream of research on discrimination studies that are based on the dynamic 
approach and quasi-experiments (Goldin and Rouse 2000; Rubineau and Kang 2011). By 
now, the most popular method applied in discrimination studies is the correspondence 
study design (Bertrand and Duflo 2017). However, Bertand and Duflo (2017) express the 
concern that correspondence studies suffer from the following limitation: With fictitious 
similar applicants, correspondence studies can only be used to test the discrimination at 
the first stage based on callback rate, but not at later stages (i.e., interview and hiring). 
But quasi-natural experiments (e.g. Goldin and Rouse 2000) can provide more 
information regarding discrimination in the full hiring process, especially regarding the 
final hiring decisions. As Rubineau and Kang (2012, P662) state, “The key to identifying 
statistical discrimination lies in scrutinizing its dynamic rather than static predictions.” 
By empirically examining the consistency between the predictions based on the statistical 
discrimination assumption and the actual observed result, we establish a robust causal 
relationship between information change and the dynamic change in discrimination, and 
subsequently identify the mechanism of discrimination in a real-world setting. Most 
notably, the information changes employed by the existing literature (such as gender or 
criminal background information) do not differentiate between the ex ante worker 
capabilities and the ex post effort of workers (Goldin and Rouse 2000; Doleac and 
Hansen 2016). Our approach directly operates on information changes that relate only to 
worker effort and isolates the ex post hidden action mechanism that causes employer 
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uncertainty. Thus, our study suggests that the asymmetric information about worker 
effort plays an important role in explaining employers’ home bias and potentially other 
discriminatory behavior, such as gender discrimination (Sterling and Fernandez 2018). 
Third, our paper also contributes to the recent research on the discrimination 
phenomenon in the gig economy by suggesting the role of monitoring systems for 
attenuating discrimination behavior. It has been found that racial discrimination exists in 
the on-demand sharing economy, such as in accommodation sharing (Edelman et al. 
2017) and on-demand e-hailing services (Ge et al. 2016). We contribute to this stream of 
discrimination literature by showing that discrimination based on the similarity of the 
home country is a type of discrimination prevalent in the gig economy. Our study further 
suggests that monitoring systems, can increase the fairness of the gig economy without 
reducing the market efficiency.  
Meanwhile, we acknowledge several limitations of our study, opening up avenues for 
follow-up studies. First, we note that our sample is limited to projects within the IT 
category. It is possible that taste-based preferences may play a more important role in 
certain design or data analysis tasks that tend to have a lower RTI than IT projects. 
Second, we conduct our study in the online employment setting and our findings may not 
be directly generalizable to offline labor markets and other online platforms. In offline 
labor markets, for example, employment contracts for long-term collaboration may serve 
per se as an effective incentive mechanism to motivate workers’ effort, thus reducing the 
risk of shirking due to ex post information asymmetry and reducing the reliance on 
statistical home bias. Furthermore, our study also provides insightful implications for 
other online platforms. In particular, our study suggests the coexistence of the statistical 
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and taste-based home bias in online labor markets. Future research can explore whether 
home bias on other platforms can also be partially attributed to the statistical 
discrimination or taste-based mechanisms.  
 Using a unique large-scale data set from one of the prevalent online labor 
markets, we investigate the existence and mechanism of home bias in the online 
employment setting for the first time. Moreover, owing to the quasi-natural experiment 
design, we conclude that the introduction of the monitoring system substantially lowers 
employers’ home bias. Our results suggest that when information is limited, employers 
might employ statistical discrimination and prefer to hire workers from their home 
countries. This kind of discrimination could be alleviated without the loss of market 
efficiency if platforms implement monitoring systems and reduce ex post information 
asymmetry. Overall, our study offers strong implications for the marketplace design by 
underscoring the value of monitoring systems in increasing the fairness and efficiency of 
online platforms. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN AVOIDANCE OF MONITORING  
AND GENDER WAGE GAP IN ONLINE GIG ECONOMY 
 
We explore whether there exists a gender wage gap in the gig economy and examine 
to what degree gender differences in job application strategy could account for the gap. 
With a large-scale dataset from a leading online labor market, we show that females only 
earn around 81.4% of the hourly wage of their male counterparts. We further investigate 
three main aspects of job application strategy, namely bid timing, job selection, and 
avoidance of monitoring. After matching males with females using the propensity score 
matching method, we find that females tend to bid later and prefer jobs with a lower 
budget. In particular, the observed gender difference in bid timing can explain 7.6% of 
the difference in hourly wage, which could account for 41% of the gender wage gap (i.e. 
18.6%) observed by us. Moreover, taking advantage of a quasi-natural experiment 
wherein the platform rolled out the monitoring system, we find that females are less 
willing to bid for monitored jobs than males. To further quantify the economic value of 
the gender difference in avoidance of monitoring, we run a field experiment on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (AMT), which suggests that females tend to have a higher willingness 
to pay (WTP) for the avoidance of monitoring. The gender difference in WTP for the 
avoidance of monitoring can explain 8.1% of the difference in hourly wage, namely, 44% 
of the observed gender wage gap. Overall, our study reveals the important role of job 
application strategies in the persistent gender wage gap. 
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Keywords:  gender wage gap, job application strategy, gig economy, quasi-natural 
experiment 
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3.1. Introduction 
There is a growing literature documenting the gender wage gap in the labor market. 
As the previous literature suggests, while employers exhibit less discrimination against 
females in the hiring process, females still earn a lower wage than males in the same 
positions (Goldin and Rouse 2000; Kuhn and Shen 2012). Therefore, an emerging school 
of thought is that “gender wage gap is caused mainly by women’s choice, not 
discrimination.”38 In the same vein, more studies are suggesting that the gender wage gap 
is partially attributable to motherhood penalty, gender differences in career plans, or 
preferences for non-monetary attributes in a job, such as flexibility (Mas and Pallais 
2017), work-from-home (Mas and Pallais 2017), and workplace competitiveness 
(Niederle and Vesterlund 2007,2011; Flory et al. 2014). 
Given that gender pay gap is a longstanding phenomenon, the new gig economy, 
which is thriving in many industries (e.g., ridesharing, temporary lodging, outsourcing), 
seems to provide an efficient way to reduce the gender wage gap. Owing to the market 
openness and the emphasis on spot-market based short-term employment in gig economy, 
many scholars predict that gender differences in career development, as well as the 
gender wage gap, will be smaller in the gig economy (e.g. Goldin 2014). Specifically, it’s 
predicted but not empirically confirmed that workers tend to have more flexible work 
hours and locations in the gig economy, making motherhood penalty less likely to 
become an obstacle to career development. As the booming gig economy is projected to 
                                                 
38 https://www.campusreform.org/?ID=9827 
 This report reads “The American Association of University Women (AAUW) has finally admitted that the 
“gender pay gap” is caused primarily by women’s choices, not discrimination. In fact, the AAUW's own 
research suggests that only about 7% of the observed pay gap can be attributed to discrimination, with 
simple economic factors accounting for the remainder.” 
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comprise a large portion of the future of work39, it is imperative to examine whether there 
is a gender wage gap in the gig economy. Moreover, given that females tend to have 
much more flexibility in gig work than in the traditional workplace, the gig economy also 
provides us an unprecedented opportunity to explore factors other than motherhood 
penalty or compensation differential for flexibility that might influence the gender wage 
gap, which is critical to policy prescription to further narrow the gender wage gap. In 
particular, as the gig economy, especially the online gig economy platform, enables 
workers from all over the world to seek a wider diversity of remote jobs posted by 
employers from various countries, this provides a unique setting to dig into potential 
gender differences in job application strategy, which is hitherto little explored. To this 
end, with the advantage of the availability of large-scale micro-level granular data in the 
online gig economy (Hong and Pavlou 2017), we attempt to explore several critical 
aspects of gender differences in job application strategy and their impact on the gender 
wage gap. Specifically, we examine whether there are gender differences in avoidance of 
monitoring and to what extent such gender differences can account for the gender wage 
gap in the gig economy (if any). In particular, we are interested in the following 
questions: 
1) Is there a gender wage gap in the gig economy? 
2) Whether and to what extent the gender wage gap is driven by gender differences in 
avoidance of monitoring?  
                                                 
39  “Independent work: Choice, necessity, and the gig economy” https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-
insights/employment-and-growth/independent-work-choice-necessity-and-the-gig-economy 
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In this paper, we take advantage of a comprehensive dataset from a leading gig 
economy platform, a quasi-natural experiment, and a supporting field experiment to 
answer the above research questions. First, we infer workers’ genders based on their 
profile images40 with human labeling. We find that there is a gender wage gap based on 
the historical hiring data. This result is consistent when we control for various workers’ 
characteristics. We find that, on average, females earn 81.4% of the hourly wage of their 
male counterparts.  
Second, we recover each worker’s consideration set of jobs based on our 
comprehensive dataset. It is notable that although there are a few studies analyzing 
employers’ preference for workers in the online labor market (Chan and Wang 2017), 
workers’ behaviors are yet to be explored, e.g., gender differences in avoidance of 
monitoring, likely due to the lack of data regarding workers’ consideration sets. In our 
study, because the platform restricts workers to only bid for jobs with at least one skill 
requirement matched with their own skill sets, we are able to reconstruct the whole list of 
contemporaneous jobs which were available for workers to bid. Based on the recovered 
consideration sets, we find that females prefer to bid jobs without monitoring based on a 
quasi-natural experiment and that females tend to have a higher willingness to pay (WTP) 
for the avoidance of monitoring through a field experiment. Specifically, hinging on the 
exogenous shock when the platform implemented the monitoring system on all the hourly 
jobs, we observe that females are less willing to bid for monitored jobs based on a 
difference-in-differences (DID) estimation and difference-in-difference-in-differences 
(DDD) estimation. In particular, we take fixed-price jobs as the control group and 
                                                 
40 We find consistent results when we use the first name of workers to infer gender. 
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incorporate the interaction of the monitoring treatment with contractual forms across jobs 
and the worker’s gender. To further quantify the economic value of the gender difference 
in WTP for the avoidance of monitoring than males, we conduct a randomized field 
experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). We randomly provide two hourly jobs 
for workers on AMT (Turkers), in which only one requires monitoring. We also 
randomize the wage premium offered by the job with the monitoring requirement, which 
varies between $-2 and $5. The result suggests that females have a higher WTP for the 
avoidance of monitoring than males, which lends support to our finding from the quasi-
natural experiment. In fact, the gender difference in WTP for the avoidance of monitoring 
can explain roughly 8.13% of the hourly wage, which is equivalent to 43.71% of the 
observed gender wage gap. 
Our paper contributes to three related strands of literature. First, our study contributes 
to the literature on gender wage gap (Blau and Kahn 2017; Mas and Pallais 2017; 
Wiswall and Zafar 2015, 2017) by providing new explanations for the gender wage gap 
that are unrelated to gender discrimination, i.e., gender differences in the avoidance of 
monitoring. Second, this study also contributes to the literature on the online labor market 
by showing the importance of workers’ job preferences. Although employers’ preference 
of workers has been recently explored (Chan and Wang 2017; Hong and Pavlou 2017), 
there is little research exploring the preference from the supply side (i.e., workers’ 
preference for jobs). Our study advances the previous literature on online labor markets 
by documenting gender differences in job application strategy and how they may explain 
the gender wage gap. Lastly, this paper also contributes to the literature on compensation 
differential (Bonhomme and Jolivet 2009; Mas and Pallais 2017). Our study takes 
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advantage of both a quasi-natural experiment and a field experiment to show the gender 
difference in WTP for the avoidance of monitoring, a non-wage aspect which has hardly 
been explored in the compensation differential literature.  
3.2. Theoretical Background  
3.2.1 Gender Wage Gap 
The gender wage gap has been established long ago. According to the estimates from 
the Institute for Women’s Policy Research, women are still paid 20% less than their male 
counterparts in the same position in 201541. In fact, based on the statistics from the 
Census Bureau, the female-to-male earnings ratio, which has not been updated since 
2007, is 0.80542. The persistence of gender pay gap is difficult to explain because the 
explanations for the wage gap provided by the previous literature, such as gender 
differences in occupation choice and preference for flexibility, seem to be less relevant in 
today’s society, especially in gig economy. For instance, even in the IT industry, which 
tends to provide workers with a relatively flexible work schedule, women are still 
systematically paid less than men and are promoted more slowly. 
There is a large body of literature exploring the causes of the gender wage gap. First, 
discrimination from the demand side has found to be one of the key explanations. 
Regarding the mechanisms of discrimination, the findings from the previous literature are 
still mixed. Some studies suggest that only statistical discrimination (Gupta and Smith 
                                                 
41 https://iwpr.org/publications/the-gender-wage-gap-2015-annual-earnings-differences-by-gender-race- 
and-ethnicity 
 
42 https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/C459_9.11.17_Gender-Wage-Gap-2016-data-update.pdf 
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2012; Castillo et al. 2013) contributes to the gender wage gap while some other papers 
lend support to the taste-based discrimination explanation (Goldin and Rouse 2000; 
Marom et al. 2016). Second, a growing literature suggests that gender differences in 
worker confidence and compensation differential also help to account for the gender 
wage gap, which will be discussed below.  
3.2.2 Gender Wage Gap and the Gig Economy 
The emerging gig economy is expected to help to decrease the gender wage gap by 
increasing work schedule flexibility and reducing the motherhood penalty (Goldin and 
Rouse 2000). According to a report from Hyperwallet, a gig-work payment platform, 
86% of females believe that they can earn equal pay to males in the gig economy, while 
only 41% of females think so in the traditional workplace43. Moreover, Chan and Wang 
(2017) found that employers prefer to hire female workers in feminine-typed jobs and 
even gender-neutral jobs in an online gig economy platform, which suggests that 
discrimination is less likely to be a serious obstacle to females. That being said, females 
are still found to pay an invisible cost owing to gender differences in preference-based 
characteristics, such as females’ lower willingness to work more hours in the car-hailing 
service industry when the hourly wage is high (Cook et al. 2018). However, it is still 
unknown whether females still earn less than males in online gig economy platforms 
wherein the hourly wage is less dependent on the working time and location. Given that 
the effect of discrimination in online gig economy platforms has already been explored in 
the prior study (Chan and Wang 2017), in this paper, we will focus on examining key 
                                                 
43 “The Future of Gig Work is Female,” available at www.hyperwallet.com 
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factors that contribute to the gender wage gap other than the gender discrimination in 
online gig economy platforms. 
3.2.3 Gender Wage Gap and Gender differences in Confidence and Avoiding Uncertainty  
Gender differences in worker confidence and avoidance of uncertainty are found to be 
key contributing factors to the gender wage gap. First, gender differences in confidence 
may lead to gender differences in competitiveness and the wage gap. For instance, 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) identified gender differences in competitiveness in a lab 
experiment. They found that although there are no significant gender differences in 
performance, women show less preference for the competitive tournament. Further, they 
explained that gender differences in competitiveness were caused by the differences in 
confidence and attitudes toward competition instead of gender differences in risk 
aversion (Niederle and Vesterlund 2011). In line with this study, Flory et al. (2014) found 
that gender differences in preferences for uncertainty and competition jointly drive 
gender differences in job-entry choices. Moreover, some contingent factors influence the 
size of gender differences, including whether the job involves teamwork or has overt 
gender associations, and his/her age, etc. (Flory et al. 2014). Inspired by this stream of 
literature, we expect that there might exist gender differences in job application strategy 
due to gender differences in confidence and avoidance of uncertainty suggested in the 
previous literature and explore the subsequent impact on the gender wage gap. 
3.2.4 Gender Wage Gap and Gender difference in Compensation 
Differential/Preference 
Meanwhile, the gender wage gap can also be caused by compensation differential. 
Research in this space has focused on how gender differences in preference for various 
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non-wage job characteristics may account for the gender wage gap. This is also referred 
to as cross-gender compensation differential. Cross-gender compensation differential 
means that females and males may have different WTP for different nonwage job 
attributes (Arnould and Nichols 1983), which subsequently leads to their different job 
choices and wages. For example, gender differences in work flexibility have been found 
to help to explain the gender wage gap. Marini and Fan (1997) found that gender 
differences in worker characteristics (including occupational aspirations, job-related 
skills, and credentials) explain roughly 30% of the gender wage gap. More recently, 
Wiswall and Zafar (2017) found that females show a stronger preference for work 
flexibility and job stability whereas males prefer potential earnings growth. Moreover, 
such gender differences in preference also indirectly lead to gender differences in college 
major choices and subsequent income (Wiswall and Zafar 2017). In the same vein, Mas 
and Pallais (2017) find a significant gender difference in WTP for working from home 
but an insignificant gender difference in WTP for scheduling flexibility in their large-
scale field experiment. Given that most jobs in the gig economy tend to have high 
scheduling flexibility and allow working-from-home, we focus on potential gender 
differences in WTP for the avoidance of monitoring, which has become increasingly 
important with the popularity of online, IT-enabled monitoring systems. 
3.3. Research Methodology 
3.3.1 Research Framework 
Gender wage gap is a longstanding phenomenon. There is a large body of literature 
exploring the causes of the gender wage gap from the demand (employer) side, e.g., the 
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gender hiring bias (Goldin and Rouse 2000; Kuhn and Shen 2012) or promotion bias in 
the workplace (Budig and England 2001; Anderson et al. 2002). We propose an 
alternative explanation from the supply (worker) side, i.e., gender differences in 
avoidance of monitoring (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8. Research Questions of this Study 
Specifically, we first explore whether a gender wage gap exists in the gig economy. 
Then, we examine whether there are gender differences in job application strategy and 
how these differences may contribute to the gender wage gap. Table 38 summarizes our 
research framework. Next, we explain them in turn. 
Table 38. Research Agenda and Empirical Identification Strategy 
 
Key concepts Research questions Data source Empirical model 
Gender wage 
gap 
Is there a gender wage 
gap in the gig 
economy? 
Observational data 
from 
Freelancer.com 
Fixed-effect model with the worker 
country and month two-way fixed 
effects 
Gender 
differences 
in job 
application 
strategy 
 
Do females prefer to 
bid jobs without 
monitoring? 
Observational data 
from 
Freelancer.com 
with a quasi-
natural experiment 
Propensity score matching between 
female and male workers; propensity 
score matching between fixed-price and 
hourly jobs; 
Differences-in-Differences and triple 
differences estimator based on a quasi-
natural experiment  (with the control 
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for the fixed effects on the 
consideration set) 
A field experiment 
on AMT 
logit model  
 
3.3.2 Observational Data  
Our data for the main analysis were collected from Freelancer.com, one of the leading 
online gig economy platforms. In Freelancer, all jobs are awarded based on a reverse 
auction mechanism wherein employers post jobs first and workers bid for those jobs of 
their interest. When posting the job, the employer provides the project title, project 
description, required skills, and project budget. To reduce the potential confounding 
effects of various job requirements, we limit our sample to the “IT, software & website” 
category, which is the most popular category in Freelancer, in terms of number of jobs 
and transactions. Given that we attempt to explore the gender difference in job 
preference, we focus on jobs that can be done remotely.44 Our final dataset includes a 
majority of the IT jobs posted in Freelancer between October 2013 and November 2014. 
Users of Feelancer.com come from over 100 countries. Before making the first bid on the 
platform, they are required to list those skills they acquired and upload their profile 
images. Our dataset includes various job- and user- level characteristics as reported in 
Table 39. 
Table 39. Definitions and Summary Statistics of Related Variables 
Variable Variable definition Mean SD Min Median Max 
Bid 
A dummy variable (0,1); =1 
if the worker bids for the job 
or not 
0.005 0.069 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Employer_norating 
A dummy variable (0,1); =1 
if the employer has not any 
reviews written by previous 
workers hired by him/her 
0.080 0.272 0.000 0.000 1.000 
                                                 
44 Local jobs only accounts for less than 0.01% of all the jobs posted on the platform. 
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Log(employer_review) 
The number of reviews for 
the employers entered by 
previous workers (log-
transformed) 
3.255 1.207 0.000 3.178 6.071 
Employer_rating 
The average overall ratings 
for the employer (in the 
range of [0-5]) 
4.884 0.470 0.000 4.996 5.000 
Log(budget) 
The maximum of the hourly 
wage for this job set by the 
employer (log-transformed) 
2.300 1.275 0.000 2.197 5.994 
Female 
A dummy variable (0,1); =1 
if the worker is a female 
0.146 0.353 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Log(title_length) 
Number of characters in the 
job title (log-transformed) 
3.472 0.412 2.398 3.466 4.796 
Log(desc_length) 
Number of characters in the 
job description (log-
transformed) 
5.312 0.918 2.773 5.242 8.101 
Log(skills_count) 
Number of necessary skills 
listed by the employer (log-
transformed) 
1.509 0.315 0.693 1.609 1.792 
Featured_job 
A dummy variable; =1 if 
this job is featured 
prominently on the job 
catalog page 
0.005 0.071 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NDA 
A dummy variable; =1 if 
this job requires NDA (Non-
Disclosure Agreement) 
0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Log(remain_days) 
Number of days between the 
bid date and the date when 
the auction is closed (log-
transformed) 
1.361 0.594 0.000 1.386 3.135 
Log(auction_duration) 
Number of days wherein the 
job is open for bid (log-
transformed) 
2.089 0.106 0.693 2.079 3.135 
Log(hourly_wage) 
The hourly wage of the 
awarded bid (log-
transformed) 
2.247 0 .983 0 .693 2.303 7.600 
Notes: a) Due to the overdispersion in the “log(budget)” variable, we dropped the outliers based on 99th 
percentile cutoff; b) Given that the consideration set of each worker’s bid decision is very large (close to 
200 jobs), the mean value of “bid” is relatively low. If “bid “is equal to 0.005, it means that the worker 
chooses one job to bid among all the 200 jobs for which s/he could bid. c)We label the gender of each 
user based on his/her profile image. we hired student workers and MTurk workers to label workers’ 
genders based on their profile images. For each image, there are at least two persons to label them. For 
those images we could not identify their genders based on the profile images or there is some 
inconsistency between the labels of the same image, we label their genders as “unknown”. We find 
consistent results when we use the first name of workers to infer gender. 
 
3.3.3 Construction of Workers’ Consideration Sets 
To explore workers’ job application strategy, we compile the whole dataset and 
reconstruct each worker’s consideration set based on the platform regulation policy 
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(Figure 9). In general, there are two main restrictions imposed on the workers’ job 
selection. First, the job should be open for bids at that time. Second, the worker has at 
least one skill matched with the skill requirements of the project. As such, we take 
advantage of the comprehensiveness of our dataset, which includes both the detailed 
auction duration, job skill requirements and all workers’ skill sets, and further construct 
workers’ consideration sets as follows: 
To begin with, we first find a list of active workers and their bids during our 
observation window. Specifically, the worker j is considered as an active worker at day t 
only if s/he bid at least once on that day. Further, we find all the IT jobs which were open 
to bidding when s/he made the bid decision. Lastly, we check whether the worker has at 
least one skill matched with the job skill requirements to finalize his/her consideration 
set. According to the platform regulation, the worker could bid for all the jobs satisfying 
with these two restrictions. In essence, we examine female and male workers’ revealed 
preference for job characteristics based on the actual bid decisions they made, given all 
the open jobs fitted with their skills.45  
                                                 
45 To ensure that workers can bid for all the jobs in the consideration set, we only limit to those jobs which 
do not use sealed auctions and are described in English. Additionally, since the “hireme” jobs are posted for 
targeted workers, we also rule out these jobs from our sample.  
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When browsing a job without any matched skills: 
 
When browsing a job with at least one matched skill, the “bid now” button is displayed: 
 
 
Figure 9. A Screenshot from Freelancer.com for Jobs with/without Matched Skills 
3.3.4 Experimental Data for the Analysis of Gender Differences in WTP 
We conduct a field experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk. In total, we have 
recruited 300 participants, among which 276 have completed the experiment. The 
experiment follows a between-subject design with 15 treatments by varying wage 
premium of the job with monitoring (Table 40).  For each treatment group, participants 
will be provided a short introduction of the monitoring system and two job options shown 
randomly. The order of available job positions is also randomized to reduce the potential 
concern of the anchoring effect of the first option (Strack and Mussweiler 1997). When 
the participant is choosing between two hourly choices with different wages, his/her 
WTP to avoid monitoring can only be driven by his/her distaste for monitoring. To 
ensure the internal validity of randomization, we ensure the comparability of participants 
in different treatment groups across various wage premium cases. 
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Table 40. Treatment Design of the Field Experiment 
Single 
choice 
question 
   Job option design 
Wage premium of the job with 
monitoring 
An hourly job without 
monitoring or an hourly job with 
monitoring 
Wage premiums ∈[-2, -1.5, -1, -0.5, 
0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5] 
3.4. Measures and Models 
3.4.1 Measuring the Gender Wage Gap 
To measure the gender wage gap in the gig economy, we explore whether female 
workers systematically earn a lower hourly wage in all the hourly job transactions made 
on Freelancer.com. Specifically, we use the log-transformed hourly wage based on those 
awarded bids as the dependent variable and the 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 dummy is the key independent 
variable of our interest. We employ the following linear regression model to estimate the 
effect of gender on hourly wage: 
log(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠(Worker𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                     (8) 
According to the literature on the gender wage gap, we attempt to calculate the 
adjusted gender wage gap which needs to be corrected for differences in payment due to 
country or occupation, differences in period, and differences in human capital (Freeman 
and Oostendorp 2000; O'Neill 2003; Oostendorp 2004; Blau and Kahn 2017). To adjust 
for the country or period differences, we control for the worker country and month two-
way fixed effects and cluster standard errors accordingly. Given that our observations 
come from the same type of jobs (online IT jobs), the occupation differences among our 
sample is relatively small. To correct for human capital, we assume that the worker’s 
rating, experience, and tenure can serve as good proxies for the worker’s human capital. 
Accordingly, we further add the control for various time-varying covariates regarding 
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worker i, such as the number of reviews entered by previous employers, the average 
rating, the tenure measured in the month unit, the primary language set by worker i, 
verification measures and the length of the tagline on worker i’s profile, etc. A significant 
coefficient of the dummy 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 suggests that there is a gender wage gap in the gig 
economy. 
3.4.2 Gender Differences in Avoidance of Monitoring in the Quasi-Natural Experiment 
We estimate gender differences in avoidance of monitoring by taking advantage of 
the exogenous shock when the platform introduced the monitoring system for workers in 
hourly jobs. Meanwhile, this monitoring system is not available for fixed-price jobs. The 
monitoring system can automatically take screenshots of the workers’ laptops and share 
those with employers.46  
By exploiting the different availability of monitoring across two types of jobs, we 
employ the DID estimation and the DDD estimation to check whether females are less 
willing to work under monitoring. First, in the DID estimation framework, we are 
interested in the coefficient of the interaction term (𝛽2), which denotes that whether 
female workers are less willing to bid for hourly jobs after the introduction of monitoring 
systems by taking the fixed-price jobs as the control group. Here, we employ the 
propensity score matching to control for the selection on observables among job types 
and only use highly comparable fixed-price jobs as the counterfactual.  
                                                 
46 To protect the privacy of workers, workers can delete a few screenshots if they don’t feel comfortable to 
be seen other others. However, the short time interval logged along with these sensitive screenshots may not 
be guaranteed to get paid.   
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𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡_𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑜𝑛_𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑗 +
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠(𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑗                                                                                            (9)       
Further, we also match male and female workers based on their reputation and 
various profile information. Based on the comparable females and males within the 
matched sample, we explore the difference in the treatment effect of monitoring on males 
and females in term of job preference: 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡_𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑜𝑛_𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑗 +
𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑗 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠(𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑗    (10) 
We compare the difference in preference for hourly jobs for males before and after 
the introduction of monitoring systems (DD𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒)  with the difference in preference for 
hourly jobs for females before and after (DD𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒). In other words, DDD = DD𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒-
DD𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒, which will be captured by the coefficient of the triple interaction (𝛽4). Note that, 
compared to the traditional DDD estimation, the term 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 × 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 is omitted 
because it is nested in the time-varying fixed effect 𝛼𝑖𝑡. If we observe a significantly 
negative coefficient of DDD (𝛽4), it suggests that females tend to have a stronger 
avoidance of monitoring than their male counterparts, which means that females prefer to 
bid for jobs without monitoring. 
3.4.3 Gender Differences in WTP for Avoidance of Monitoring in the Field Experiment 
Following the modeling framework of Mas and Pallais (2017), the probability of 
workers choosing a job with monitoring when the wage premium of the monitored job is 
∆𝑊 = 𝑊𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝑊𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒 as follows: 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) = Pr(𝑊𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔,𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋 − 𝑍𝑖 > 𝑊𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒,𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋) = Pr(∆𝑊𝑖 − 𝑍𝑖 > 0)      (11) 
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where X is a vector of various job characteristics other than the hourly wage and the 
monitoring condition, 𝑍𝑖 is the disutility for worker i if s/he works under monitoring. 
∆𝑊𝑖 − 𝑍𝑖 is the utility of worker i choosing a monitored job with the utility for a job 
without monitoring normalized to zero. Further, we can get the likelihood function of the 
above probability is ln ∏ (𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1))
𝑌𝑖(1 − 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1))
1−𝑌𝑖
𝑖  and use the maximum 
likelihood estimation to  identify 𝜇 and 𝜎, which represent the mean and standard 
deviation of the distribution of WTP, respectively. In our robustness checks, we also 
check if our result is consistent when the probit model is employed. 
3.5. Results Regarding the Existence of Gender Wage Gap 
As Table 41 shows, the coefficient of the “female” dummy is significantly negative, 
which suggests that females systematically earn a lower wage than males. We control for 
workers’ reputation and experience in Model 1 and additional characteristics of their 
profiles in Model 2. The result is highly consistent. Based on the result of Model 2, on 
average, females can only earn 81.4% of the wage of their male counterparts, which is 
very close to the gender wage gap found in the general fulltime job in the US (i.e., 
80%)47. 
Table 41. Evidence of Gender Wage Gap in the Gig Economy 
Dependent variable: log(hourly_wage) 
Model (1) (2) 
Job type hourly hourly 
Female -0.208** (0.099) -0.205** (0.101) 
Log(bidder_rating) 0.021 (0.094) 0.020 (0.091) 
Log(bidder_reviews) 0.055* (0.029) 0.055* (0.032) 
                                                 
47 Based on the report from American Association of University Women (AAUW), females working in 
full-time jobs usually get paid 80% of the wage earned by males (source: 
https://www.aauw.org/research/the-simple-truth-about-the-gender-pay-gap/).  
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Bidder_primary_language_eng 0.020 (0.252) 0.020 (0.248) 
Log(bidder_tenure_month) 0.150*** (0.036) 0.162*** (0.037) 
Log(tagline_length)   0.085 (0.059) 
Identity_verified   -0.050 (0.068) 
Phone_verified   0.024 (0.297) 
Preferred_freelancer   0.041 (0.078) 
Log(milestone_percentage)   0.009 (0.034) 
Observations 1,300 1,288 
R-squared 0.047 0.053 
Bidder country dummy yes yes 
Month fixed effects FE yes yes 
Notes: a) Here, log(tagline_length) denotes the length of the tagline on worker i’s profile, which 
can be considered as the short headline of the self-introduction on the profile page; b) Robust 
standard errors clustered by the bidder country and month two-way fixed effects are reported in 
parentheses; c) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
3.6. Results Regarding Gender Differences in Job Application  
3.6.1 Sample Matching   
To ensure the similarity between females and males, we employ the propensity score 
matching method to match females with males, and match fixed-price jobs with hourly 
jobs. As suggested in Table 42, we match males and females based on their reputation, 
experience, verification, primary language, primary currency and whether they have the 
“preferred freelancer” badges, most of which serve as proxies for their human capital and 
the credibility of their identity or work. The balance check result and the density 
distribution of the propensity score suggest that after the matching, females and males are 
highly comparable in most of the observable characteristics displayed to the employers. 
Table 42. Balance Check for Propensity Score Matching between Females and Males 
Variable Sample 
Mean 
%bias 
% 
reduced |bias| 
t-test  
Female Male t p>|t| 
Registration_month 
Unmatched 635.910 629.490 27.400  
95.500 
7.070 0.000 
Matched 635.910 636.200 -1.200 -0.300 0.768 
Bidder_reviews 
Unmatched 14.587 15.650 -1.500  
-14.000 
-0.430 0.669 
Matched 14.587 15.798 -1.700 -0.260 0.795 
Bidder_rating 
Unmatched 2.082 2.207 -5.200  
-3.800 
-1.440 0.149 
Matched 2.082 1.953 5.400 1.150 0.251 
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Payment_verified 
Unmatched 0.006 0.009 -4.600  
100.000 
-1.770 0.076 
Matched 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Identity_verified 
Unmatched 0.004 0.011 -7.800  
93.100 
-2.870 0.004 
Matched 0.004 0.004 0.500 0.240 0.808 
Phone_verified 
Unmatched 0.001 0.001 -1.600 
-70.600 
-0.610 0.542 
Matched 0.001 0.002 -2.700 -0.820 0.414 
Preferred_freelancer 
Unmatched 4.916 4.940 -8.300 
95.500 
-3.340 0.001 
Matched 4.916 4.917 -0.400 -0.100 0.918 
Notes: 1) Results of Nearest Neighbor (1) Matching Method without replace are presented. 2) Due to 
length limitation, results regarding some variables are omitted, including the “primary_language_Eng” 
and “primary_currency_US” dummies. The means of both variables are not significantly different 
across groups.  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Density of Propensity Score of Being Female (before and after Matching) 
Similarly, given that we use fixed-price jobs as the control group in our analysis for 
the quasi-natural experiment wherein Freelancer.com rolled out its monitoring system for 
hourly jobs, we deploy the propensity score matching method to match two types of jobs. 
We match two types of jobs based on various characteristics which are suggested to be 
correlated with the contract type by the previous literature (Banerjee and Duflo 2000; 
Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan 2008; Lin et al. 2016; Roels et al. 2010), such as employers’ 
reputation, project size (the total amount of project), the complexity of job (the number of 
skills required), whether employers have a concrete idea of the job (the length of job title 
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propensity score and the mean of all observable covariates are highly comparable in two 
groups after matching. 
Table 43. Balance Check for PSM Between Fixed-Price Jobs and Hourly Jobs 
Variable Sample 
Mean 
%bias 
% 
reduced 
|bias| 
t-test  
Hourly Fixed-price t p>|t| 
Employer_developed 
Unmatched 0.381 0.762 -83.300  
99.300 
-35.970 0.000 
Matched 0.381 0.379 0.600 0.190 0.852 
Title_length 
Unmatched 31.968 35.346 -20.400  
94.200 
-8.100 0.000 
Matched 31.968 32.164 -1.200 -0.420 0.674 
Job_desc_length 
Unmatched 270.970 455.200 -41.600  
92.000 
-15.500 0.000 
Matched 270.970 285.680 -3.300 -1.490 0.136 
Employer_tenure_ 
month 
Unmatched 25.497 32.570 -25.300 
95.200 
-9.630 0.000 
Matched 25.497 25.158 1.200 0.460 0.645 
Employer_ rating 
Unmatched 4.916 4.940 -8.300 
95.500 
-3.340 0.001 
Matched 4.916 4.917 -0.400 -0.100 0.918 
Primary_language_ 
Eng 
Unmatched 0.947 0.902 17.000 
85.700 
6.570 0.000 
Matched 0.947 0.953 -2.400 -0.970 0.331 
Auction_duration 
Unmatched 7.996 7.646 7.400 
99.500 
2.480 0.013 
Matched 7.996 7.994 0.000 0.010 0.995 
Total_paid_amount 
of_project (/$100) 
Unmatched 1.764 2.752 -6.700 
67.100 
-2.410 0.016 
Matched 1.764 2.090 -2.200 -1.240 0.214 
Skills_count 
Unmatched 3.530 3.317 15.300 
79.100 
6.410 0.000 
Matched 3.530 3.486 3.200 1.070 0.287 
Notes: 1) Results of Nearest Neighbor (1) Matching Method without replace are presented. 2) Due to 
length limitation, results regarding some covariates are omitted, including the “featured_job”, “urgent”, 
“NDA”, and “payment_verified” dummies. The means of all these variables are not significantly different 
across groups. 
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3.6.2 Results on Gender Differences in Avoidance of Monitoring 
Another gender difference of our key interest is workers’ avoidance of monitoring. 
Specifically, if females have a stronger avoidance of monitoring, they may be less willing 
to bid for hourly jobs or accept a lower wage job which does not require monitoring in 
other platforms or markets, which subsequently lowers their labor participation or 
average hourly wage in the gig economy. Based on the result of Model 1 and Model 2 
with the DID estimation, females are significantly less willing to bid for hourly jobs after 
the introduction of the monitoring system, with the trend in their preference of the fixed-
price jobs as the counterfactual. Moreover, we further explore gender differences in 
avoidance of monitoring with the DDD estimation by taking the difference between the 
differences-in-differences (DD) observed in the female sample and the DD observed 
male sample. As the result of Model 3 in Table 44 shows, females are less willing to bid 
for hourly jobs after the introduction of monitoring systems. Given that monitoring 
systems are advocated for all hourly jobs on Freelancer.com after the introduction and it 
is difficult to observe the outside option for most female workers, we turn to a field 
experiment to observe gender differences in WTP for the avoidance of monitoring and 
infer its impact on the gender wage gap accordingly. 
Table 44. Gender Differences in Avoidance of Monitoring 
Dependent Variable: Bid or Not 
Sample Full sample 
Female, matched 
jobs 
Matched sample 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Hourly 0.003** (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 
After*hourly -0.003** (0.002) -0.004** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
Hourly*female     0.007*** (0.003) 
After*hourly*female     -0.006** (0.003) 
Employer_norating 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
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Log(employer_review) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Employer_rating 0.001** (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 
Log(budget) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
Log(title_length) -0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001* (0.001) 
Log(desc_length) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 
Log(skills_count) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Featured_job -0.011*** (0.004) -0.01* (0.004) -0.014*** (0.004) 
NDA -0.02*** (0.009) omitted omitted 
Log(remain_days) 0.008*** (0.000) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.000) 
Log(auction_duration) -0.009*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.001) 
Consideration set FE yes yes yes 
Employer country 
dummy 
yes yes yes 
Observations 105,479 52,221 101,420 
R-squared 0.089 0.188 0.159 
Adjusted R-squared 0.035 0.092 0.062 
Residual Std. Error 0.064 0.057 0.065 
Notes: a) Model 1 is estimated based on all the hourly and fixed-price job choices made by all the female 
workers; Model 2 is estimated based on the matched hourly and fixed-price job choices made by the 
matched female workers; Model 3 is estimated based on the matched hourly and fixed-price job choices 
made by the matched female and male workers; b) Robust standard errors clustered by the consideration 
set of each bid decision are reported in parentheses; c) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
3.6.3 Results on Gender Differences in WTP for Avoidance of Monitoring 
To further investigate whether there exists gender difference in avoidance of 
monitoring, we conducted a field experiment by providing all participants with two 
hourly job options and asking them to choose the one they preferred. Following the 
previous literature, we estimated the mean WTP of males and females with a logit model 
(Mas and Pallais 2017). Specifically, we estimated the distribution of WTP among all the 
participants. In particular, based on the difference in the probability of choosing a job 
with monitoring as the wage premium of the job with monitoring changes, we estimate 
the mean and standard deviation of female and male participants’ willingness to pay for 
the avoidance of monitoring. As the result of the maximum likelihood logit model in 
Table 45 shows, an average female is willing to pay $1.779 for the avoidance of 
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monitoring while an average male is only willing to pay $1.276. The gender difference in 
WTP for avoidance of monitoring is around $0.503, which is significant at the 0.05 
significance level based on 1,000 bootstrap samples. In particular, according to the prior 
study on AMT, the mean hourly wage is $6.19 for all those paid work (Hara et al. 2018). 
Therefore, the gender difference in WTP for the avoidance of monitoring is equivalent to 
8.13% of the average hourly wage on AMT. In other words, females are willing to accept 
an hourly job without monitoring by offering 8.13% discount on their hourly wage.  
Table 45. Gender Differences in WTP for Avoidance of Monitoring 
Willingness to pay for the avoidance of monitoring 
 female male difference 
Mean (𝜇) $ 1.779 (0.138) $ 1.276 (0.188) $0.503 (0.227) 
SD (𝜎)  $ 1.223 (0.135) $ 0.891 (0.169)  
Note: Standard errors are calculated based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 
 
3.7. Robustness Checks 
3.7.1 Alternative Measure 
To assess the robustness of our result, we use an alternative measure to show females’ 
preference to bid later than males. Specifically, we construct another measure, 
log(passed_days), which represents the number of days between the start date of the 
auction and the bid decision date. We again find a negative coefficient for the main effect 
of log(passed_days) and a positive coefficient for the interaction term between 
log(passed_days) and the gender dummy, which suggests that females tend to bid later 
than males (Table 46).  
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Table 46. Gender Differences in Job Application Strategy for Hourly Jobs 
Dependent Variable: Bid or Not 
Sample Matched sample Matched sample Matched sample Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(passed_days) -0.016*** (0.001) -0.019*** (0.001) -0.019*** (0.001) -0.017*** (0.001) 
Log(passed_days)* 
female 
  0.006*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.002) 
Log(budget) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000* (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Log(budget)* 
female 
-0.001** (0.000)   -0.001* (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) 
Employer_norating 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Log(employer_review) 0.001** (0.000) 0.001** (0.000) 0.001** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
Employer_rating 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) 
Log(auction_duration) 0.021*** (0.003) 0.021*** (0.003) 0.021*** (0.003) 0.016*** (0.002) 
Log(title_length) -0.002* (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) -0.001*** (0.001) 
Log(desc_length) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001** (0.000) 
Log(skills_count) 0.003** (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Featured_job -0.021*** (0.007) -0.020*** (0.007) -0.02*** (0.007) -0.006 (0.004) 
Consideration set FE yes yes yes yes 
Employer country 
dummy 
yes yes yes yes 
Observations 42,545 42,545 42,545 150,706 
R-squared 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.281 
Adjusted R-squared 0.097 0.098 0.098 0.080 
Residual Std. Error 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.064 
Notes: a) Robust standard errors clustered by the consideration set of each bid decision are reported in 
parentheses; b) The “NDA” dummy is omitted because of the lack of variation. Among all the hourly 
jobs in the matched workers’ consideration set, all jobs do not require NDA. c)Because we control for 
the fixed effect of the consideration set of each bid, the worker’s fixed effect is omitted. d) The 
dependent variable, “bid”, the dummy denoting whether the worker chose to bid for the job or not) is 
relatively small (its mean is 0.005). As such, even the magnitude of the coefficient is small, its marginal 
effect measured with percentage change can be large. e)* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Moreover, instead of merely inferring the workers’ genders based on their profile 
images, we predict each worker’s gender based on his/her first names by taking 
advantage of the Facebook profile name database (Tang et al. 2013; Chan and Wang 
2017). Following the previous literature (Chan and Wang 2017), we limit to those first 
names with a gender probability higher or equal to 95%, based on which we can reliably 
infer the worker’s gender. Further, we rerun all the models with the sample of those 
workers whose genders can be consistently predicted with both profile images and first 
names. As Table 47 shows, the results are highly consistent with our main finding.  
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Table 47. Gender Differences in Avoidance of Monitoring 
Dependent Variable: Bid or Not 
Sample Full sample Female, matched jobs Matched sample 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Hourly 0.006*** (0.003) 0.005** (0.003) -0.005** (0.003) 
After*hourly -0.006*** (0.003) -0.005** (0.003) 0.006*** (0.003) 
Hourly*female     0.011*** (0.004) 
After*hourly*female     -0.013*** (0.004) 
Employer_norating 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
Log(employer_review) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Employer_rating 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 
Log(budget) 0.000* (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Log(title_length) -0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001** (0.001) 
Log(desc_length) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Log(skills_count) -0.002** (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Featured_job -0.016*** (0.007) -0.011 (0.005) -0.011* (0.004) 
NDA -0.025*** (0.017) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 
Log(remain_days) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 
Log(auction_duration) -0.007*** (0.002) -0.004* (0.002) -0.01*** (0.002) 
Consideration set FE yes yes yes 
Employer country 
dummy 
yes yes yes 
Observations 47,041 32,064 70,000 
R-squared 0.088 0.130 0.119 
Adjusted R-squared 0.029 0.049 0.046 
Residual Std. Error 0.058 0.054 0.064 
Notes: a) Model 1 is estimated based on all the hourly and fixed-price job choices made by all the 
female workers; Model 2 is estimated based on the matched hourly and fixed-price job choices made by 
the matched female workers; Model 3 is estimated based on the matched hourly and fixed-price job 
choices made by the matched female and male workers; b) Robust standard errors clustered by the 
consideration set of each bid decision are reported in parentheses; c) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
3.7.2 Alternative Specification 
To further evaluate the credibility of our result, we also try to check our result is still 
consistent if we adopt an alternative specification. For one thing, we explore gender 
differences in job application strategy by controlling the bidder-day pair-specific fixed 
effects instead of the consideration set fixed effects. We still find highly consistent 
results. The result in Table 48 suggests that females show a stronger avoidance of 
monitoring.  
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Table 48. Gender Differences in Avoidance of Monitoring 
Dependent Variable: Bid or Not 
Sample Full sample 
Female, matched 
jobs 
Matched sample 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Hourly 0.002* (0.002) 0.003* (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 
After*hourly -0.003* (0.002) -0.003* (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
Hourly*female     0.006** (0.003) 
After*hourly*female     -0.005** (0.003) 
Employer_norating 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
Log(employer_review) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Employer_rating 0.001** (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 
Log(budget) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
Log(title_length) -0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001* (0.001) 
Log(desc_length) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 
Log(skills_count) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Featured_job -0.011*** (0.004) -0.01* (0.004) -0.014*** (0.003) 
NDA -0.020*** (0.009) omitted omitted 
Log(remain_days) 0.008*** (0.000) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.000) 
Log(auction_duration) -0.009*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.001) 
Bidder-day pair FE yes yes yes 
Employer country 
dummy 
yes yes yes 
Observations 105,479 52,221 101,420 
R-squared 0.082 0.175 0.143 
Adjusted R-squared 0.036 0.095 0.063 
Residual Std. Error 0.064 0.057 0.065 
Notes: a) Model 1 is estimated based on all the hourly and fixed-price job choices made by all the 
female workers; Model 2 is estimated based on the matched hourly and fixed-price job choices made by 
the matched female workers; Model 3 is estimated based on the matched hourly and fixed-price job 
choices made by the matched female and male workers; b) Robust standard errors clustered by the 
consideration set of each bid decision are reported in parentheses; c) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
For another, we also use another model, i.e., the probit model to estimate the gender 
difference in WTP for the avoidance of monitoring. As Table 49 suggests, the gender 
difference in WTP for the avoidance of monitoring is still $0.503 and significantly larger 
than zero based on the bootstrapped standard errors, which is highly consistent with our 
main result. 
Table 49. Gender Differences in WTP for Avoidance of Monitoring Estimated with 
Probit  
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Willingness to pay for the avoidance of monitoring 
 female male difference 
Mean (𝜇) $ 1.773 (0.143) $ 1.283 (0.213) $0.503 (0.257) 
SD (𝜎)  $ 1.208 (0.173) $ 0.828 (0.312)  
Note: Standard errors are calculated based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 
 
3.7.3 Parallel Trends Assumption 
We further test the parallel trend assumption between the matched female and male 
sample using the approach proposed by Autor (2003). Specifically, we estimate the time-
varying change in females’ avoidance of hourly jobs with the matched males as the 
counterfactual based on the following equation: 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡_𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑜𝑛_𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑗 +
𝛽3𝛿𝑡 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 × 𝛿𝑡 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑗 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠(𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑗) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑗        (12)     
where 𝛿𝑡 represents a vector of time dummies and {𝛽4} denotes the matrix of relative 
time parameters of females’ avoidance of hourly jobs estimated at time 𝑡. Given that the 
monitoring system was implemented on February 5th, 2014, we use the month prior to the 
policy change (January 2014) as the baseline (Autor 2003). We find that all the relative 
time coefficients are not significant prior to the introduction of the monitoring system and 
roughly half of the relative time coefficients are significantly negative after the 
introduction. This implies that the pre-existing treatment trend is not an issue in our 
study, which lends support to the causality of our findings. 
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Figure 12. Coefficients of the Monthly DID Estimates of the Treatment Effect  
Note: The dash vertical line denotes when Freelancer first implemented the monitoring system (February 
2014).  
3.7.4 Alternative Matching 
To further alleviate the concern of incomparability between fixed-price jobs and 
hourly jobs, we employ alternative matching methods, including Coarsened Exact 
Matching (CEM) (Iacus et al. 2012; Blackwell et al. 2009) and the propensity score 
matching with five nearest neighbors, to match males with females, and fixed-price jobs 
with hourly jobs. In Table 50, we summarize the result based on the matched sample with 
the CEM approach, which is highly consistent with our main result. 
Table 50. Gender Differences in Avoidance of Monitoring 
Dependent variable: whether the worker chose to bid for the job or not 
Sample Full sample Female, matched jobs Matched sample 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Hourly 0.003** (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 
After*hourly -0.003** (0.002) -0.004*** (0.002) 0.003* (0.002) 
Hourly*female     0.008*** (0.003) 
After*hourly*female     -0.009*** (0.003) 
Employer_norating 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Log(employer_review) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Employer_rating 0.001** (0.000) 0.002** (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 
log(budget) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
Log(title_length) -0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Log(desc_length) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
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Log(skills_count) -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
Featured_job -0.011*** (0.004) -0.008* (0.003) -0.010* (0.003) 
NDA -0.020*** (0.006) -0.005 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) 
Log(remain_days) 0.008*** (0.000) 0.008*** (0.000) 0.008*** (0.000) 
Log(auction_duration) -0.009*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.002) -0.010*** (0.001) 
Consideration set FE yes yes yes 
Employer country 
dummy 
yes yes yes 
Observations 105,479 71,825 90,139 
R-squared 0.089 0.129 0.117 
Adjusted R-squared 0.035 0.054 0.045 
Residual Std. Error 0.064 0.062 0.064 
Notes: a) Model 1 is estimated based on all the hourly and fixed-price job choices made by all the 
female workers; Model 2 is estimated based on the matched hourly and fixed-price job choices made by 
the matched female workers; Model 3 is estimated based on the matched hourly and fixed-price job 
choices made by the matched female and male workers; b) Robust standard errors clustered by the 
consideration set of each bid decision are reported in parentheses; c) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Overall, all the robustness checks lend support to our finding that females tend to bid 
later, prefer jobs with lower wage budget, and have a higher WTP for the avoidance of 
monitoring than males. 
3.8. Discussion 
In this paper, we explore whether there is a gender wage gap in the gig economy and 
examine whether there are gender differences in job application strategy which could 
account for the persistent gender wage gap. First, we show that females can only earn 
around 81.4% of the hourly wage of their male counterparts. Second, we find that 
females tend to bid later and prefer jobs with a smaller hourly wage budget based on both 
the model-free evidence and the empirical results of the linear probability model with the 
consideration set fixed-effect. We further find that the observed gender difference in bid 
timing can lead to a decrease of 7.58% in hourly wage, which could roughly account for 
40.75% of the gender wage gap (i.e. 18.6%) observed by us. Third, we examine the 
gender difference in avoidance of monitoring with a quasi-natural experiment and a field 
  155 
experiment. We find that females are less willing to bid for hourly jobs than males and 
tend to have a higher willingness to pay for the avoidance of monitoring. The gender 
difference in WTP for the avoidance of monitoring can explain roughly 8.13% of the 
hourly wage, which is equivalent to 43.71% of the observed gender wage gap. On the 
whole, our study underscores the important impact of gender differences in job 
application strategy on the gender wage gap. 
Our paper contributes to several streams of literature. First, our paper contributes to 
several streams of literature. First, our study adds to the literature on gender wage gap 
and highlights new explanatory factors for the gender wage gap other than gender 
discrimination, i.e. gender differences in bid timing, job selection, and avoidance of 
monitoring. The existing literature mainly focusing on the traditional employment 
relationship suggests that discrimination, WTP for flexibility (Mas and Pallais 2017), 
motherhood penalty and career choices (Blau and Kahn 2017) could help to explain the 
gender wage gap. On top of that, some scholars predict that the gig economy is an 
emerging labor market design which helps to narrow the gender wage gap owing to the 
flexibility and remoteness of its on-demand employment relationship (Goldin and Rouse 
2000; Goldin 2014). In contrast, a recent study on the gig economy suggests that the 
gender wage gap still exists. Using a large-scale dataset from a gig economy platform 
which provides offline car-hailing service (i.e. Uber), Cook et al. (2018) find that, gender 
differences in experience and willingness to work extra hours when the hourly wage is 
high, mainly explain the gender wage gap. However, given that workers tend to have 
limited freedom to choose jobs in the car-hailing platform, the existence and potential 
impact of gender differences in job application strategy is hitherto little explored in their 
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study. Given that the freedom of choosing jobs based on preference is such a common 
primary feature shared by most gig economy platforms, our study focuses on potential 
gender differences in job application strategy and points out that gender differences in bid 
timing, job selection, and WTP for the avoidance of monitoring help to explain the 
gender wage gap in gig-economy. 
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the online labor market by 
providing a framework to recover workers’ consideration sets and underscores the 
importance of workers’ job preference. Though employers’ preference of workers has 
been recently explored (Chan and Wang 2017; Hong and Pavlou 2017), there is little 
research exploring the preference from the supply side (i.e. workers’ preference for jobs). 
We extend this prior work by taking advantage of a comprehensive dataset and the 
platform policy to recover workers’ consideration sets. We further demonstrate gender 
differences in job application strategy from three aspects, including bid timing, job 
budget preference and avoidance of monitoring. Our study advances the previous 
literature on online labor markets by documenting gender differences in job application 
strategy, which has strong academic and managerial implications for the online labor 
market.  
Lastly, our study also expands the literature on compensation differential. Prior 
studies have found compensation differential in several non-wage job amenities in 
traditional employment relationship (Bonhomme and Jolivet 2009), such as flexibility 
(Mas and Pallais 2017), unemployment benefits (Hall and Mueller 2015), and non-wage 
job value (Sorkin 2017). Given that online monitoring is prevalent in most online labor 
markets, we focus on potential compensation differential in avoidance of monitoring, a 
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non-wage aspect which has hardly been explored in the previous compensation 
differential literature. Taking the introduction of the monitoring system as an exogenous 
shock, we find that females are less willing to bid for jobs with monitoring, compared to 
males. We further conduct a field experiment on AMT to explicitly estimate gender 
differences in WTP for the avoidance of monitoring. Our finding suggests that gender 
differences in WTP for the avoidance of monitoring are likely to persistently contribute 
to the gender wage gap. 
Meanwhile, we acknowledge several limitations of this study. For instance, we note 
that our results are limited by the IT job sample and it should be cautious to generalize 
the results to other job categories, especially those feminine-typed jobs. Further, it might 
not be appropriate to generalize the results to other offline labor markets until sufficient 
evidence is available. Last but not least, although our analysis points to a strong 
relationship between these gender difference in job preference and the gender wage gap, 
we admit that we cannot rule out all the possible unobserved factor influencing both the 
gender difference in job application strategy and the gender wage gap. We believe our 
study helps to suggest the potential ways to reduce the wage gap instead of concluding 
the drivers of the gender wage gap. 
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CONCLUSION 
My research contributes to the literature on Gig economy and IT-enabled monitoring 
on four fronts. First, most prior studies focus on the performance effect of monitoring in 
offline contexts (Duflo et al. 2012; Hubbard 2000; Ranganathan and Benson 2017), 
whereas my research focuses on the impact of an IT-enabled monitoring artifact on both 
demand-side (employer) preference and supply-side (worker) competition in online 
platforms.  
Second, my research advances the prior literature on the relationship between 
monitoring systems and reputation systems in online platforms by showing that the 
introduction of monitoring systems only reduces employers’ preference for workers with 
high effort-related reputation but not those with high capability-related reputation 
(Demiroglu and James 2010; Diamond 1991; Lin et al. 2016). Given that my study’s 
setting allows me to identify the causal effects of the introduction of the monitoring 
system on both the supply and demand sides of an online labor market, I found that IT-
enabled monitoring facilitates market competition by lowering the entry-barrier in terms 
of reputation.  
Third, my research contributes to the home bias literature, as it is among the first to 
investigate the existence of home bias in the employment setting that explored the 
mechanisms with a quasi-natural experiment. It extends the previous home bias research 
in contexts of equity or trade, which mainly focuses on decisions under ex ante 
information asymmetry, to the employment decision threatened by both ex ante and ex 
post information asymmetry.  
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Last but not least, my research also contributes to the literature on compensation 
differentials and the gender wage gap. There is an emerging literature investigating 
workers’ WTP for non-wage job amenities (Bonhomme and Jolivet 2009) and gender 
wage gap, such as flexibility (Mas and Pallais 2017), unemployment benefits (Hall and 
Mueller 2015), and non-wage job value (Sorkin 2017). My study takes advantage of both 
a quasi-natural experiment and a field experiment to show the gender difference in WTP 
for the avoidance of monitoring, a non-wage aspect which has hardly been explored in 
the compensation differential literature. 
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Table A1. Balance Check for Propensity Score Matching48 
Variable Sample 
Mean 
%bias 
% reduced 
|bias| 
T-test  
Treated Control t p>|t| 
Desc_length 
(/100) Unmatched 3.51 4.42 -20.50  
86.00 
-9.18 0.00 
 Matched 3.51 3.64 -2.90 -1.38 0.17 
Title_length Unmatched 5.67 5.58 3.10  
94.90 
1.48 0.14 
 Matched 5.67 5.67 0.20 0.06 0.95 
Software Unmatched 0.32 0.33 -1.10  
42.80 
-0.55 0.58 
 Matched 0.32 0.33 -0.70 -0.26 0.80 
Design Unmatched 0.09 0.09 -1.70  
66.20 
-0.79 0.43 
 Matched 0.09 0.09 -0.60 -0.22 0.83 
Writing Unmatched 0.15 0.12 7.70  
96.30 
3.79 0.00 
 Matched 0.15 0.14 0.30 0.11 0.91 
Marketing Unmatched 0.05 0.04 3.10  
64.50 
1.53 0.13 
 Matched 0.05 0.04 1.10 0.43 0.67 
Administrative Unmatched 0.06 0.04 11.50  
93.90 
5.89 0.00 
 Matched 0.06 0.07 -0.70 -0.25 0.81 
Translation Unmatched 0.02 0.03 -0.90  
-12.90 
-0.44 0.66 
 Matched 0.02 0.03 -1.00 -0.41 0.68 
Employer_tenure_
month 
Unmatched 30.21 30.18 0.10  
-0.80 
0.06 0.95 
Matched 30.21 30.25 -0.10 -0.05 0.96 
Employer_ 
overall_rating 
Unmatched 4.92 4.92 -0.50 
-198.5 
-0.22 0.82 
Matched 4.92 4.92 -0.90 -0.34 0.73 
Article writing Unmatched 0.11 0.06 18.30  
86.70 
9.48 0.00 
 Matched 0.11 0.12 -2.40 -0.84 0.40 
Php Unmatched 0.23 0.23 1.30  0.62 0.53 
 Matched 0.23 0.24 -1.60 -23.60 -0.62 0.54 
Article rewriting Unmatched 0.05 0.03 8.70  4.44 0.00 
 Matched 0.05 0.05 -0.70 92.10 -0.25 0.81 
Ghost writing Unmatched 0.04 0.02 9.40  
91.90 
4.87 0.00 
 Matched 0.04 0.04 -0.80 -0.26 0.79 
Video services 
 
Unmatched 0.01 0.01 -2.90  
73.60 
-1.33 0.18 
Matched 0.01 0.01 0.80 0.33 0.74 
Blog 
 
Unmatched 0.03 0.01 9.30  
84.30 
4.85 0.00 
Matched 0.03 0.03 -1.50 -0.49 0.62 
Website design Unmatched 0.15 0.13 5.90  2.87 0.00 
 Matched 0.15 0.16 -2.30 61.20 -0.86 0.39 
Technical writing Unmatched 0.04 0.02 7.90  4.04 0.00 
 Matched 0.04 0.04 -0.30 96.40 -0.10 0.92 
Cms Unmatched 0.00 0.00 -6.60  -2.75 0.01 
 Matched 0.00 0.00 -1.00 84.40 -0.64 0.52 
                                                 
48 We match fixed-price projects with time-based projects by using the Nearest Neighbor (4) matching 
method. In order to construct a more homogenous sample, we limit our sample to projects with the common 
public auction format. Therefore, those projects which require NDA contracts, are featured or sealed, are 
fulltime jobs, use a non-dollar currency, are not written in English are dropped. 
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Aftereffects Unmatched 0.00 0.01 -4.10  -1.85 0.07 
 Matched 0.00 0.00 1.10 72.00 0.57 0.57 
Shopping carts Unmatched 0.01 0.01 -0.80  -0.38 0.71 
 Matched 0.01 0.01 -0.60 21.90 -0.24 0.81 
Report writing Unmatched 0.01 0.02 -2.30  -1.10 0.27 
 Matched 0.01 0.01 1.80 20.90 0.79 0.43 
Action script Unmatched 0.00 0.00 0.90  0.43 0.67 
 Matched 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 1.00 
Adobe flash Unmatched 0.01 0.01 -0.50  -0.25 0.81 
 Matched 0.01 0.01 -0.20 60.70 -0.08 0.94 
Xml Unmatched 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.99 
 Matched 0.00 0.00 -0.50 -2461.80 -0.19 0.85 
Ajax Unmatched 0.01 0.01 1.40  0.68 0.49 
 Matched 0.01 0.01 -1.20 14.20 -0.44 0.66 
Captcha Unmatched 0.00 0.00 -0.40  0.18 0.86 
 Matched 0.00 0.00 0.90 -132.70 0.39 0.70 
Grow Unmatched 0.00 0.00 2.00  -0.91 0.36 
 Matched 0.00 0.00 0.40 78.40 0.21 0.83 
Overview Unmatched 0.00 0.01 8.10  -3.27 0.00 
 Matched 0.00 0.00 0.90 88.80 -0.73 0.47 
Solid Unmatched 0.00 0.01 2.50  -1.09 0.28 
 Matched 0.00 0.00 0.20 91.60 -0.10 0.92 
Blank Unmatched 0.00 0.01 2.90  -1.27 0.21 
 Matched 0.00 0.01 1.40 51.60 -0.63 0.53 
Voic Unmatched 0.01 0.01 1.50  -0.73 0.47 
 Matched 0.01 0.01 1.50 3.00 -0.58 0.56 
Upgrad Unmatched 0.01 0.01 3.70  -1.50 0.13 
 Matched 0.01 0.01 0.40 90.40 -0.32 0.75 
Drop Unmatched 0.01 0.02 3.60  -1.63 0.10 
 Matched 0.01 0.01 0.50 85.10 -0.23 0.82 
Load Unmatched 0.01 0.02 8.40  -3.58 0.00 
 Matched 0.01 0.01 0.80 90.40 -0.47 0.64 
Team Unmatched 0.03 0.02 3.90  1.86 0.06 
 Matched 0.03 0.02 2.50 35.20 1.00 0.32 
Valu Unmatched 0.02 0.02 3.20  -1.42 0.15 
 Matched 0.02 0.01 1.40 57.20 0.61 0.54 
Full Unmatched 0.03 0.04 3.70  -1.74 0.08 
 Matched 0.03 0.03 0.80 77.70 0.36 0.72 
Menu Unmatched 0.02 0.04 7.40  -3.20 0.00 
 Matched 0.02 0.02 0.20 97.90 0.09 0.93 
Market Unmatched 0.03 0.04 3.80  -1.67 0.10 
 Matched 0.03 0.03 0.10 97.70 0.04 0.97 
Written Unmatched 0.04 0.05 5.70  -2.62 0.01 
 Matched 0.04 0.04 1.20 79.10 -0.52 0.60 
Part Unmatched 0.04 0.05 5.60  -2.48 0.01 
 Matched 0.04 0.04 0.80 85.50 -0.37 0.71 
Field Unmatched 0.03 0.06 7.20  -3.30 0.00 
 Matched 0.03 0.03 0.20 97.90 -0.08 0.94 
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Check Unmatched 0.05 0.06 2.10  -0.98 0.33 
 Matched 0.05 0.05 0.20 92.60 0.06 0.95 
Address Unmatched 0.04 0.07 7.00  -3.08 0.00 
 Matched 0.04 0.04 0.20 97.80 -0.08 0.94 
Excel Unmatched 0.06 0.07 0.90  -0.41 0.68 
 Matched 0.06 0.06 0.40 58.60 -0.15 0.88 
Notes: (a) Results of Nearest Neighbor (4) Matching Method are presented. We also conducted robustness 
checks with other matching algorithms in the additional analysis section. The result is qualitatively 
consistent.  (b) Within the matched sample, the group means of all the month dummies are not significantly 
different between time-based projects and fixed-price projects.  
 
 
  Figure A13. Distribution of Propensity Scores for Time-based Projects and Fixed-price 
Projects 
 
  
(a) Before Matching (b) After Matching 
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In order to further test the parallel trend assumption of the DID model (Angrist and 
Pischke 2008), we employ the relative time model test to assess whether time-based 
projects and fixed-price projects have a common trend during the pre-treatment period. 
This analysis also allows us to check at what time the effects start to emerge. We specify 
the relative time model as follows: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗 + 𝛽( 𝜏𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗) + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑗 +
𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                                                                                    (A1) 
where  𝑦𝑖𝑗 represents the dependent variables of our interest, including 𝐵𝑖𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 
and 𝑃𝑐𝑡_𝑛𝑜_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗. 𝜏𝑡  represents a vector of time dummies and {𝛽} denotes the matrix 
of relative time parameters to be estimated for project 𝑗  posted by employer 𝑖  whose 
auction duration ends at time 𝑡. If there exists a pre-treatment trend, we should observe 
significant relative time parameters before the introduction of the monitoring system. 
Following Autor (2003)’s approach, we use projects whose auctions end at the week before 
the change (the last week of January 2014) as the baseline since the monitoring system 
introduction happened on February 5th, 2014. We visualize the results in Figure A2. The 
analysis shows that all the relative time parameters are insignificant prior to the 
introduction while some of the relative time parameters in these two models are significant 
after February 2014 wherein Freelancer introduced the IT-enabled monitoring system. As 
such, the result of the relative time model lends further support to the validity of the parallel 
trend assumption and also to our main findings. 
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Figure A2. Coefficients of the Weekly Dynamic Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
Note: The dash vertical line denotes the week in which Freelancer first introduced the monitoring system 
(February 2014). Error bars represent the 90% confidence intervals using clustered standard errors. 
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Given our main analyses suggesting that the introduction of the monitoring system 
reduces employers’ preference for effort-related reputation and lowers the entry barrier, 
an interesting follow-up questions of the key interest of policy makers is that what is the 
impact of this policy change on project outcomes. Especially, if project outcomes are 
worse than before, then the long-run impact of the introduction may have a negative 
impact on the growth of the platform. In fact, there is a stream of literature on the 
traditional workplace suggesting that reducing privacy can demotivate workers and 
subsequently reduce their productivity (Bernstein 2012, 2014). It is interesting to test 
whether the introduction of the monitoring system cannot influence the matching 
between employers and workers in the online labor market, but also affect the eventual 
project outcomes, which is important to the long-turn growth of the platform. Therefore, 
we employ the DID model to the same sample used in our main analysis and investigate 
the impact of monitoring on various measures of project outcomes, such as whether the 
project is completed, the completion time, and various rating measures. In particular, 
given that we do not have an accurate measurement of completion time, we use the time 
gap between the date when the awarded bid was submitted and the date when the 
employer wrote the review as the proxy measure of completion time. As Table A2 and 
Table A3 show, there is no significant change in various measures of project outcomes, 
including project completion, completion time, or any rating measures. Overall, the result 
suggests that although the entry barrier has been decreased by the introduction of the 
monitoring system, this policy change does not seem to have a negative impact on project 
outcomes.  
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Table A2. Estimation Results of the DID Models on Project Completion 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Completion 
Log_completion_ 
day 
Rating_score 
Bad_rating_ 
dummy 
Time_based -0.003*   (0.002) 1.069***(0.153) -0.026     (0.055) -0.005     (0.028) 
Time_based*After -0.003     (0.007) -0.066      (0.131) 0.020     (0.053) 0.001     (0.024) 
Log_budget_max -0.001     (0.002) 0.296***(0.042) 0.003     (0.015) -0.006     (0.007) 
Log_title_length 0.001     (0.002) -0.018     (0.083) 0.018     (0.032) -0.008     (0.016) 
Log_desc_length 0.002     (0.001) 0.078** (0.039) -0.020     (0.014) 0.016** (0.007) 
Category dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employer dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clusters(employers) 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261 
Observations 2,976 2,976 2,976 2,976 
R-squared 0.009 0.068 0.009 0.016 
Notes: (a) Robust standard errors clustered on employers are reported in parentheses. (b) The results are 
consistent if we use 1th, 5th, or 10th percentile of the chi-squared distribution of the Mahalanobis distance from 
the iterative basic set as a threshold to separate outliers from nonoutliers. (c) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table A3. Estimation Results of the DID Models on Project Ratings 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
Communication 
Expertise Hire_again 
Quality Professionalism 
Time_based -0.043   (0.060) -0.014   (0.054) -0.000   (0.061) 0.006    (0.055) 0.002   (0.052) 
Time_based*After 0.014   (0.050) -0.032   (0.052) 0.006   (0.061) -0.015    (0.050) -0.026   (0.052) 
Log_budget_max 0.004   (0.014) 0.006   (0.013) 0.020   (0.016) 0.013    (0.012) 0.008   (0.014) 
Log_title_length 0.016   (0.031) 0.001   (0.032) 0.027   (0.037) -0.007    (0.034) 0.019   (0.031) 
Log_desc_length -0.020   (0.013) -0.020   (0.014) -0.023   (0.016) -0.031**(0.014) -0.018   (0.013) 
Category dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employer 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clusters(employer
s) 
1,259 
1,259 1,259 1,259 1,259 
Observations 2,970 2,970 2,970 2,970 2,970 
R-squared 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.018 0.013 
Notes: (a) Robust standard errors clustered on employers are reported in parentheses. (b) The results are 
consistent if we use 1th, 5th, or 10th percentile of the chi-squared distribution of the Mahalanobis distance 
from the iterative basic set as a threshold to separate outliers from nonoutliers. (c) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
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To show the robustness our findings, we rerun the model with a shorter observational 
window (six months before and after) to see if we still find a similar treatment effect for 
the introduction of monitoring systems. As Table A4 shows, we find that employers are 
subject to home bias and that their home bias decreases significantly after the monitoring 
system introduction, based on both the full sample panel and the matched sample panel 
during a shorter observational window. 
Table A4. Estimation Results Based on a Different Observational Windows 
Sample 
Full sample 
(Six months before and after) 
Matched sample 
(Six months before and after) 
Model Logit LPM Logit LPM 
 DV: whether the bidder is awarded 
Homecountry 0.279*** (0.101) 0.021** (0.009) 0.351* (0.181) 0.051** (0.023) 
Time-
basedHomecountry 
0.773*** (0.237) 0.094*** (0.026) 0.647** (0.300) 0.067* (0.036) 
AfterHomecountry -0.007 (0.121) 0.006 (0.011) -0.098 (0.217) -0.011 (0.030) 
Time-basedAfter 
Homecountry 
-0.857** (0.357) -0.112*** (0.041) -0.922** (0.451) -0.123** (0.055) 
Same language 0.406*** (0.041) 0.016*** (0.002) 0.440*** (0.071) 0.028*** (0.005) 
Same currency 0.057*       (0.033) 0.005*** (0.002) 0.067 (0.055) 0.007 (0.005) 
Same time zone 0.249*** (0.088) 0.025*** (0.008) 0.523*** (0.145) 0.075*** (0.019) 
Log bid price -1.862*** (0.028) -0.105*** (0.002) -2.013*** (0.051) -0.161*** (0.004) 
Log milestone 
percentage 
-0.058*** (0.022) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.136*** (0.037) -0.011*** (0.003) 
Log count rating 0.091*** (0.011) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.100*** (0.018) 0.008*** (0.002) 
Log avg rating 0.077*** (0.014) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.049** (0.023) 0.002 (0.002) 
Log bid order rank -0.350*** (0.020) -0.020*** (0.001) -0.328*** (0.037) -0.028*** (0.003) 
Preferred freelancer 0.508*** (0.027) 0.031*** (0.002) 0.469*** (0.047) 0.045*** (0.005) 
Bidder country 
dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 155,471 155,471 35,110 35,110 
R-squared 0.488 0.049 0.488 0.079 
LogLik -20,815  -6,225  
AIC 41,704  12,524  
BIC 42,072  12,837  
Number of projects 10,925 10,925 4,003 4,003 
Notes: a) All bids which submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer 
are dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is 
not included in our model because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly 
consistent if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly 
consistent if we control for the country-month two-way fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels 
of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results are highly consistent if we limit our 
sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-
type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). The results are highly consistent if we include the original bid price 
instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors clustered by projects are 
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reported in parentheses; e) R-squared in the logit model is calculated based on the maximum likelihood 
R-squared; f)* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Further, to reduce the potential difference between the labor supply for time-based and 
fixed-price projects, we reexamine our DID estimate by limiting our sample to those bids 
which are submitted by workers bidding on both fixed-price and time-based projects (dual-
type workers). This sampling approach helps ensure that workers are comparable and 
similar between the treatment group and the control group. Again, the results of the 
restricted sample are still highly consistent with our main findings.  
Table A5. Estimation of Employers’ Home Bias Based on Dual-type Workers 
Sample Dual-type sample 
Model Logit LPM 
 DV: whether the bidder is awarded 
Homecountry 0.387***(0.054) 0.036***(0.005) 
Same language 0.407***(0.029) 0.019***(0.001) 
Same currency 0.051**   (0.023) 0.004***(0.001) 
Same time zone 0.240***(0.065) 0.025***(0.006) 
Log bid price -1.779***(0.020) -0.101***(0.001) 
Log milestone percentage -0.096***(0.017) -0.006***(0.001) 
Log count rating 0.085***(0.008) 0.005***(0.000) 
Log avg rating 0.112***(0.010) 0.004***(0.001) 
Log_bid_order_rank -0.307***(0.015) -0.017***(0.001) 
Preferred freelancer 0.476***(0.019) 0.028***(0.001) 
Country dummy Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 297,724 297,724 
R-squared 0.472 0.047 
LogLik -40,433  
AIC 80,935  
BIC 81,295  
Number of projects 21,129 21,129 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the 
employer are dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) 
Log (bidder tenure) is not included into our model because it is highly correlated with log 
(count rating). The results are highly consistent if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of 
Log (count rating). c) The results are highly consistent if we limit our sample to bids submitted 
by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-type 
workers”) (Lin et al. 2016).  The results are highly consistent if we include the original bid 
price instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors clustered 
by projects are reported in parentheses; e) R-squared in the logit model is calculated based on 
the maximum likelihood R-squared; f) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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  Table A6. DID Estimation Results Based on Dual-type Workers 
Sample Full sample Matched sample 
Model Logit LPM Logit LPM 
DV: whether the bidder is awarded 
Homecountry 0.254***(0.091) 0.024***(0.009) 0.446***(0.162) 0.071***(0.024) 
Time-based 
Homecountry 
0.773***(0.185) 0.094***(0.023) 0.625***(0.241) 0.064*    (0.034) 
AfterHomecountry 0.174*    (0.101) 0.020*    (0.010) 0.009     (0.183) -0.001      (0.027) 
Time-based After 
Homecountry 
-1.212***(0.245) -0.140***(0.028) -1.080***(0.312) -0.134***(0.042) 
Same language 0.428***(0.029) 0.020***(0.001) 0.397***(0.048) 0.031***(0.004) 
Same currency 0.046*    (0.023) 0.004***(0.001) 0.072*    (0.038) 0.007**  (0.004) 
Same time zone 0.239***(0.067) 0.026***(0.006) 0.386***(0.104) 0.054***(0.013) 
Log bid price -1.783***(0.020) -0.105***(0.001) -1.865***(0.035) -0.158***(0.003) 
Log milestone 
percentage 
-0.094***(0.017) -0.006***(0.001) -0.238***(0.028) -0.020***(0.002) 
Log count rating 0.082***(0.008) 0.005***(0.000) 0.082***(0.013) 0.007***(0.001) 
Log avg rating 0.063***(0.011) 0.002***(0.001) 0.037**(0.017) 0.001      (0.001) 
Log_bid_order_rank -0.305***(0.015) -0.017***(0.001) -0.312***(0.026) -0.026***(0.002) 
Preferred freelancer 0.473***(0.019) 0.028***(0.001) 0.439***(0.033) 0.042***(0.004) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 285,187 285,187 67,553 67,553 
R-squared 0.451 0.047 0.448 0.075 
Number of projects 20,786 20,786 7,857 7,857 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are 
dropped. Moreover, our sample is only limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is 
not included into our model because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly 
consistent if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly 
consistent if we limit our sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based 
projects (named as “dual-type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). The results are highly consistent if we include 
the original bid price instead of the log-transformed bid price to the model. d) Robust standard errors 
clustered by projects are reported in parentheses; e) R-squared in the logit model is calculated based on 
the maximum likelihood R-squared; f)* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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We further employ the PSM method to regenerate a comparable sample. We find that 
after the matching, the related covariates are not significantly different between the two 
groups (Table A7). The results of our DID estimate based on the matched sample are still 
highly consistent with our main findings. 
Table A7. Balance Check for Propensity Score Matching49 
Variable Sample 
Mean 
%bias 
% reduced 
|bias| 
t-test  
Treated Control t p>|t| 
Project desc 
length 
Unmatched 66.322 89.535 -28.400 
91.500 
-13.710 0.000 
 Matched 66.322 68.302 -2.400 -1.130 0.260 
Paid amount Unmatched 209.030 183.670 3.600 
65.700 
2.880 0.004 
 Matched 209.030 217.750 -1.200 -0.390 0.697 
Title length Unmatched 5.921 5.852 2.200 
27.000 
1.180 0.238 
 Matched 5.921 5.971 -1.600 -0.620 0.536 
Employer tenure 
month 
Unmatched 24.618 29.153 -15.300 
94.200 
-7.710 0.000 
Matched 24.618 24.356 0.900 0.370 0.710 
Bid count Unmatched 14.400 17.732 -21.500 
98.400 
-10.620 0.000 
 Matched 14.400 14.455 -0.400 -0.160 0.875 
Median bid ratio Unmatched 0.772 0.804 -6.100 
99.000 
-2.590 0.010 
 Matched 0.772 0.772 0.100 0.030 0.973 
Employer 
overall rating 
Unmatched 4.906 4.926 -4.700 
80.900 
-2.720 0.006 
Matched 4.906 4.902 0.900 0.320 0.750 
Notes: a) Results of Nearest Neighbor (1) Matching Method are presented. b) Within the matched 
sample, the group means of all the month dummies are not significantly different between time-based 
projects and fixed-price projects. Balance checks of all the month dummies are omitted for brevity. 
 
Table A8. Estimation Results of Linear Probability Model and Conditional Logit Model 
Sample 
Full sample Matched sample 
Model Logit LPM Logit LPM 
Homecountry 0.219*** (0.076) 0.016*** (0.006) -0.138 (0.246) -0.008 (0.019) 
Time-
basedHomecountry  
0.759*** (0.175) 0.089*** (0.020) 1.144*** (0.288) 0.116*** (0.027) 
AfterHomecountry 0.223*** (0.083) 0.020*** (0.007) 0.705** (0.292) 0.064** (0.026) 
Time-basedAfter 
Homecountry 
-1.116*** (0.232) -0.119*** (0.025) -1.599*** (0.374) -0.162*** (0.036) 
                                                 
49 We match fixed-price projects with time-based projects by using the Nearest Neighbor (1) matching 
method. In order to reduce the potential effect of various auction types, we limit our sample to projects with 
the common public auction format and exclude projects which require NDA contracts, are featured or sealed, 
etc. 
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Same language 0.415*** (0.026) 0.018*** (0.001) 0.530*** (0.070) 0.026*** (0.003) 
Same currency 0.063*** (0.021) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.015 (0.054) -0.000 (0.004) 
Same time zone 0.250*** (0.057) 0.025*** (0.005) 0.263* (0.134) 0.030** (0.013) 
Log bid price -1.736*** (0.018) -0.090*** (0.001) -1.374*** (0.049) -0.087*** (0.003) 
Log milestone 
percentage 
-0.066*** (0.016) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.378*** (0.032) -0.024*** (0.002) 
Log review count 0.096*** (0.007) 0.005*** (0.000) 0.123*** (0.018) 0.008*** (0.001) 
Log avg rating 0.103*** (0.009) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.082*** (0.023) 0.002 (0.001) 
Log bid order rank -0.313*** (0.014) -0.016*** (0.001) -0.197*** (0.035) -0.011*** (0.002) 
Preferred freelancer 0.471*** (0.018) 0.026*** (0.001) 0.636*** (0.046) 0.046*** (0.004) 
Bidder country 
dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 371,968 371,968 46,655 46,655 
R-squared 0.489 0.047 0.431 0.075 
LogLik -47,545  -6,845  
AIC 95,163  13,764  
BIC 95,564  14,087  
Number of projects 23,943 23,943 3,563 3,563 
Notes: a) The results are estimated based on the matched sample with the CEM approach. The results 
are highly consistent if we estimate the model based on the full sample. b) All bids submitted by workers 
having prior collaboration experience with the employer are dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited 
to projects with only one winner. c) Log(bidder tenure) is not included in our model because it is highly 
correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly consistent if we include Log(bidder tenure) 
instead of Log(count rating). d) The results are highly consistent if we control for the country-month 
two-way fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow 
countrymen. The results are highly consistent if we limit our sample to bids submitted by workers who 
bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as “dual-type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). The 
results are highly consistent if we include the original bid price instead of the log-transformed bid price 
in the model. e) Robust standard errors clustered by projects are reported in parentheses. f) R-squared 
in the logit model is calculated based on the maximum likelihood R-squared. g) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
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Next, we explore the robustness of our DID estimate by adding more time-varying or 
project-specific controls. Specifically, we control for potential time-varying variations in 
levels of competitiveness and “market tightness” from each worker’s fellow countrymen 
(e.g. the number of bidders from the same country and the average rating of bidders from 
the same country who bid on the specific project). Second, we add the country-month two-
way fixed effect as the control for the country-specific time trend on the supply side. Tables 
A9 and A10 summarize the results of these two robustness checks, respectively. Overall, 
the results are consistent with our main findings. 
Table A9. Estimation Results of Linear Probability Model and Conditional Logit Model 
Sample Full sample Matched sample 
Model Logit LPM Logit LPM 
Homecountry 0.226*** (0.076) 0.015** (0.006) 0.314** (0.138) 0.040** (0.016) 
Time-
basedHomecountry 
0.743*** (0.174) 0.088*** (0.020) 0.694*** (0.222) 0.080*** (0.027) 
AfterHomecountry 0.218*** (0.083) 0.019*** (0.007) 0.174 (0.151) 0.016 (0.018) 
Time-basedAfter 
Homecountry 
-1.103*** (0.230) -0.120*** (0.025) -1.071*** (0.286) -0.130*** (0.034) 
Same language 0.412*** (0.026) 0.017*** (0.001) 0.383*** (0.043) 0.026*** (0.003) 
Same currency 0.065*** (0.021) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.086** (0.035) 0.008*** (0.003) 
Same time zone 0.250*** (0.057) 0.025*** (0.005) 0.402*** (0.090) 0.051*** (0.010) 
Log bid price -1.735*** (0.018) -0.090*** (0.001) -1.849*** (0.032) -0.139*** (0.002) 
Log milestone 
percentage 
-0.067*** (0.016) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.200*** (0.026) -0.016*** (0.002) 
Log count rating 0.097*** (0.007) 0.005*** (0.000) 0.092*** (0.012) 0.007*** (0.001) 
Log avg rating 0.102*** (0.010) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.065*** (0.015) 0.000 (0.001) 
Log bid order rank -0.312*** (0.013) -0.016*** (0.001) -0.330*** (0.024) -0.025*** (0.002) 
Preferred freelancer 0.474*** (0.018) 0.026*** (0.001) 0.456*** (0.032) 0.041*** (0.003) 
Log avg country 
rating 
0.001 (0.011) 0.009*** (0.001) 0.043** (0.017) 0.012*** (0.001) 
Log country bidder -0.093*** (0.015) -0.002 (0.001) -0.129*** (0.027) -0.008*** (0.002) 
Bidder country 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 371,968 371,968 86,840 86,840 
R-squared 0.490 0.045 0.487 0.072 
LogLik -47,526  -14,809  
AIC 95,129  29,696  
BIC 95,551  30,061  
Number of projects  23,943 23,943 9,028 9,028 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are 
dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is not 
included in our model because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly 
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consistent if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly 
consistent if we control for the country-month two-way fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels 
of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results are highly consistent if we limit our 
sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as 
“dual-type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). The results are highly consistent if we include the original bid 
price instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors clustered by projects 
are reported in parentheses; e) R-squared in the logit model is calculated based on the maximum 
likelihood R-squared; f) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table A10. Estimation Results of Linear Probability Model and Conditional Logit Model 
Sample Full sample Matched sample 
Model Logit LPM Logit LPM 
Homecountry 0.306*** (0.084) 0.021*** (0.007) 0.377** (0.156) 0.047*** (0.017) 
Time-
basedHomecountry 
0.732*** (0.180) 0.084*** (0.020) 0.731*** (0.235) 0.076*** (0.027) 
AfterHomecountry 0.087 (0.096) 0.011 (0.008) 0.049 (0.174) 0.005 (0.019) 
Time-basedAfter 
Homecountry 
-1.043*** (0.235) -0.113*** (0.025) -1.053*** (0.299) -0.123*** (0.034) 
Same language 0.418*** (0.027) 0.017*** (0.001) 0.394*** (0.045) 0.025*** (0.003) 
Same currency 0.068*** (0.022) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.096*** (0.036) 0.009*** (0.003) 
Same time zone 0.248*** (0.057) 0.024*** (0.005) 0.417*** (0.093) 0.051*** (0.010) 
Log bid price -1.744*** (0.018) -0.090*** (0.001) -1.870*** (0.033) -0.138*** (0.002) 
Log milestone 
percentage 
-0.072*** (0.016) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.213*** (0.027) -0.016*** (0.002) 
Log count rating 0.098*** (0.007) 0.005*** (0.000) 0.093*** (0.012) 0.007*** (0.001) 
Log avg rating 0.101*** (0.010) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.064*** (0.016) 0.000 (0.001) 
Log bid order rank -0.314*** (0.014) -0.016*** (0.001) -0.338*** (0.025) -0.026*** (0.002) 
Preferred freelancer 0.477*** (0.018) 0.026*** (0.001) 0.459*** (0.032) 0.040*** (0.003) 
Log avg country 
rating 
0.005 (0.012) 0.009*** (0.001) 0.052*** (0.017) 0.012*** (0.001) 
Log country bidder -0.079*** (0.015) -0.002 (0.001) -0.107*** (0.028) -0.009*** (0.003) 
Bidder country and 
month two-way 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 371,968 371,968 86,840 86,840 
R-squared 0.270 0.048 0.522 0.082 
LogLik -51,816  -14,495  
AIC 104,806  30,146  
BIC 111,161  35,563  
Number of projects  23,943 23,943 9,028 9,028 
Notes: a) All bids submitted by workers having prior collaboration experience with the employer are 
dropped. Moreover, our sample is limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder tenure) is not 
included in our model because it is highly correlated with log (count rating). The results are highly 
consistent if we include Log (bidder tenure) instead of Log (count rating). c) The results are highly 
consistent if we control for the country-month two-way fixed effect and the potential time-varying levels 
of competitiveness from a worker’s fellow countrymen. The results are highly consistent if we limit our 
sample to bids submitted by workers who bid on both fixed-price and time-based projects (named as 
“dual-type workers”) (Lin et al. 2016). The results are highly consistent if we include the original bid 
price instead of the log-transformed bid price in the model. d) Robust standard errors clustered by projects 
are reported in parentheses; e) R-squared in the logit model is calculated based on the maximum 
likelihood R-squared; f) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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